Simulation Experiment of Key Exchange Protocol in Mobile Devices With E-Commerce Application

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 38-49
Author(s):  
Pranav Vyas ◽  
Bhushan Trivedi

In this article, the authors discuss their experiment of simulating a proposed key exchange protocol by implementing it in a sample e-commerce application on a mobile device. The article compares its performance with other protocols. The authors also implemented similar industry standard key exchange protocols among other similar protocols proposed by other researchers for comparison. The authors consider different parameters such as number of operations required for key exchange, key exchange time and battery usage. The authors also consider different network bandwidth and mobile devices in their experiment.

2012 ◽  
Vol 182-183 ◽  
pp. 2075-2079
Author(s):  
Ren Junn Hwang ◽  
Feng Fu Su ◽  
Loang Shing Huang

This paper proposes a three-party authenticated key exchange protocol using two-factor including a password and a token. The proposed protocol allows two users to establish a session key through a trusted server with whom they both share a human-memorable password and a token. Over the past years, many three-party authenticated key exchange protocols have been proposed. However, many proposed protocols use smart cards with tamper-resistance property as tokens. It is not practical by using smart cards because of the high cost and the infrastructure requirements. Therefore, the proposed paper only uses a common storage device such as a USB memory stick. We believe the proposed protocol is suitable for practical scenarios.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Janaka Alawatugoda

AbstractTypically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-term public keys and establishes secret session keys. In this paper we address the partial leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants due to various side-channel attacks. Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange protocols have been developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret values. This paper combines and extends the advances of security modelling for AKE protocols addressing more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants. Further, we fix some flaws in security proofs of previous leakage-resilient key exchange protocols.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
marwa ahmim ◽  
Ahmed Ahmim ◽  
Mohamed amine Ferrag ◽  
Nacira ghoualmi-zine ◽  
Leandros Maglaras

Abstract The use of Internet key exchange protocols in IP Security architecture and in IoT environments has vulnerabilities against various malicious attacks and affects communication efficiency. To address these weaknesses, we propose a novel efficient and secure Internet key exchange protocol (ESIKE), which achieves a high level of security along with low computational cost and energy consumption. ESIKE achieves perfect forward secrecy, anonymity, known-key security and untraceability properties. ESIKE can resist several attacks, such as, replay, DoS, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle and modification. In addition, the formal security validation using AVISPA tools confirms the superiority of ESIKE in terms of security.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junghyun Nam ◽  
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo ◽  
Minkyu Park ◽  
Juryon Paik ◽  
Dongho Won

Authenticated key exchange protocols are of fundamental importance in securing communications and are now extensively deployed for use in various real-world network applications. In this work, we reveal major previously unpublished security vulnerabilities in the password-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol according to Lee and Hwang (2010): (1) the Lee-Hwang protocol is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack and thus fails to achieve implicit key authentication; (2) the protocol cannot protect clients’ passwords against an offline dictionary attack; and (3) the indistinguishability-based security of the protocol can be easily broken even in the presence of a passive adversary. We also propose an improved password-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol that addresses the security vulnerabilities identified in the Lee-Hwang protocol.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Garber ◽  
Delaram Kahrobaei ◽  
Ha T. Lam

AbstractThe Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was implemented and studied with the braid groups as its underlying platform. The length-based attack, introduced by Hughes and Tannenbaum, has been used to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol in this setting. Eick and Kahrobaei suggest to use the polycyclic groups as a possible platform for the AAG protocol. In this paper, we apply several known variants of the length-based attack against the AAG protocol with the polycyclic group as the underlying platform. The experimental results show that, in these groups, the implemented variants of the length-based attack are unsuccessful in the case of polycyclic groups having high Hirsch length. This suggests that the length-based attack is insufficient to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol when implemented over this type of polycyclic groups. This implies that polycyclic groups could be a potential platform for some cryptosystems based on conjugacy search problem, such as non-commutative Diffie–Hellman, El Gamal and Cramer–Shoup key-exchange protocols. Moreover, we compare


2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
Mohammed A. Tawfiq ◽  
◽  
Sufyan T. Faraj Al-janabi ◽  
Abdul-Karim A. R. Kadhim ◽  
◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1805-1808
Author(s):  
Shao-feng DENG ◽  
Fan DENG ◽  
Yi-fa LI

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