Preventing Cartels: the Effectiveness of Leniency Policy

Author(s):  
Danguolė Klimašauskienė
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Anna Danilovskaia

The object of this research is competition policy and criminal law policy with regards to protection of competition in Europe that are similar to the Russian approach of countering infringement on fair competition. Legislation on competition is dynamically developing in all countries, which causes corresponding changes in their criminal law policy. For improving the effectiveness of cartel detection, many countries endorsed leniency policy for cartels, as well as make amendments to their laws due to proliferation of unfair competition, particularly on the Internet, as well irregularities in tendering. The analysis of modern sources of competition and criminal law of Germany, Great Britain and France, as the first European countries that developed the rules aimed at protection of competition, can be valuable for understanding the concept of protection of competition adopted by the world community, as well as its European model. The consists in broadening the existing knowledge on criminal law protection of competition in Europe, acquired as a result of comprehensive research of the legislations of the European Union, Germany, Great Britain and France in the area of protection of fair competition with consideration of recent amendments, including leniency policy for cartels. The author concludes that Europe has a developed criminal law mechanism for counteracting anticompetitive behavior, which is characterized by a range of prohibited acts, application of versatile criminal law measures to the persons guilty of such infringements, differentiated approach to the questions of their criminal liability, and substantial main and additional sanctions applicable to not only physical entities, but also legal entities in some countries. The obtained results can be useful in lawmaking, scientific and educational activity.


Author(s):  
Whelan Peter

This chapter focuses on the second challenge of design for European antitrust criminalization: articulating and overcoming the unique challenges of criminal immunity for cartelists and responding to the challenge of ensuring peaceful co-existence of both administrative leniency/immunity and criminal cartel sanctions. It identifies three mechanisms that can be useful in resolving any conflict between administrative leniency programmes and criminal sanctions. The first mechanism identified was the creation of a criminal immunity programme for cartel activity. The second mechanism which is designed to resolve any conflict between administrative leniency programmes and criminal sanctions is the linking of the criminal immunity policy with the administrative leniency policy. The third mechanism identified involves dealing with the issue of criminal disclosure.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-340
Author(s):  
Julia Kupka ◽  
Adele Thomas

Despite the fact that it has existed for over ten years, the Competition Act has had little impact in diluting the dominance of big business in the South African manufacturing sector. This study sought to ascertain the extent of anti-competitive behaviour in two sub-sectors of the South African manufacturing sector and to determine whether the competition authorities should focus on supporting SMEs as competitors to big business. The findings indicated that SMEs in these two sub-sectors face unique difficulties in fighting anti-competitive behaviour, and that there is scope for the competition authorities to facilitate the participation of SMEs in the economy through the use of tools such as market inquiries, the Corporate Leniency Policy and structural remedies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Marie Stomper

Does it really make sense to criminalize hardcore antitrust violations in German law? And if so, how could an effective, system- and constitution-compliant implementation of this project look like, which also takes into account the justified concerns of the opponents of criminalization? This book examines these two questions in depth and – on the basis of a theoretical analysis of the legitimacy and utility of criminalization – develops concrete legislative proposals for a new cartel offense as well as the necessary accompanying regulations, such as a leniency policy specific to cartel criminal law and some new regulations for reforming cartel criminal proceedings.


The Justice ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 301-343
Author(s):  
Semin Park
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Beverley Hooper

On 24 February 1954, twenty-one American GIs and a British marine crossed the border from North Korea into the PRC. Whatever the individual differences in the men’s explanations, there was a common theme that to some extent accorded with the emotive accusations of brainwashing. After taking over the camps from the North Korean army, the Chinese pursued their so-called leniency policy which, instead of punishing soldiers as the enemy, was directed at convincing them of the superiority of communism and the evils of their own government. The United States and Britain admitted that their soldiers had not been trained for this type of POW experience. There were also strong disincentives for returning to the United States—or even to Britain. To Western governments the men were collaborators, making them liable to prosecution.


Ekonomika ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-52
Author(s):  
Danguolė Klimašauskienė ◽  
Vincentas Giedraitis

The paper focuses on the theory and practice of antitrust action in detecting and deterring cartels and analyzing the development of the modern leniency policy. Drawing from game theory and following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel formation and sustainability and a statistical analysis of cartel prosecutions, our attempt is to show that leniency programs, accompanied by strong enforcement powers and effective sanctions, increase the inherent instability of cartels and therefore have proven to represent a functional and successful tool for detecting and punishing, as well as preventing the formation of anticompetitive agreements.


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