scholarly journals Is zero the safe real rate?

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Mix
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Real Rate ◽  
Equity Prices ◽  
Secular Stagnation ◽  
Low Interest Rates ◽  
History Of

The current economic debate with regards to the secular trend of ever lower, even negative, safe real interest rates is dominated by Keynesian, neoclassical and Austrian explanations. The former (two) argue that the interdependence phenomena of a global savings glut and a secular stagnation cause an oversupply of savings and thus drive down rates. From this position, central bank merely react to market forces. The latter dissent and argue that it was rather the other way around and an asymmetric central bank policy aimed at propping up equity prices led to the secular stagnation now quoted for its justification. In contrast, from the perspective of a critique of ideology, safe real rates where neither driven down by market forces nor central banks but by the weight of being not reasonably safe but riskless. Specifically, I argue that by equating the riskless return with the short-term interest rate, Black and Scholes (1973) state a tautology and imply that both rates shall be zero. In the subsequent inquiry, I show that this argument allows for a neat narration of the economic history of the neoliberal age. Furthermore, I explain why under current conditions ultra low interest rates fail to translate into inflation.

scholarly journals Journal of the History of Economic Thought Preprints - Limits to Arbitrage and Interest Rates: A Debate Between Keynes, Hawtrey and Hicks

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy BRILLANT
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycle ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
History Of Economic Thought ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Limits To Arbitrage ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Business Cycle

This paper deals with a debate between Hawtrey, Hicks and Keynes concerning the capacity of the central bank to influence the short-term and the long-term rates of interest. Both Hawtrey and Keynes considered the central bank’s ability to influence short-term rates of interest. However, they do not put the same emphasis on the study of the long-term rates of interest. According to Keynes, long-term rates are influenced by future expected short-term rates (1930, 1936), whereas for Hawtrey (1932, 1937, 1938), long-term rates are more dependent on the business cycle. Short-term rates do not have much effect on long-term rates according to Hawtrey. In 1939, Hicks enters the controversy, giving credit to both Hawtrey’s and Keynes’s theories, and also introducing limits to the operations of arbitrage. He thus presented a nuanced view.

Politics, Independence, and Retirees

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Conti-Brown
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Short Term ◽  
2016 Election ◽  
Low Interest Rates ◽  
The Face ◽  
History Of

Until recently, it was widely believed that central banks must protect people from their own worst instincts: the populace demands easy money and low interest rates, and a politically sensitive representative class will give it to them. Central banks have the responsibility of resolving this time inconsistency problem by protecting the long-term value of the currency even against the short term demands of politics. Yet the financial crisis of 2008 and the 2016 election have changed this narrative. This chapter explores how this new political economy of central banking, in the face of long-term low interest rates, changes the posture of central banks against the rest of the polity. It discusses some history of political pressures against central banks in other climates and makes predictions about how the ‘new normal’ of lower interest rates will challenge the Fed’s ability to stay above the political fray, despite its best intentions.

scholarly journals Causes of The Outbreak of the Eurozone Crises: The Role of the Usa and the European Central Bank Monetary Policy

e-Finanse ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Natalia Białek
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
European Central ◽  
Low Interest Rates ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The U.S

Abstract This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions-the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank-were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.

scholarly journals Low interest rates and executive risk-taking incentives: Evidence from the United States

2020 ◽  
pp. 234094442092771
Author(s):  
Paula Castro ◽  
Maria T Tascon ◽  
Francisco J Castaño ◽  
Borja Amor-Tapia
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
The United States ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
Low Interest Rates ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

This article contributes to the literature by indicating how certain monetary policies impact the compensation incentives of US managers to adopt riskier business policies. Specifically, based on the agency problems between shareholders and managers and between shareholders and creditors, a research framework is developed to identify the influence of low interest rates on managers’ risk-taking incentives proxied by the sensitivity of executive compensation to stock return volatility (Vega). We examine 1,293 firms in the United States between 2000 and 2016, and the results indicate that low interest rates increase the managers’ short-term risk-taking incentives and that those incentives contribute to the risk effectively taken by the firm. Our results are robust to the use of alternative monetary proxies and to the presence of passive versus active institutional shareholders. JEL CLASSIFICATION E41; E43; E51; M12; M52

Fifteen Years of Central Banking in Honduras

1967 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 488-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. LaBarge ◽  
Frank Falero
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
World War ◽  
Monetary Policies ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of ◽  
Commercial Paper

