scholarly journals The effect of emotion on interpretation and logic in a conditional reasoning task

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 1112-1125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabelle Blanchette
1992 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Markovits ◽  
Fabien Savary

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) have proposed that people possess classes of linguistically based schemas that have an internal structure that is determined by pragmatic considerations. They found that when permission schemas (“If you want to do P, then you must do Q”) are used in the selection task, the success rate is much superior to what is usually observed. According to Cheng and Holyoak, this is due to the fact that the permission schema is defined by a set of production rules that give the same answers to problems of conditional inference as those of formal logic. In order to test this hypothesis specifically, 160 university students were given one of two tests. The first contained two sets of inferential reasoning tasks, one using a permission schema, the second using a relation of multiple causality. The second test employed the same two conditional relations, but in an appropriate context. The results indicated that subjects did better on the reasoning task with the schema of multiple causality when presented in context, but, as predicted, their performance was much worse on the inferential reasoning task with the permission schema, which generated a higher proportion of logically incorrect responses. These results suggest that contrary to what has been affirmed, permission schemas might not have a logical structure that is equivalent to conditional logic. A second experiment examined selection task performance using the same two relations in context. Performance on the permission schema was superior to that found with the relation of multiple causality. This confirmed previous results indicating that permission schemas do improve selection task performance, but also suggests that this effect is not related to understanding of conditional reasoning.


1993 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Toms ◽  
Neil Morris ◽  
Deborah Ward

Little is known about the role of working memory in conditional reasoning. This paper reports three experiments that examine the contributions of the visuo-spatial scratch pad (VSSP), the articulatory loop, and the central executive components of Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) model of working memory to conditional reasoning. The first experiment employs a spatial memory task that is presented concurrently with two putative spatial interference tasks (tapping and tracking), articulatory suppression, and a verbal memory load. Only the tracking and memory load impaired performance, suggesting that these tap the VSSP and central executive, respectively. Having established the potency of these interference tasks two further experiments examined the effects of tapping and tracking (Experiment 2) and articulation and memory load (Experiment 3) on a conditional reasoning task. Neither tracking nor tapping affected the number of inferences accepted or response latency. Articulation also failed to affect conditional reasoning but memory load selectively reduced acceptance of modus tollens inferences. These results are discussed in terms of both rule-based and mental models theories of reasoning. While these data cannot discriminate between the two perspectives they provide support for one of the central assumptions in each: that some errors in reasoning are attributable directly to working memory demands. Taken together these experiments suggest that conditional reasoning requires an abstract working memory medium for representation; it does not require either the VSSP or the articulatory loop. It is concluded that the central executive provides the necessary substrate.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Srikanth Dandotkar ◽  
Katja Wiemer-Hastings

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca McKenzie ◽  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
Simon J. Handley

1988 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Markovits

This study examined interactions between empirical data, internal representations, and reasoning performance on a conditional reasoning task using a concrete apparatus. Subjects were asked an initial series of questions in order to determine the pattern of inferences they made after simple exposure to the apparatus. They were subsequently shown two different experimental manipulations designed to provide data about the internal structure of the apparatus without giving information about specific inferences. Some subjects did change their reasoning in response to the new data, although most remained stable throughout the experiment. These results are consistent with the idea that reasoning may require generation of an internal representation of a problem space. It was also concluded that the relation between reasoning and empirical evidence cannot be understood without supposing that evidence is often interpreted by subjects according to their reasoning patterns.


1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Markovits ◽  
Robert Vachon

2015 ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Miguel López Astorga

RESUMENEn este trabajo, analizamos un experimento sobre el razonamiento condicional de Staller, Sloman y Ben-Zeev (2000). En dicho experimento, los sujetos parecen manifestar un comportamiento contrario a las prescripciones de la lógica formal. Nosotros lo revisamosy descubrimos todas las variables que es preciso atender en los procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje, variables que no siempre son consideradas por los docentes.Palabras clave: condicional, conocimiento general, inferencia, procesamiento de la información, representación mental.DO WE REASON ACCORDING TO OUR GENERALKNOWLEDGE? A STUDY ABOUT INTERACTIONSBETWEEN INFORMATION PROCESSING AND LOGICALINFERENCEABSTRACTIn this paper, I analyze an experiment about conditional reasoning presented by Staller,Sloman and Ben-Zeev (2000). In that experiment, the subjects’ behavior seems contradictory to prescriptions of formal logic. I check it and I discover all the variables that we need to deal with them in teaching and learning processes, despite that such variables are notalways checked by the teachers.Keywords: conditional, general knowledge, inference, information processing, mentalrepresentation.


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