Adherence

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-53
Author(s):  
Michael Möcker ◽  
Klaus Mann
Keyword(s):  
Health Policy ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Medical Advice ◽  
Libertarian Paternalism ◽  
Dynamic Inconsistency

Non-adherence to medical advice is a serious problem to patients, health policy and practitioners. This article outlines concepts of behavioral economics that might lead a patient to decide against the provider's recommendations and thus to be non-adherent. Especially the timing of pay-offs and dynamic inconsistency, their uncertainty and ambiguity aversion, loss-aversion and numerous heuristics like the peak-end-rule are discussed. The paper concludes with some hints on “libertarian” paternalism that may improve the situation.

scholarly journals The empirical relationship between nonstandard economic behaviors

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (33) ◽  
pp. 16262-16267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dean ◽  
Pietro Ortoleva
Keyword(s):  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Empirical Relationship ◽  
Endowment Effect ◽  
Behavioral Characteristics ◽  
Strong Correlations ◽  
Behavioral Economic ◽  
Economic Choice ◽  
And Gender

We study the joint distribution of 11 behavioral phenomena in a group of 190 laboratory subjects and compare it to the predictions of existing models as a step in the development of a parsimonious, general model of economic choice. We find strong correlations between most measures of risk and time preference, between compound lottery and ambiguity aversion, and between loss aversion and the endowment effect. Our results support some, but not all attempts to unify behavioral economic phenomena. Overconfidence and gender are also predictive of some behavioral characteristics.

Borgmann and the Non-Neutrality of Technology

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trine Antonsen ◽  
Erik Lundestad ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Libertarian Paternalism ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Material Environment ◽  
Contemporary Life ◽  
Basic Approaches

The paper focuses on Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. We argue in support of Borgmann’s “Churchill principle” (“we shape our buildings, and afterwards they shape us”) as presented in Real American Ethics (RAE) (2006) by comparing it to findings within behavioral economics in general and to the “libertarian paternalism” of Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler in particular. According to our interpretation of it, the Churchill principle implies that because our material environment in fact influences our choices, this environment can and should be rearranged so that we “automatically” will tend to make better decisions. Having defended the Churchill principle, we go on to discuss how this principle is related to Borgmann’s approach in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (TCCL) (1984). In this earlier work, Borgmann suggests we reform technology by making room for focal practices, that is, meaningful practices in which we develop our skills and excellences. We argue that while these two works have different basic approaches—rearranging the material environment in RAE and developing certain skills and excellences in TCCL—they can and ought to be seen, not as mutually excluding, but as supplementing one another. Together they form a highly salient critique of technology that takes into consideration questions of the good life without becoming overly paternalistic.

Economists’ Odd Stand on the Positive–Normative Distinction

2014 ◽  
pp. 199-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Value Neutrality

This chapter examines economists’ indefensible attachment to the positive–normative distinction, and suggests a behavioral economics explanation of their behavior on the subject. It traces the origins of the distinction to Hume’s guillotine and logical positivism, and argues they contributed to Robbins’ understanding of value neutrality. It connects philosophers’ rejection of logical positivism and their rejection of the positive-normative distinction, explains and modifies Putnam’s view of fact–value entanglement, and identifies four main ethical value judgments that contemporary economists employ. The behavioral explanation of economists’ denial of these value judgments emphasizes loss aversion and economists’ social identity as economists.

scholarly journals No group differences in Traditional Economics Measures of loss aversion and framing effects in bipolar I disorder

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. e0258360
Author(s):  
Zachary Anderson ◽  
Kim Fairley ◽  
Cynthia M. Villanueva ◽  
R. McKell Carter ◽  
June Gruber
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Bipolar I Disorder ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Survey Approach

Bipolar disorder (BD) is associated with impaired decision making, yet few studies have adopted paradigms from behavioral economics to decompose which, if any, aspects of decision making may be impacted. This may be particularly relevant for decision-making processes relevant to known difficulties with emotive dysfunction and corresponding reward dysregulation in BD. Participants with bipolar I disorder (BD; n = 44) and non-psychiatric healthy controls (CTL; n = 28) completed three well-validated behavioral economics decision making tasks via a remote-based survey, including loss aversion and framing effects, that examined sensitivity to probabilities and potential gains and losses in monetary and non-monetary domains. Consistent with past work, we found evidence of moderate loss aversion and framing effects across all participants. No group differences were found in any of the measures of loss aversion or framing effects. We report no group differences between bipolar and non-psychiatric groups with respect to loss aversion and framing effects using a remote-based survey approach. These results provide a framework future studies to explore similar tasks in clinical populations and suggest the context and degree to which decision making is altered in BD may be rooted in a more complex cognitive mechanism that warrants future research.

Law’s Loss Aversion

2014 ◽  
pp. 267-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Psychological Literature ◽  
The Law ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
Default Rules

Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory is probably the most influential contribution to behavioral economics, and loss aversion is the most important element of this theory: Losses loom larger than gains. This chapter surveys the effect this notion has had on legal theory. It first provides an overview of the vast psychological literature on loss aversion. It then demonstrates the contribution made by studies of loss aversion in several contexts that are of particular interest to the law, including consumer behavior and litigation and settlement. The chapter further discusses the possibility of triggering loss aversion through legal framing, focusing on two examples: default rules and burden of proof. It also suggests that there is a striking correspondence between loss aversion and basic features of the law, and offers possible explanations for this correspondence. Finally, the chapter briefly discusses some of the normative implications of loss aversion for the law.

How We Contradict Ourselves: The Case of John Cochrane—Gliding and Behavioral Economics

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
Daniel Sazhin ◽  
Matthew Morey
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Libertarian Paternalism ◽  
Pilot Error ◽  
Jel Classifications

John Cochrane, a leading economist, has consistently expressed a skeptical view toward behavioral economics and libertarian-paternalism. Specifically, he has consistently voiced his disagreement with the premise of “protecting” people from their own choices. However, in his hobby of piloting gliders, he has strongly argued that pilots will make behavioral errors. Indeed, he notes that pilots can be tempted to make unsafe decisions and has argued for specific rules to help prevent pilot error. In this article, we examine this contradiction. In doing so, it provides an interesting case study of how our beliefs in one system can be quite different in another. JEL Classifications: B31, D91, G40

scholarly journals RELATIVE CAPITALIST SYSTEMS AND FAIRNESS IN THE BALTICS: THE CASE OF LITHUANIA

Ekonomika ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maik Huettinger ◽  
Aras Zirgulis
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Price Change ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Unique Form ◽  
Economic Decision ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
Different Cultures

Abstract. This paper deals with the concept of fairness as it is applied to economic decision making in different cultures. The objective of the research is to determine whether the concept of fairness can be applied universally throughout all cultures by doing a study in Lithuania and comparing it to similar studies done in other countries. Lithuania was chosen because it belongs to the group of the Baltic advanced transition countries with their own unique form of capitalism. We find that Lithuanians are more apt to consider price or wage changes as fair as long as there is an underlying macroeconomic reasoning for the price change. These effects were found to hold true in spite of the framing effects of loss aversion found in previous studies.Key words: behavioral economics, fairness, capitalism, Baltics, Lithuania

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