scholarly journals Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values

10.3982/te787 ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tymofiy Mylovanov ◽  
Thomas Tröger
Keyword(s):  
Informed Principal ◽  
Private Values

The Simple Algebra of Surplus in Open, Private Values Auctions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Froeb ◽  
Vlad Mares ◽  
Steven Tschantz
Keyword(s):  
Simple Algebra ◽  
Private Values

scholarly journals Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

2011 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Biran ◽  
Françoise Forges
Keyword(s):  
Private Values ◽  
Independent Private Values

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale

Public Choice ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 138 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 409-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Sui
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Private Values
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document