A Bundle of Rights and Pachamama: Visa Kurki’s Theory of Legal Personhood

Revus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brunello Stancioli
Author(s):  
J. E Penner

Ranging over a host of issues, Property Rights: A Re-Examination pinpoints and addresses a number of theoretical problems at the heart of property theory. Part 1 reconsiders and refutes the bundle of rights picture of property and the related nominalist theories of property, showing that ownership reflects a tripartite structure of title, the right to immediate, exclusive, possession, and the power to licence what would otherwise be a trespass, and to transfer ownership. Part 2 explores in detail the Hohfeldian theory of jural relations, in particular liberties and powers and Hohfeld’s concept of ‘multital’ jural relations, and shows that this theory fails to illuminate the nature of property rights, and indeed obscures much that it is vital to understand about them. Part 3 considers the form and justification of property rights, beginning with the relation an owner’s liberty to use her property and her ‘right to exclude’, with particular reference to the tort of nuisance. Next up for consideration is the Kantian theory of property rights, the deficiencies of which lead us to understand that the only natural right to things is a form of use- or usufructory-right. Part 3 concludes by addressing the ever-vexed question of property rights in land.


Author(s):  
J. E. Penner

This chapter discusses property law. It considers the idea that property had a “nominalist” ontology, and it was in danger of “disintegration” as a working legal category for that very reason. Nominalism about property has had a significant impact in U.S. case law. The concern here, however, is whether it is a helpful stance to take as a theorist of property. The chapter argues that it is not. There are indeed “high” level abstractions about property which one cannot plausibly do without if one is to understand property rights and property law doctrine. Moreover, the “bundle of rights” (BOR) challenge does not assist one in making sense of these abstractions. The chapter then looks at the conceptual failure of BOR and the New Private Law as it relates to property. BOR is generally regarded as being underpinned by what might be called the Hohfeld-Honoré synthesis. The synthesis rests upon a fairly serious mistake, which is that while the Hohfeldian examination of jural norms is analytic if it is anything, Honor’s elaboration of the incidents making up ownership is anything but—it is functional. This means that Honoré describes the situation of the owner not principally in terms of his Hohfeldian powers, duties, and rights vis-à-vis others, but in terms of the social or economic advantages that an owner has by virtue of his position, and the terms and limitations of those advantages.


Author(s):  
Christian List

AbstractThe aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.


2021 ◽  
pp. 053901842110114
Author(s):  
Philipp Degens

This article explores the relation between ownership and sustainability on a conceptual level. It specifically examines different imaginaries of sustainable property by asking how private property rights and their restrictions are conceptualized as instruments for sustainability. To do so, conflicting notions of property that underlie Western jurisprudence and political theory are contrasted. This brings us to the identification of two major traditions in property thought that build on atomist or relational conceptions of society and property, respectively. Property might be conceived as an owner’s exclusive control over an object, or as a ‘bundle of rights’ that comprises entitlements, restrictions, and obligations to various actors. Largely within the paradigm of modernization as a trajectory of sustainability, these two fundamental traditions in property theory relate to different approaches to encode sustainability into property law: i) propertization, i.e. the extension of private property forms, as in the case of carbon emissions trading schemes; ii) the acknowledgment of social and environmental obligations inherent to property, illustrated by the social obligation norm in German law.


Author(s):  
Craig M. Kauffman

With the onset of climate change, the prospect of mass extinction, and the closing window of opportunity to take meaningful action, a growing number of activists, lawyers, scientists, policy-makers, and everyday people are calling for Rights of Nature (RoN) to be legally recognized as a way to transform human legal and governance systems to prioritize ecological sustainability. Over the past decade, RoN has gone from being a radical idea espoused only by a handful of marginalized actors to a legal strategy seriously considered in a wide variety of domestic and international policy arenas. In January 2021, at least 185 legal provisions recognizing RoN existed in 17 countries spanning five continents, and 50 more RoN laws were pending in a dozen other countries. RoN is also recognized in numerous international policy documents. After defining RoN, this chapter examines how different kinds of actors have organized in global networks to advance RoN in different policy arenas through distinct pathways. This has caused RoN to be structured and implemented differently in distinct contexts. The chapter examines this variation, comparing cases from around the world. It highlights the implications of structuring RoN as a set of unique substantive rights for ecosystems versus extending legal personhood (a set of rights designed for humans). It concludes by examining the relationship between RoN and human rights—including environmental rights, Indigenous rights, and economic rights—and the implications for reconceptualizing sustainable development to prioritize ecological sustainability.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Michelle Worthington ◽  
Peta Spender
Keyword(s):  

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