From Business to Central Planning: Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia in 1918-1938 and 1948-1960

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-443
Author(s):  
Jan Slavíček
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Central Planning ◽  
Business History ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Business Enterprises

The paper focuses on cooperatives — seen as business enterprises — in the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) and the period of 12 years after the communist putsch (1948-1960). It compares the functions of cooperatives, the limits placed on their (semi-)independent business activities, and their chances to decide for themselves in the market economy and the centrally planned economy. Drawing on the methods of business history and economic history, the study seeks to answer the following questions: 1. Were the cooperatives in the First Czechoslovak Republic really fully independent companies running their business on a free market? 2. Were the cooperatives in the Stalinist and early post-Stalinist Czechoslovakia really subordinated subjects in a centrally planned economy? 3. Are there any real connections in the functioning of cooperatives in these two eras? In other words, is it possible that something of the independent cooperatives survived and that the traditional interpretations (according to which the two eras were completely different and even contradictory) can be seen in new and more accurate ways?

scholarly journals Accountancy in Poland in the period of centrally planned economy – oral history

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (97 (153)) ◽  
pp. 161-178
Author(s):  
Anna Karmańska
Keyword(s):  
Oral History ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Accounting Practice ◽  
Basic Reason ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of

This article presents an account of an interview with Zdzisław Fedak, PhD, who participated in the work on the systemic solutions in accounting in the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL), and currently is an animator of improvements in Polish accounting practice in the conditions of market economy. The basic reason for this publication is the need to fill the gap in the picture of the determinants and characteristics of accountancy in Poland in the period of non-market economy, taking advantage of the expertise and experience of people knowing the status quo in this area. This text is part of the trend to document the history of accountancy by means of a research method known as oral history.

Information and the Market Economy

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sarokin ◽  
Jay Schulkin
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Large Measure ◽  
Subprime Mortgage ◽  
Market Signals ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Mortgage Crisis ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy

The Soviet Union tried to manage the information needed to run a centrally-planned economy. Their efforts failed in large measure due to information shortcomings. Capitalism is a much better information processor, relying on the ‘invisible hand” to recognize and respond to market signals. But capitalism can have information failures too, as evidenced by Enron, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the work of information economists.

scholarly journals Karl Polayni, Market Economy and Economic Liberalisation in Nepal

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Krishna P. Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Interdisciplinary Studies ◽  
Short Account ◽  
Economic Exchanges ◽  
World Economic ◽  
Market Practice ◽  
Liberalization Policy

This review essay is a short account for Karl Polanyi’s alternative interpretation of the world economic history that largely relies on the comparative analysis of two forms of economic exchanges; non-market and market. The replacement of reciprocity and redistribution produced by the market economy based on the principles of profit making, gain and competition, in which money has a central role, is the key argument that Polanyi brings into consideration. His notion of market economy that is self-regulating by its very nature has been synonymous with the free market practice under economic liberalization policy adopted by the capitalist societies nowadays. Despite his projection of the collapse of the market economy in the future, it is gaining ground along with frequent adjustments, adaptations and compromises with other dynamics of society, which could be considered as a new form of embeddedness. The essay raises few analytical issues embeddedness from Nepal’s exercise of market economy on the backdrop of Polanyi’s notion of self-regulating market.Crossing the Border: International Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies Vol.3(1) 2015: 11-20

scholarly journals Accountancy in Poland in the period of centrally planned economy. A few comments from experience

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (99 (155)) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Zdzisław Fedak ◽  
Anna Karmańska
Keyword(s):  
Oral History ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Basic Reason ◽  
The People ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
History Of

Accountancy in Poland in the period of centrally planned economy. A few comments from experience This article presents comments on selected aspects of the accounting law applicable in Poland in the period of the centrally planned economy. They were made based on the interview with Mr. Zdzisław Fedak, PhD, a participant of the works on the systemic solutions in accountancy in the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL). He is currently trying to stimulate improvements in the Polish accountancy practice in the conditions of market economy. The basic reason for this publication is the need to fill the gap in the picture of the surroundings and unique characteristics of accountancy in Poland in the period of the nonmarket economy, while taking into account the expertise and experience of the people who knew well the reality of those times. This text is a part of the trend to document the history of accountancy by means of the research method known as oral history.

scholarly journals Strategic Investment, Uncertainty And Distribution Reform In The P.R. China: Why A Gradual Reform Strategy Works

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clement Chow Kong Wing
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Reform Strategy ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Low Uncertainty

<span>This paper attempts to provide an explanation to the success of the gradual reform strategy of China by showing that such a strategy can minimize the uncertainty created in the process of transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy. In a commitment versus flexibility game, low uncertainty motivates enterprises to adopt a strategy of pre-committing their investment which is crucial in sustaining a faster growth rate in the industry. In addition, Chinas successful use of market forces of competition and entry is also an important factor in the transition process.</span>

Contract Formation and Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Party in Vietnam

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Le Net
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Free Market Economy ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
The World

This chapter examines the recent changes to the Vietnamese Civil Code and its impact on contract formation and third party beneficiaries. Since the enactment of the first modern civil code in 1995, major revisions have been made every ten years with the 2015 Code repealing more than 50 per cent of the 2005 Code; representing more than 300 articles of the 2005 Code. Concepts like apparent authority were only recognized in 2005, while the notion of an offer to the world (rather than to specific parties) was only recognized in 2015. The 2015 Code was a product of the move from a planned economy to a socialist-oriented free market economy. The challenge of the Code was to address state interest and regulatory concerns to modify the norms of contractual freedom found in the Code.

scholarly journals Problem zamówień publicznych w PRL

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-369
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Horubski
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Cost Efficiencies ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Public Contracts ◽  
The Times ◽  
Public Contract

The article characterises selected legal solutions applied in the process of public contract award in the realities of the nationalised centrally-planned economy in the times of the Polish People’s Republic. In the study, manifestations of discrimination of private businesses in the access to public contracts are presented. Such discrimination was one of the foundations for the legislation applicable at the time. The article also highlights other features of legal acts of statutory rank governing contracts awarded by state-owned organisational units, such as the fragmented nature of their regulations, including the omission of regulations governing the procedure of reaching an agreement and executing a contract. This allowed formulating conclusions about the merely superficial role of the provisions on supplies, services, and works for state entities and the fundamental inability of these regulations to play the role attributed to public procurement in the market economy, consisting in deploying the mechanism of competition between entrepreneurs for cost-efficiencies in public spending.

scholarly journals Homo Economicus in the Shortage Economy

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 207-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hana Lipovská ◽  
Lucie Coufalová ◽  
Libor Žídek
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Rational Agent ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Higher Law

Abstract Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.

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