scholarly journals Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1203-1235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Meyer ◽  
Inés Moreno de Barreda ◽  
Julia Nafziger
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Geometric Condition ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
Small Deviations ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Fully Revealing Equilibrium ◽  
Full Revelation

This paper studies information transmission in a two‐sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver, and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium that fully reveals the state, there exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), i.e., one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition—the local deterrence condition—that relates the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver—the min rule—that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists.

scholarly journals Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Newton
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Simple Models

AbstractThis paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze two-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given. It is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders’ preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are (i) that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver and (ii) that both senders have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are anonymous, and weakly increases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are observed.

scholarly journals QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS: PARTIAL GELFAND–SHILOV SMOOTHING EFFECT AND NULL-CONTROLLABILITY

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-53
Author(s):  
Paul Alphonse
Keyword(s):  
Euclidean Space ◽  
Quadratic Differential ◽  
Parabolic Equations ◽  
Evolution Equations ◽  
Differential Operators ◽  
Null Controllability ◽  
Geometric Condition ◽  
Positive Time ◽  
Regularizing Effects ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

We study the partial Gelfand–Shilov regularizing effect and the exponential decay for the solutions to evolution equations associated with a class of accretive non-selfadjoint quadratic operators, which fail to be globally hypoelliptic on the whole phase space. By taking advantage of the associated Gevrey regularizing effects, we study the null-controllability of parabolic equations posed on the whole Euclidean space associated with this class of possibly non-globally hypoelliptic quadratic operators. We prove that these parabolic equations are null-controllable in any positive time from thick control subsets. This thickness property is known to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the null-controllability of the heat equation posed on the whole Euclidean space. Our result shows that this geometric condition turns out to be a sufficient one for the null-controllability of a large class of quadratic differential operators.

On the solution near the critical frequency for an oscillating and translating body in or near a free surface

1993 ◽  
Vol 254 ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuming Liu ◽  
Dick K. P. Yue
Keyword(s):  
Free Surface ◽  
Closed Form Solution ◽  
Geometric Interpretation ◽  
Form Solution ◽  
The Body ◽  
Geometric Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Gravitational Acceleration ◽  
Submerged Body ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

We consider a floating or submerged body in deep water translating parallel to the undisturbed free surface with a steady velocity U while undergoing small oscillations at frequency ω. It is known that for a single source, the solution becomes singular at the resonant frequency given by τ ≡ Uω/g=¼, where g is the gravitational acceleration. In this paper, we show that for a general body, a finite solution exists as τ → ¼ if and only if a certain geometric condition (which depends only on the frequency ω but not on U) is satisfied. For a submerged body, a necessary and sufficient condition is that the body must have non-zero volume. For a surface-piercing body, a sufficient condition is derived which has a geometric interpretation similar to that of John (1950). As an illustration, we provide an analytic (closed-form) solution for the case of a submerged circular cylinder oscillating near τ = ¼. Finally, we identify the underlying difficulties of existing approximate theories and numerical computations near τ = ¼, and offer a simple remedy for the latter.

scholarly journals MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRÉDÉRIC KOESSLER ◽  
FRANÇOISE FORGES
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission ◽  
Bounded Number

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.

scholarly journals The loser's curse in the search for advice

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 1015-1061
Author(s):  
Pak Hung Au
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Information Transmission ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Search Cost ◽  
Quality Of Information ◽  
Multiple Experts ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

An agent searches sequentially for advice from multiple experts concerning the payoff of taking an operation. After incurring a positive search cost, the agent can consult an expert whose interest is partially aligned with him. There are infinitely many experts, each has access to an identically and conditionally independent signal structure about the payoff, and each makes a recommendation after observing the signal realization. We find that the experts face a loser's curse, which could hamper the quality of information transmission. This effect is illustrated by studying the limit of equilibria with vanishing search cost. The main findings are as follows. First, there are signal structures with which both the agent's payoff and social welfare are strictly lower than the alternative scenario in which the agent commits to consulting a single expert only. Second, under some signal structures, no information can be transmitted in equilibrium, even though informative recommendation is possible if the agent could commit to a single expert. Finally, we identify the necessary and sufficient condition that ensures perfect information aggregation in the limit.

scholarly journals KEWENANGAN PEMERINTAH DALAM PEMBENTUKAN PERATURAN KEBIJAKAN

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ni Luh Gede Astariyani
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Public Law ◽  
State Agency ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
The Public ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
Intended Use ◽  
The Welfare State

Shifting the notion countries formal law into state law meteriil (wefare staat) within the meaning of the welfare state agency or official  Administrative often take a variety of specific policy measures, among others, creating what is commonly called policy rule(beleidsregel). Such products can not be separated from the association Freies  ermessen. In order setting is a rule or rules of conduct set that regulation (Regeling) can be found in the legislation (Algemeen verbindende voorschriften) internal rules that apply to the (interne regelingen) and policy (beleidrege). Establishing the policy rule (beleidsregel) is located on the beoordelingsruimte (space considerations) given by the legislators to officials or governing bodies to take action on its own initiative public law that is setting, determination and positive action to resolve the problem- governance problems faced. Freis ermessen only intended use in the public interest. Freis ernessen implementation should be morally accountable to God Almighty, uphold the dignity and the degree of human dignity and the values ??of truth and justice, promoting unity and oneness, for the sake of joint / public interest. Tests on policy rule is more geared to doelmatigheid guided by the general principles of good governance

On the Tension between Full Revelation and Earnings Management: A Reconsiderastion of the Revelation Principle

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 273-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tavy Ronen ◽  
Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Revelation Principle ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Partial Suppression ◽  
Fully Revealing Equilibrium ◽  
Undominated Equilibrium ◽  
Full Revelation

We challenge the popular view that because of the revelation principle, the research on earnings management must be restricted only to situations in which a truth-telling, fully revealing equilibrium/i> does not exist. After presenting and discussing the revelation principle, we state conditions under which truth-telling equilibria may be dominated by equilibria wherein the message (such as earnings) is managed. The optimal message in an undominated equilibrium may involve either partial suppression of information (omission of some data) or aggregation (summarization of data).

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