scholarly journals Analysis of airline seat control with region factor

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanming Ge ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Seat Control

Development of a New Type 4D Dynamic Seat Platform Control System Based on PLC

2013 ◽  
Vol 475-476 ◽  
pp. 776-781
Author(s):  
Qing Kui Chen ◽  
Yu Long Chen
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Linear Displacement ◽  
Displacement Sensor ◽  
Hydraulic Pump ◽  
Cost Performance ◽  
Loop Feedback ◽  
New Type ◽  
Working Principle ◽  
Closed Loop Feedback ◽  
Seat Control

This article has introduced the development method of a kind of 4d cinema dynamic seat control system based on PLC, expounds the system's hardware structure , working principle, function characteristics, etc. The system's power is provided by hydraulic pump, hardware adopts closed loop feedback control system constituted by omron PLC, A/D module, D/A module, linear displacement sensor and electromagnetic proportional directional valve. The system has good stability, high cost performance, miniaturization, intelligent, etc.

Intelligent Seat Control for Adjusting to the Course of the Road

ATZ worldwide ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 114 (10) ◽  
pp. 36-39
Author(s):  
Thilo Ludewig
Keyword(s):  
The Road ◽  
Seat Control

scholarly journals Discrete Choice Dynamic Pricing and Seat Control Problem in Airlines

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Moon-Gil Yoon ◽  
Hwi-Young Lee ◽  
Yoon-Sook Song
Keyword(s):  
Control Problem ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Seat Control

scholarly journals The effects of corporate governance on capital structure in Taiwanese corporations after controlling for the heterogeneity of industries and firm size

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (Special Issue 1) ◽  
pp. 35-47
Author(s):  
Lie-Huey Wang ◽  
Hsien-Chang Kuo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Seat Control ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

Since the MM theory, scholars have discussed capital structure issues from the perspectives of agency problems in corporate governance. Corporate governance has been seen as the means to reducing the agency costs produced by aligning the interests of management and shareholders, and the incentive for the management to engage in opportunistic behavior has been influenced by the firm’s ownership and board of director structures. Previous studies, however, focus on traditional financial factors and neglect the debt and equity agency problems triggered by corporate governance and their possible influences on capital structure decisions. The sample used in this study consists of 317 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2007. By controlling for the heterogeneity of industries and firm size, our models incorporate the cash flow rights-voting rights-seat control divergence, the ownership structure, and the structure of the board of directors to examine the effects of corporate governance on the firm’s capital structure. The results show that, when the divergence between cash flow rights and seat control is lower or when the divergence between voting rights and seat control is higher, the controlling shareholders can either control the board of directors to better monitor the firm or exhibit a preference for debt financing based on entrenchment motives. Further analysis indicates that blockholders prefer lower debt financing and do not expropriate minority shareholders. Financial institutional shareholders function through their provision of monitoring and the certification of debt for technological firms and can decrease the firms’ debts. The management in the technological industry firms prefers debt financing in order to obtain agency-related benefits. While directors in traditional industries or large firms might use personal or firm debt to tunnel the firm’s assets, the function of independent directors in technological firms or large firms of lowering debts in order to reduce the firm’s bankruptcy risks is more evident.

scholarly journals Board effectiveness: Investigating payment asymmetry between board members and shareholders

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wuchun Chi ◽  
Chung-Yuan Hsu ◽  
Wan-Ying Lin
Keyword(s):  
Board Members ◽  
Slight Reduction ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Agency Issues ◽  
Seat Control ◽  
Shareholder Perspective ◽  
External Shareholders ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Personal Interests

Board members may well be responsible for dissension between themselves and shareholders since they are simultaneously the setters and receivers of both board remuneration and dividends. They may act out of their own personal interests at the expense of external shareholders. We investigate the impact of ownership structure, board structure and control deviation on payment asymmetry, where excessively high remuneration is paid to board members but considerably lower dividends are distributed to shareholders. We find strong evidence confirming that the smaller the shareholdings of board members and outside blockholders are, the more asymmetric the payments are. With controlling family members on the board and a higher percentage of seats held by independent board members, there is a slight reduction in the likelihood and severity of payment asymmetry. In addition, it is abundantly clear that the larger the board seat-control deviation is, the greater is the likelihood and severity of payment asymmetry. While prior research has primarily focused on board-manager agency issues, the board-shareholder perspective could be even more important in that it is the board that is the most directly delegated agent of shareholders, not the managers.

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