scholarly journals Glottal toggling in Itunyoso Triqui

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian DiCanio ◽  
Basileo Martínez Cruz ◽  
Benigno Cruz Martínez ◽  
Wilberto Martínez Cruz
Keyword(s):  
Optimality Theory ◽  
Word Formation ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
First Person ◽  
Comprehensive Description ◽  
Exchange Rule ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Right ◽  
Primary Exponent ◽  
Glottal Features

Itunyoso Triqui (Oto-Manguean: Mexico) possesses several unique morphological derivations, each of which is typified by a toggling of glottal features at the right edge of the root. Root-final coda /ɦ/ is deleted if it is present on uninflected stems, but inserted if it is absent. This process, traditionally known as a morphophonological exchange rule (c.f. Baerman 2007; de Lacy 2012; Wunderlich 2012), is regular and productive in the language. Moreover, it is the primary exponent of the first person singular, the topical third person, and nominal quantifier morphemes, while tonal alternations are secondary, morpheme-specific exponents. The current paper both provides the first comprehensive description of these patterns in Itun-yoso Triqui and argues two theoretical points. First, Triqui glottal toggling involves a morphophono-logical exchange mapping (/α/ → [β]; /β/ → [α]) which, in coordination with syllable well-formedness conditions, produces a toggling pattern. Second, exchange mappings or rules like the Triqui toggle pose unique problems for parallelist approaches to Optimality Theory but not to serialist approaches which permit intermediate stages of representation, a finding that accords well with the necessity for multiple strata in Triqui word formation.

scholarly journals Morphosyntactic features and paradigmatic uniformity in two dialectal varieties of the island of Lesvos

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adamantios I. Gafos ◽  
Angela Ralli
Keyword(s):  
Optimality Theory ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Plural ◽  
Clitic Clusters ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Plural ◽  
Independent Work ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Considerable Support

This paper discusses data from the nominal paradigms of two dialectal varieties of East Lesvos, those of Thermi and Pamfila. It is shown that there is abundant evidence for the key role of the paradigm in the phonological realization of the [noun-clitic] clusters. We argue that the grammars of these dialectal varieties must crucially include constraints that require identity between related surface forms in the [noun-clitic] paradigm. This proposal has received considerable support by independent work, carried out mainly within Optimality Theory, in various languages. The Lesvian dialectal varieties, however, allow us to probe deeper into the precise statement of such intra-paradigmatic identity constraints. We show, first, that the identity constraints holding among various surface forms must have a limited domain of application, circumscribed by the forms of the paradigm and only those. Second, we show that intra-paradigmatic identity constraints do not require identity uniformly among all surface forms of the paradigm. Rather, distinct identity constraints hold between distinct forms. For instance, the identity constraint between the {+first person, +singular} and the {+third person, +singular} is different from that holding between the {+first person, +singular} and the {+first person, +plural}. We argue, specifically, that the network of such intra-paradigmatic identity constraints is projected on the basis of shared morphosyntactic features along the dimensions of Person and Number that enter into the construction of the paradigm.

scholarly journals Point of View in Narrative

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 911
Author(s):  
Suhair Al-Alami
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
First Person ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Locative Expression ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Speech Presentation ◽  
Cognitive Dimensions

Point of view in narrative is a focal angle of seeing, hearing, smelling, and sensing the story’s settings, characters, and events. Researchers within the fields of language, linguistics and literature, assert that there are three main types of narrator: first-person, second-person, and third-person. The current paper depicts the three types, highlighting each in terms of aim, use, and potential for narrative effectiveness. Linking the paper to narrative stylistics, aspects and markers of point of view such as locative expression, thought and speech presentation, mind style, dis-narration, and modality are discussed. To examine point of view in narrative through discussing areas of relevance to the topic, the paper sheds light on socio-pragmatic and cognitive dimensions within narrative contexts. Finally, the paper concludes with a number of essential factors for shaping the construct of effective point of view in narrative.

First-Person Experiments in Thinking

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger
Keyword(s):  
Physiological Parameters ◽  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Thinking Process ◽  
Mental Contents

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.

Effects of Light-Hearted and Serious Entertainment on Enjoyment of the First and Third Person

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hofer
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Media Consumption ◽  
First Person ◽  
Online Experiment ◽  
Entertainment Media ◽  
Third Person Effect ◽  
The Third ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Perceived Enjoyment ◽  
The Third Person

Abstract. This was a study on the perceived enjoyment of different movie genres. In an online experiment, 176 students were randomly divided into two groups (n = 88) and asked to estimate how much they, their closest friends, and young people in general enjoyed either serious or light-hearted movies. These self–other differences in perceived enjoyment of serious or light-hearted movies were also assessed as a function of differing individual motivations underlying entertainment media consumption. The results showed a clear third-person effect for light-hearted movies and a first-person effect for serious movies. The third-person effect for light-hearted movies was moderated by level of hedonic motivation, as participants with high hedonic motivations did not perceive their own and others’ enjoyment of light-hearted films differently. However, eudaimonic motivations did not moderate first-person perceptions in the case of serious films.

Praxeology, Imperatives, and Shifts of View

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benj Hellie
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
First Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
And Shifts ◽  
Practical Metaphysics ◽  
The Way

Recent neo-Anscombean work in praxeology (aka ‘philosophy of practical reason’), salutarily, shifts focus from an alienated ‘third-person’ viewpoint on practical reason to an embedded ‘first-person’ view: for example, the ‘naive rationalizations’ of Michael Thompson, of form ‘I am A-ing because I am B-ing’, take up the agent’s view, in the thick of action. Less salutary, in its premature abandonment of the first-person view, is an interpretation of these naive rationalizations as asserting explanatory links between facts about organically structured agentive processes in progress, followed closely by an inflationary project in ‘practical metaphysics’. If, instead, praxeologists chase first-personalism all the way down, both fact and explanation vanish (and with them, the possibility of metaphysics): what is characteristically practical is endorsement of nonpropositional imperatival content, chained together not explanatorily, but through limits on intelligibility. A connection to agentive behavior must somehow be reestablished—but this can (and can only) be done ‘transcendentally’.

Seeming to Seem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
The Third Person

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.

scholarly journals When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Existential Crisis ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Pathological Development ◽  
Sense Of Reality ◽  
Intentional Structure

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

Meeting of minds: Narratives as a tool to reduce prejudice toward stigmatized group members

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022110127
Author(s):  
Nuri Kim ◽  
Cuimin Lim
Keyword(s):  
Social Presence ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Intergroup Contact ◽  
First Person ◽  
Narrative Texts ◽  
Intergroup Anxiety ◽  
Narrative Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Perceived Social Presence ◽  
Group Members

This study investigates a mechanism of mediated intergroup contact effects that occurs through experiencing social presence of a stigmatized outgroup character. Conceiving narrative texts as a context for mediated intergroup contact, we experimentally test ( N = 505) the effects of narrative perspective (first vs. third person) and the photograph of the outgroup protagonist (present vs. absent) on perceived social presence of the outgroup character. We further test whether experiencing the outgroup protagonist as socially present affects intergroup outcomes (i.e., perspective-taking, intergroup anxiety, outgroup knowledge, and outgroup attitudes). Findings indicate that first-person narratives are more effective than third-person narratives in inducing social presence of the stigmatized outgroup character; photos, unexpectedly, did not have such an effect. Social presence, in turn, plays a key role in facilitating positive intergroup outcomes from reading online narrative texts. The implications of our findings are discussed.

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