Implementing the Soil Pollution Control Law

Hideto Yoshida

doi:10.3985/wmr.14.79

Minimization of the diffuse pollution caused by dairy farms in Cyprus through the development of guidelines for their sustainable operation

Water Science & Technology ◽

10.2166/wst.2007.439 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 56 (1) ◽

pp. 89-97 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

D. Fatta ◽

M. Monou ◽

C. Voscos ◽

N. Kythreotou ◽

Ch. Stylianou

Keyword(s):

Soil Pollution ◽

Dairy Cow ◽

Pollution Control ◽

Dairy Farms ◽

Diffuse Pollution ◽

Control Law ◽

Second Stage ◽

Sustainable Operation ◽

Water And Soil Pollution

This paper summarizes the work carried out for Cyprus in respect to developing guidelines on the measures that have to be taken for the reduction of the impacts caused by the operation of dairy cow farms and in a second stage, to aid the competent authorities in permitting the dairy farms under the Water and Soil Pollution Control Law. The paper includes information on the existing situation in Cyprus in regards to: (1) the operation of the farms, the production of waste and the existing practices for the management of waste, and (2) the guidelines and measures for the reduction of waste, odours and the use of waste in order to ensure the safe and sustainable operation of the farms and the management of waste.

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Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽

10.3390/land10040389 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 389

Author(s):

Caihua Zhou

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Soil Pollution ◽

Pollution Control ◽

Local Governments ◽

Central Government ◽

Fiscal Decentralization ◽

Third Party ◽

The Third ◽

Party Control ◽

The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

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