scholarly journals Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values

10.3982/te787 ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tymofiy Mylovanov ◽  
Thomas Tröger
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Froeb ◽  
Vlad Mares ◽  
Steven Tschantz

2011 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Biran ◽  
Françoise Forges

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.


Public Choice ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 138 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 409-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Sui
Keyword(s):  

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