scholarly journals The evolution of inefficiency in a simulated stag hunt

2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Neil Bearden
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt

scholarly journals Loss avoidance as selection principle: Evidence from simple stag-hunt games

2005 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ondrej Rydval ◽  
Andreas Ortmann
Keyword(s):  
Selection Principle ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Loss Avoidance

A stag hunt with signalling and mutual beliefs

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelle de Boer
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

A stag-hunt with playing cards

1879 ◽  
Vol s5-XII (313) ◽  
pp. 509-510
Author(s):  
Cuthbert Bede
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt

scholarly journals The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis A. Palacio ◽  
Alexandra Cortés-Aguilar ◽  
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Strategic Role ◽  
Different Levels

This paper studies the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats and promises. We develop a model of strategic communication, based on theconflict game with perfect information, in which a noisycommitment messageis sent by a better-informed sender to a receiver who takes an action that determines the welfare of both. Our model captures different levels of aligned-preferences, for which classical games such asstag hunt,hawk-dove, andprisoner’s dilemmaare particular cases. We characterise the Bayesian perfect equilibrium with nonbinding messages undertruth-telling beliefsandsender’s bargaining powerassumptions. Through our equilibrium selection we show that the less conflict the game has, the more informative the equilibrium signal is and less credibility is necessary to implement it.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document