The purpose of this paper is to draw together from primary sources the case history of formative policy years for the Central Bank of Honduras. This bank, like others formed throughout the underdeveloped world in the post-World War II era, was created in 1950 as a vehicle for stimulating economic growth. In retrospect over 186 months of operations this particular Central Bank has an unusually outstanding policy record—a record which argues forcefully for appropriate monetary policy as a stimulant to economic advance.The first meeting of Central Bank directors was held on May 31, 1950, for the purpose of establishing the major monetary policies under which the Bank would commence operations July 1. At that meeting the directors established a schedule of maximum interest rates to be charged by the public commercial banks and a schedule of rates at which eligible commercial paper of 12 months maturity or less could be rediscounted with the Central Bank.

scholarly journals Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
General Question ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Fixed Rate ◽  
Proposed Model

Abstract Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under-’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.

LIMITS TO ARBITRAGE AND INTEREST RATES: A DEBATE AMONG KEYNES, HAWTREY, AND HICKS

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Brillant
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycle ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Short Term ◽  
John Maynard Keynes ◽  
Limits To Arbitrage ◽  
The Business Cycle

This paper deals with a debate among Ralph George Hawtrey, John Richard Hicks, and John Maynard Keynes concerning the capacity of the central bank to influence the short-term and the long-term rates of interest. Both Hawtrey and Keynes considered the central bank’s ability to influence short-term rates of interest. However, they do not put the same emphasis on the study of the long-term rates of interest. According to Keynes, long-term rates are influenced by future expected short-term rates (1930, 1936), whereas for Hawtrey ([1932] 1962, 1937, 1938), long-term rates are more dependent on the business cycle. Short-term rates do not have much effect on long-term rates, according to Hawtrey. In 1939, Hicks enters the controversy, giving credit to both Hawtrey’s and Keynes’s theories, and also introducing limits to the operations of arbitrage. He thus presented a nuanced view.

Financial Aspects of Korea's Economic Growth under Japanese Rule

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitsuhiko Kimura
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Trade Expansion ◽  
Financial Variables ◽  
Meiji Restoration ◽  
Financial Cooperatives ◽  
History Of ◽  
Yi Dynasty ◽  
The One

Feeling strong pressure from Western Powers Japan abandoned her seclusion policy in 1854 and inaugurated serious efforts to modernize her society and economy after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. She, in turn, forced Korea who had been keeping the seclusion policy on her own to open the door in 1876. The feudal Korean government (the Yi Dynasty, 1392–1910) was impelled to embark on social and economic reforms by opening the door. Yet, after nearly thirty years’ struggle to make reforms and to secure the independence of the country, Korea was converted into a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and was officially annexed to her in 1910. The Japanese government recognized that the creation of modern monetary and banking systems in Korea was the precondition for trade expansion between the two countries (for Japan, rice imports on the one hand and textile exports on the other) and thus started its colonial rule over Korea by establishing a central bank, development banks and financial cooperatives. This paper aims at setting forth an analysis of a more or less unexplored field in the study of the economic history of Korea, that is, the financial aspects of her economic growth under Japanese rule. Particularly, emphasis will be placed on quantitative analysis of major financial variables represented by money, interest rates and bank credit. Before proceeding to the main subject, it may well serve to review some of the financial problems in the late Yi Dynasty period.

scholarly journals High-Frequency Estimates of the Natural Real Rate and Inflation Expectations

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (034) ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Alex Aronovich ◽  
◽  
Andrew Meldrum ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
High Frequency ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Study Analysis ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Real Rate ◽  
Nominal Interest Rates ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

We propose a new method of estimating the natural real rate and long-horizon inflation expectations, using nonlinear regressions of survey-based measures of short-term nominal interest rates and inflation expectations on U.S. Treasury yields. We find that the natural real rate was relatively stable during the 1990s and early 2000s, but declined steadily after the global financial crisis, before dropping more sharply to around 0 percent during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Long-horizon inflation expectations declined steadily during the 1990s and have since been relatively stable at close to 2 percent. According to our method, the declines in both the natural real rate and long-horizon inflation expectations are clearly statistically significant. Our estimates are available at whatever frequency we observe bond yields, making them ideal for intraday event-study analysis--for example, we show that the natural real rate and long-horizon inflation expectations are not affected by temporary shocks to the stance of monetary policy.

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