scholarly journals Testing Models of Social Learning on Networks: Evidence From Two Experiments

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arun G. Chandrasekhar ◽  
Horacio Larreguy ◽  
Juan Pablo Xandri

We theoretically and empirically study an incomplete information model of social learning. Agents initially guess the binary state of the world after observing a private signal. In subsequent rounds, agents observe their network neighbors' previous guesses before guessing again. Agents are drawn from a mixture of learning types—Bayesian, who face incomplete information about others' types, and DeGroot, who average their neighbors' previous period guesses and follow the majority. We study (1) learning features of both types of agents in our incomplete information model; (2) what network structures lead to failures of asymptotic learning; (3) whether realistic networks exhibit such structures. We conducted lab experiments with 665 subjects in Indian villages and 350 students from ITAM in Mexico. We perform a reduced‐form analysis and then structurally estimate the mixing parameter, finding the share of Bayesian agents to be 10% and 50% in the Indian‐villager and Mexican‐student samples, respectively.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Ping ◽  
Wang Xiaoxu

The default of Suntech Power made the year 2013 in China “the first year of default” of bond markets. People are also clearly aware of the default risk of corporate bonds and find that fair pricing for defaultable corporate bonds is very important. In this paper we first give the pricing model based on incomplete information, then empirically price the Chinese corporate bond “11 super JGBS” from Merton’s model, reduced-form model, and incomplete information model, respectively, and then compare the obtained prices with the real prices. Results show that all the three models can reflect the trend of bond prices, but the incomplete information model fits the real prices best. In addition, the default probability obtained from the incomplete information model can discriminate the credit quality of listed companies.


2001 ◽  
Vol 28 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 631-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cheng ◽  
Bradley D. Childs ◽  
William W. Sheng

1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 357-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Jalal Shamsie

The dramatic increase in antisocial adolescent behaviour is shown through statistics outlining the increase in juvenile crime for Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. This paper presents a review of evaluative studies of conventional treatments available for antisocial adolescents. Studies involving Case Work, Individual Psychotherapy, Behaviour Modification, Group Counselling, Family Therapy, Milieu Therapy and Therapeutic Community are discussed. Findings indicate that, in general, these treatments are inadequate for the rehabilitation needs of adolescents with conduct disorders. One question arising from this review is whether the unsatisfactory results with present treatment approaches may be due to the perception of antisocial behaviour as a sickness rather than a lack of socialization. The Social Learning Theory is investigated as a means for teaching social norms. A number of studies are cited as showing the effectiveness of social learning types of programs. Success has also been achieved with antisocial adolescents in a behavioural-employment intervention program; this area is also explored. The impact of evaluative studies on clinical practice is reported as minimal. Some of the reasons which could explain this lack of impact are explored. The paper emphasizes the need for discarding those treatments which have been shown to be ineffective and adopting those which show promise.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia Vélez ◽  
Hyowon Gweon

When our own knowledge is limited, we often turn to others for information. However, social learning does not guarantee accurate learning or better decisions: Other people's knowledge can be as limited as our own, and their advice is not always helpful. The current study examines how human learners put two "imperfect" heads together to make utility-maximizing decisions. Participants played a card game where they chose to "stay" with a card of known value or "switch" to an unknown card, given an advisor's advice to stay or switch. Participants used advice strategically based on which cards the advisor could see (Experiment 1), how helpful the advisor was (Experiment 2), and what strategy the advisor used to select advice (Experiment 3). Overall, participants benefited even from imperfect advice based on incomplete information. Participants' responses were consistent with a Bayesian model that jointly infers how the advisor selects advice and the value of the advisor's card, compared to an alternative model that weights advice based on the advisor's accuracy. By reasoning about others' minds, human learners can make the best of even noisy, impoverished social information.


Author(s):  
Nadiya Kostyuk

Abstract Can cyber deterrence work? Existing scholarly works argue that deterrence by punishment using cyberattacks is ineffective because the difficulty of attributing the origin of cyberattacks makes the threat of future attacks less credible. However, these works have told us relatively little about the deterrence ability of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs), defined as publicly observable proactive efforts aimed at signaling a country’s level of cyber offensive and defensive capability. This research shows that middle powers (that have scarce cyber arsenals) can use PCIs to deter cyber attacks that cause significant damage to their economy and prosperity; however, this deterrent capability is rather limited. Using an incomplete-information model, we demonstrate that PCIs only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the costs created by these institutions. Despite this limited deterrence ability, middle powers tend to over-invest resources in these cyberinstitutions: Weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince strong cyber adversaries that they are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong. By doing so, states reduce their overall cybercapacity. We establish the empirical plausibility of these results using election interference campaigns as examples of strategic attacks. Our focus on the strategic use of PCIs as a deterrent represents a departure from existing literature—which has focused only on cyberoperations—and has important policy implications.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Gonzalez ◽  
Richard Watson ◽  
Seth Bullock

Social learning, defined as the imitation of behaviors performed by others, is recognized as a distinctive characteristic in humans and several other animal species. Previous work has claimed that the evolutionary fixation of social learning requires decision-making cognitive abilities that result in transmission bias (e.g., discriminatory imitation) and/or guided variation (e.g., adaptive modification of behaviors through individual learning). Here, we present and analyze a simple agent-based model that demonstrates that the transition from instinctive actuators (i.e., non-learning agents whose behavior is hardcoded in their genes) to social learners (i.e., agents that imitate behaviors) can occur without invoking such decision-making abilities. The model shows that the social learning of a trait may evolve and fix in a population if there are many possible behavioral variants of the trait, if it is subject to strong selection pressure for survival (as distinct from reproduction), and if imitation errors occur at a higher rate than genetic mutation. These results demonstrate that the (sometimes implicit) assumption in prior work that decision-making abilities are required is incorrect, thus allowing a more parsimonious explanation for the evolution of social learning that applies to a wider range of organisms. Furthermore, we identify genotype-phenotype disengagement as a signal for the imminent fixation of social learners, and explain the way in which this disengagement leads to the emergence of a basic form of cultural evolution (i.e., a non-genetic evolutionary system).


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