scholarly journals Robust group strategy‐proofness

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1351-1389
Author(s):  
Steven Kivinen ◽  
Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Free Disposal ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Indivisible Objects ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post stage but not to the interim stage. Thus, we propose a new notion of GSP, coined robust group strategy‐proofness (RGSP), which ensures that no group benefits by deviating from truth telling at the interim stage. We show for the provision of a public good that the Minimum Demand rule (Serizawa (1999)) satisfies RGSP when the production possibilities set satisfies a particular topological property. In the problem of allocating indivisible objects, an acyclicity condition on the priorities is both necessary and sufficient for the Deferred Acceptance rule to satisfy RGSP, but is only necessary for the Top Trading Cycles rule. For the allocation of divisible private goods among agents with single‐peaked preferences (Sprumont (1991)), only free disposal, group replacement monotonic rules within the class of sequential allotment rules satisfy RGSP.

scholarly journals Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (4) ◽  
pp. 1486-1529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Fack ◽  
Julien Grenet ◽  
Yinghua He
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Student Preferences ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Novel Approaches

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. (JEL D11, D12, D82, I23)

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
The Many ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)

scholarly journals Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Bei ◽  
Ning Chen ◽  
Guangda Huzhang ◽  
Biaoshuai Tao ◽  
Jiajun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Piecewise Constant ◽  
Cake Cutting ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
To Receive

We study envy-free cake cutting with strategic agents, where each agent may manipulate his private information in order to receive a better allocation. We focus on piecewise constant utility functions and consider two scenarios: the general setting without any restriction on the allocations and the restricted setting where each agent has to receive a connected piece. We show that no deterministic truthful envy-free mechanism exists in the connected piece scenario, and the same impossibility result for the general setting with some additional mild assumptions on the allocations. Finally, we study a large market model where the economy is replicated and demonstrate that truth-telling converges to a Nash equilibrium.

scholarly journals Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Dolors Berga-Colom ◽  
Bernardo Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Private Good ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Cross-Monotonic in Cost Sharing Mechanisms Using Ns2

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
R Ganesan ◽  
Justin Joseph ◽  
Jisha Isaac
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Game Plan ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Key Techniques ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A cost-sharing plan is an arrangement of guidelines characterizing how to distribute the cost among adjusted clients. A cost-sharing strategy is check monotonic in case it satisfies the property that everyone is in a flawless circumstance when the course of action of individuals who get the affiliation creates. CM is a property that passes on a customer's part ought to be more humble when balanced in a more imperative set. CM is an key techniques to achieve the group strategy proofness. By using the multicast plans that objective the enhanced directing, cross-monotonic cost sharing, and stabilize budget. Unsurprising degree cost recuperations is conceivable, and also apply a primal-twofold diagram to in the meantime create an organizing strategy and a cost-sharing course of action, and demonstrate that the subsequent instrument is collect framework proof and ensures off base cost recuperation against a flawless coordinating game plan.  

scholarly journals Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-58
Author(s):  
Matthias Fahn ◽  
Nicolas Klein
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Bonus Payments ◽  
The Future ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Future Value ◽  
The Relationship

We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad. Our model thus provides an alternative explanation for indirect short-run costs of downsizing. (JEL D23, D82, D86)

scholarly journals Election Interference: The Real Harm and The Only Solution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
The Real ◽  
Counter Measures ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Clinton Presidency ◽  
Social Media Platforms ◽  
Use Of Social Media ◽  
The Impact

Although politicians and intelligence analysts have criticized Russian interference in the 2016 and 2018 elections, international lawyers seem to be at a loss for how to understand the particular harm posed by this interference. In addition to the hacking of email accounts and disclosure of private information, the most salient aspect of the interference was the use of social media platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, to sow division and heighten nativist tendencies within the electorate. Strictly speaking, the goal of the 2016 interference was to delegitimize a potential Clinton presidency or to help elect Donald Trump as president. But far more important was the method used to accomplish these goals: the impersonation of American citizens during participation in the political process. This latter development points to the real harm of election interference, which has less to do with sovereignty and more to do with the collective right of self- determination. Foreign interference is a violation of the membership rules for political decision-making, i.e., the idea that only members of a polity should participate in elections—not only with regard to voting but also with regard to financial contributions and other forms of electoral participation. Outsiders are free to express their opinions but covertly representing themselves as insiders constitutes a violation of these political norms, which are constitutive of the notion of self- determination, just as much as covertly funneling foreign money to one candidate. The only solution to this form of election interference is transparency, i.e., to expose such interventions for what they are: attempts by foreigners to make political statements while pretending to be Americans. This article ends by cataloguing the mistakes of the Obama Administration in failing to expose this interference in real time—which is the only way to nullify its insidious impact. Ex post investigations, prosecutions, and counter-measures designed to deter future misbehavior are all insufficient to nullify the impact of electoral interference. However, recent efforts by the Justice Department and the FBI, including a new policy codified in the US Attorneys Manual, and contemporaneous indictments of Russians for interference in the 2018 election, suggest that some government actors finally understand that transparency is the only solution to election interference.

The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinatan Hassidim ◽  
Assaf Romm ◽  
Ran I. Shorrer
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Graduate Programs ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Positive Signal ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Field Evidence ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof

Organizations often require agents’ private information to achieve critical goals such as efficiency or revenue maximization, but frequently it is not in the agents’ best interest to reveal this information. Strategy-proof mechanisms give agents incentives to truthfully report their private information. In the context of matching markets, they eliminate agents’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences. We present direct field evidence of preference misrepresentation under the strategy-proof deferred acceptance in a high-stakes matching environment. We show that applicants to graduate programs in psychology in Israel often report that they prefer to avoid receiving funding, even though the mechanism preserves privacy and funding comes with no strings attached and constitutes a positive signal of ability. Surveys indicate that other kinds of preference misrepresentation are also prevalent. Preference misrepresentation in the field is associated with weaker applicants. Our findings have important implications for practitioners designing matching procedures and for researchers who study them. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, decision analysis.

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