Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in der Ära der Grossen Koalition: Zur Rechtsprechung seit dem Lissabon-Urteil

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-98
Author(s):  
Florian Meinel
Keyword(s):  
Political Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Angela Merkel ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Parliamentary Procedure ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Der Beitrag analysiert die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts seit dem Lissabon-Urteil des Jahres 2009 in ihrem politischen und institutionellen Kontext. Was hat der Konflikt um die Grenzen der europäischen Integration mit der Verschärfung der verfassungsgerichtlichen Kontrolle im Wahl- und Parlamentsrecht oder der zunehmenden Bedeutung parlamentarischer Informationsrechte zu tun? Und was beides mit der Verschärfung des Neutralitätsgrundsatzes im Parteienrecht oder der Aktivierung des Alimentationsprinzips? Der Wandel der Rechtsprechung ist, so die These des Beitrags, Teil einer grundlegenden Veränderung des politischen Systems seit dem Beginn der Großen Koalitionen im Jahr 2005. Die Tendenz zur Verdichtung und Materialisierung institutioneller Maßstäbe ist einerseits eine defensive Strategie des Gerichts angesichts der gestörten Möglichkeiten des Machtwechsels. Sie ist andererseits aber gerade die Konstitutionalisierung des großkoalitionären Regierungsmodus, der die Unterscheidung von Politik und Verwaltung, von Mehrheit und Minderheit systematisch eliminiert. In einem Regierungssystem, dessen Institutionen und Verfahren nicht zu verstehen sind ohne die Bedeutung, die ihnen die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts gibt, ist das ein Vorgang von großer Tragweite. The article provides a contextual analysis of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence since the 2009 landmark ruling on the Lisbon Treaty. In key fields such as European integration, electoral rules, parliamentary procedure, parliamentary control, taxation, or civil service law, the Court has broken new ground in recent years. The article argues that these changes reflect a more fundamental transformation of the German political system in the era of grand coalitions under Angela Merkel since 2005. With the place of parliamentary opposition largely vacant, the Court has been increasingly inclined to tighten its constitutional review of the rules of the political process. On the other hand, however, its new approach has precisely entrenched the mode of governing brought about by the grand coalitions, which eliminates the distinction between both politics and administration, majority and minority. In the German constitutional order, whose institutions and procedures are deeply shaped by the unique powers of the Constitutional Court, this represents a particularly momentous transformation.

Balancing and judicial self-empowerment: A case study on the rise of balancing in the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
NIELS PETERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Argumentation Framework ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractMany critics of the proportionality principle argue that balancing is an instrument of judicial self-empowerment. This contribution argues that the relationship between balancing and judicial power is more complex. Balancing does not necessarily create judicial power, but it presupposes it. This argument is confirmed through a case study of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The analysis shows that the German Constitutional Court was very reluctant to base decisions, in which it overturned legislation, on balancing in the first two and a half decades of its jurisprudence. However, in the late 1970s, once the Court had strengthened its own institutional position, it increasingly relied on balancing when declaring laws as incompatible with the constitution. Then, balancing developed into the predominant argumentation framework of constitutional review that it is today in the Court’s jurisprudence.

German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only Under Exceptional Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

After the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) issuance of the Lisbon decision, a judgment that is generally considered to be a verdict critical of European integration as well as a measure to widen the scope of constitutional review of EU acts, many observers wondered what would happen next. Would the German court finally begin to look for an open conflict with the EU, or would the court's bark once again be worse than its bite? This had already seemed to be the case after the Maastricht decision, the slimmer and legally more coherent predecessor of the Lisbon judgment, after which the court deliberately missed the opportunity to take a shot at the Banana conflict between the EU and the WTO.

Religious Symbolism and the Resilience of Liberal Constitutionalism: On the Federal German Constitutional Court's Second Head Scarf Decision

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 887-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Mahlmann
Keyword(s):  
Case Note ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Neutral State ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Religious Symbolism ◽  
Islamic Headscarf ◽  
Liberal Constitutionalism ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

The second decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Islamic headscarf declares a general ban on headscarf to be unconstitutional and, in particular, a violation of freedom of religion. This case note examines whether this decision is an ill-conceived weakening of a religiously neutral state or, to the contrary, an encouraging manifestation of a liberal constitutional order that takes its aspirations in a highly contested area of law seriously.

Constitutional Review of Tax Laws and the Unconstitutionality of the German Inheritance Tax

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1191-1226
Author(s):  
Oliver Lepsius
Keyword(s):  
Tax Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Major Area ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Inheritance Tax ◽  
Tax Laws ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

AbstractConstitutional review of German tax laws has become a major area for the development of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, constitutional doctrine, and theory. This Article takes a recent decision in which the German Federal Constitutional Court declared parts of the inheritance tax statute unconstitutional as an example to demonstrate why tax law in particular has become such an interesting field in constitutional jurisprudence. The case is also noteworthy for the court's new views on equal protection, its deference to parliamentary discretion, and the abolishment of the so-called consequentiality doctrine (Folgerichtigkeit) it had introduced ten years before.

scholarly journals National Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Charter: A Comparative Appraisal of the German Federal Constitutional Court's Right to Be Forgotten Judgments

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Clara RAUCHEGGER
Keyword(s):  
Primary Source ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Abstract The binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

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