scholarly journals The evolution mechanism of the multi-value chain network ecosystem supported by the third-party platform

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Jiafeng Yuan ◽  
Bin Dan ◽  
Ronghua Sui ◽  
Wenbo Li
Keyword(s):  
Value Chain ◽  
Growth Stage ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Dynamics Method

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper aims to study the evolution mechanism of the third-party platform ecosystem. A multi-value chain network ecosystem composed of multiple manufacturers, multiple suppliers, several logistics providers and a third-party platform for manufacturing is considered. The system dynamics method is used to build the model, and this paper collects relevant industry and platform data to simulate the evolution of user scale and participants' revenues. Furthermore, the influence of platform subsidy and matching service level on the evolution is studied. The results show that the platform's evolution can be divided into four stages: emergence, growth, maturity and upgrade. This paper also finds that, at the emergence stage and the growth stage, the augmentation of the subsidies to manufacturers makes the manufacturers' scale expand but let their revenues decline. Meanwhile, the platform's revenues reduce at the emergence stage while increase at the growth stage. When the subsidy amount is high and continues to augment, its positive effect on the user scale is weakened while its negative effect on manufacturers' revenues is enhanced. Besides, improving the matching service level is not conducive to the platform's revenues at the emergence stage, but after entering the growth stage, it can increase user scale and the platform's revenues simultaneously.</p>

The competition between B2C platform and third-party seller considering sales effort

Kybernetes ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 1084-1108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaiying Cao ◽  
Ping He
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Third ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose By studying the competition between a B2C platform and a third-party seller, the purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare their optimal decisions and profits between cases with and without sales effort of the platform or third-party seller. Design/methodology/approach This paper studies the competition between a B2C platform and a third-party seller. The platform sells a product directly, and allows the third-party seller to sell a competing product on the platform. Based on whether the platform or the third-party seller makes sales effort, there are four scenarios. The paper analyzes the optimal decisions and profits of platform and third-party seller under each scenario, respectively. Findings The transaction fee has a negative effect on third-party seller’s sales effort level. What is more, the platform can take a free riding from the third-party seller’s sales effort, but the platform’s sales effort has a negative effect on the profit of third-party seller. Practical implications These results provide managerial insights for the platform and the third-party seller to make decisions. Originality/value This paper is among the first papers to study the competition between B2C platform and third-party seller.

scholarly journals PENGARUH DANA PIHAK KETIGA, NON-PERFORMING LOAN, DAN NET INTEREST MARGIN TERHADAP PROFITABILITAS BANK UMUM PEMERINTAH DI INDONESIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-93
Author(s):  
Adinda Putri Juleita ◽  
Achmad Nawawi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Significant Positive Effect ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
The Third ◽  
Net Interest Margin ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Interest Margin

This research was conducted to analyze the effect of Third Party Funds, Non Performing Loan (NPL), and Net Interest Margin (NIM) both partially and simultaneously on profitability in government public banks in Indonesia. This research sample is the government's public Bank in Indonesia for 10 periods (2010-2019), with a total sample of 4 banks. The sample was selected using saturated purposive sampling. The type of data in this study is quantitative data sourced from financial reports (balance sheet and calculation of financial ratios) through the official website of the Financial Services Authority (OJK). The results of this study indicate that; (1) the Third Party Funds has a significant positive effect on profitability, (2) NPL has a significant negative effect on profitability, (3) NIM has a significant positive effect on profitability, and (4) simultaneously the  Third Party Funds, NPL, and NIM have a significant positive effect on profitability. Keywords : Third Party Funds, Non Performing Loans, Net Interest Margin, Profitability  Abstrak Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk menguji Dana Pihak Ketiga (DPK), Non-Performing Loan (NPL), dan Net Interest Margin (NIM), baik secara parsial maupun simultan terhadap Profitabilitas dengan objek penelitian yaitu Bank Umum Pemerintah yang ada di Indonesia periode tahun 2010-2019. Sampel penelitian ini adalah Bank Umum Pemerintah di Indonesia yang berjumlah 4 bank dengan mengambil periode pengamatan data selama 10 tahun (2010-2019). Sampel dipilih dengan menggunakan purposive sampling jenuh. Jenis data dalam penelitian ini adalah data kuantitatif yang bersumber dari laporan keuangan (neraca dan perhitungan rasio keuangan) melalui laman web resmi Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK). Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa; (1) DPK berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap profitabilitas, (2) NPL berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap profitabilitas, (3) NIM berpengaruh positif signifkan terhadap profitabilitas, dan (4) secara simultan DPK, NPL, dan NIM berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap profitabilitas.

Resolving tension from the third-party forgiveness effect

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn M. Moloney ◽  
Chelsea A. Reid ◽  
Jody L. Davis ◽  
Jeni L. Burnette ◽  
Jeffrey D. Green
Keyword(s):  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

Relaxations of Contractual Privity and the Need for Third Party Rights in Chinese Contract Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Lei
Keyword(s):  
Direct Action ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Chinese Law ◽  
The Third ◽  
Right Of Action ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Right

This chapter examines the position of third party beneficiaries in Chinese law. Article 64 of the Chinese Contract Law states that where a contract for the benefit of a third party is breached, the debtor is liable to the creditor. The author regards this as leaving unanswered the question of whether the thirdparty has a right of direct action against the debtor. One view regards the third party as having the right to sue for the benefit although this right was ultimately excluded from the law. Another view, supported by the Supreme People’s Court, is that Article 64 does not provide a right of action for a third party and merely prescribes performance in ‘incidental’ third party contracts. The third view is that there is a third party right of action in cases of ‘genuine’ third party contracts but courts are unlikely to recognize a third party action where the contract merely purports to confer a benefit on the third party.

Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Under the Taiwan Civil Code

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN
Keyword(s):  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Relationship ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Privity Of Contract

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.

Attitudes toward Extrarelational Sex as a Function of Participant's and Third Party's Gender

2004 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 965-968
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Qaqiesh ◽  
Pamela C. Regan
Keyword(s):  
Romantic Partner ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Individual Male ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
And Gender

An experiment was conducted to examine whether attitudes toward extrarelational sex, i.e., “swinging,” differed as a function of participant's gender and gender of the third party, i.e., the “swinging” partner. Participants were asked to imagine that their current romantic partner had expressed an interest in “swinging” with another individual (male or female, randomly assigned). Analysis yielded several significant differences by participants' gender. Specifically, men expressed greater interest than did women in joining a swinger's club, reported a higher likelihood than did women of actually joining such a club, and believed more than women that their sex life with their partner would improve after joining a swinger's club. Participants also preferred a female more than a male swinging partner, although this comparison was not statistically significant.

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document