The Effects of Family CEO's on the Board Independence, Audit Independence and Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-47
Author(s):  
Tae-woo Woo ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Boockholdt

The paper explores the origins of the auditing profession in the United States. It is suggested that the development of the audit function in this country can be traced to reporting by internal and shareholder auditors in the American railroads during the middle of the nineteenth century. Evidence is presented that a recognition of the need for audit independence existed, and that the provision of advisory services and reports on internal control by American auditors have been an inherent part of the auditor's role from that time.


2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangyang Chen ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty ◽  
Cameron Truong ◽  
Madhu Veeraraghavan

SUMMARY In this paper, we investigate whether board independence has an impact on the likelihood that a company reports weaknesses in internal controls. Using a sample of 11,226 firm-year observations spanning the period 2004–2012, we establish several findings. First, we document a negative relation between board independence and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses. We also document that the negative relation is stronger for firms with unitary leadership (combined positions of CEO and chairman) than for firms with dual leadership. Next, we show that board independence is associated with both fewer account-specific and company-level weaknesses. Finally, we show that board independence is associated with timely remediation of internal control weaknesses and that the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 in 2007 weakens the effect of board independence on the disclosure of ICW. JEL Classifications: G10; G18.


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