WMD Compliance and Enforcement in a Changing Global Context

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Wunderlich ◽  
Harald Müller ◽  
Una Jakob
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
World Order ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Global Context ◽  
The Past ◽  
Cooperative Security ◽  
The Cold War

The regimes for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are essential ingredients of the global order. Yet this order is currently in transition: the bipolarity of the Cold War has given way to a more complex, multipolar world order characterized by conflicts of interest and great power competition rather than cooperative security. This competition brings with it rising strategic uncertainties which endanger stability and have far reaching implications for WMD-related agreements. To better understand the implications of this changing global context for WMD arms control and disarmament measures this report looks at the past, present and future prospects for WMD-related treaties. The report begins by outlining four broad yet interlinked approaches to arms control and disarmament before considering how these have been applied to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the past and how these measures could be applied in the future.

America, Russia, and the Future of Arms Control

2001 ◽  
Vol 100 (648) ◽  
pp. 323-329
Author(s):  
Jack Mendelsohn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Security Policies ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future

The Bush administration's national security policies, if fully and unilaterally implemented, will severely stress United States relations with Russia and China. … These policies would also deal a serious blow to the international treaty regimes developed over the past 30 years to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction and that continue to enjoy universal support and approval.

13. The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2018 ◽  
pp. 220-237
Author(s):  
John Baylis
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter explores a variety of questions on how to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, as well as the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war era from arms control to more forcible means to tackle nuclear proliferation. It then considers the emergence of new ideas, first in the Clinton administration, and then in the Bush administration, that focused less on arms control and more on counterproliferation. It also examines a host of problems and dilemmas associated with counterproliferation, the Obama administration's policy of engagement and ‘tough but direct diplomacy’, and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions. Finally, it reflects on future prospects for strategic nuclear arms control.

12. The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Baylis
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines issues regarding the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its implications for international security. It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, and the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war period from arms control to more forcible means to tackle proliferation. It then considers concerns that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s about the continuing utility of arms control as an effective means of dealing with WMDs. It also analyses new ideas that began to take shape, first during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and then under George W. Bush, about more militarily driven approaches, associated with counterproliferation. The chapter concludes with an assessment of ‘the return to arms control’ by the administration of Barack Obama and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions.

un Security Council vs. Weapons of Mass Destruction

2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Hans Blix
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Council ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Cold War

International institutions given the task to maintain collective security and to seek disarmament need to build on cooperation between major powers. The authors of the un Charter vested great powers in the Security Council but a consensus between the five permanent great powers was required for use of the powers. This inevitably paralyzed the Council during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the permanent members have remained unable jointly to pursue disarmament, but they have succeeded in several remarkable cases to reach consensus, notably on measures to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. The quick action to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria was a win-win case led by us-Russian diplomacy, while the comprehensive deal settling the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program was a victory for patient diplomacy involving all permanent members and the eu. These actions show the potentials of the Council.

Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry
Keyword(s):  
World Order ◽  
International Order ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
Liberal Internationalism ◽  
Democratic Community ◽  
Cooperative Security ◽  
Fixed Set ◽  
Liberal Vision ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Open Markets

Liberal international order—both its ideas and real-world political formations—is not embodied in a fixed set of principles or practices. Open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, the rule of law—these are aspects of the liberal vision that have made appearances in various combinations and changing ways over the last century. I argue that it is possible to identify three versions or models of liberal international order—versions 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. The first is associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, the second is the Cold War liberal internationalism of the post-1945 decades, and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. I develop a set of dimensions that allow for identifying different logics of liberal international order and identify variables that will shape the movement from liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.

scholarly journals CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING THE EXTENSION OF THE “NEW START” TREATY: CAN THE USA AND RUSSIA PRESERVE EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL?

2021 ◽  
Vol 70 (4/2020) ◽  
pp. 123-149
Author(s):  
Marina Kostic
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Security Challenge ◽  
The Cold War

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (“New START”) is the last pillar of the arms control regime on which the end of the Cold War and the new world order rested. Its expiration on 5 February 2021 is a top security challenge and indicates a possible new strategic arms race. However, can the United States and Russia still preserve the existing strategic arms control by extending the Treaty for another five years? What are the prospects, the opportunities and obstacles for this extension? What are the most pressing issues USA and Russia face with in order to preserve strategic arms control and are they willing to do so? In order to answer to these research questions author analyses several key issues that are of paramount importance for extension of the New START: nuclear modernization processes, invention of new weapons and emergence of new warfare domains; transparency and verification and broader confidence building measures; missile defence and prompt global strike; tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia; general US-Russia relations which include question of democratic capacity; and broader influence of this Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation regime. By using content and discourse analysis author concludes that, although it is obvious that the extension of the New START would be primarily in favour of Russia and that the USA has not much to gain, the character of strategic stability in the Third Nuclear Age gives reasons to believe that the New START will be extended for another five years.

Africa and the New World Order

1993 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Volman
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Force ◽  
New World Order ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
New Developments ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cold War

Theend of the cold war and of the bi-polar world order that shaped international relations over the past 50 years is forcing the Government of the United States to make dramatic policy changes that affect all parts of the globe. In Africa, it is also confronted by significant new developments on local, regional, and continent-wide levels. Of particular concern to American leaders are increasing internal demands for political democracy, and the intensification of ethnic and other conflicts which call national integrity into question. And, as the decision to send up to 30,000 marines, infantrymen, and other troops to Somalia proves, the U.S. Administration will not hesitate to use military force if authorised by the United Nations.

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 717. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 432.

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith S. Yaphe
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Delivery Systems ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
Weapons Systems

Tony Cordesman has become a veritable institution among Washington policy analysts. Few are more prolific, especially in the area of comparative analysis of weapons systems. He can be depended on to produce data-rich, comprehensive, lavishly documented studies of military doctrine and usage, intentions to acquire or produce weapons systems, and willingness to abide by international arms-control regimes. These two books are no exception. They include indepth analyses of conventional and non-conventional weapons systems. It is the latter that makes these books so important to analysts of regional weapons development and arms control. Cordesman examines Iraqi and Iranian acquisitions, from purchase, absorption, production, and use of conventional weapons to efforts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—the so-called weapons of mass destruction—and the requisite ballistic-missile–delivery systems.

A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
GORDON H. McCORMICK ◽  
GUILLERMO OWEN
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
The Past ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Made In

We consider a game-theoretic model of counterproliferation, in which a single Incumbent (holding nuclear weapons) is faced with a sequence of potential Entrants (who are considering developing and deploying a nuclear capability or other weapons of mass destruction of their own). The Incumbent can either choose to act preemptively, with certain costs, or allow the Entrants to deploy a nuclear capability, with consequent costs due to the potential for nuclear blackmail. How should each of the players decide? The players' decisions are optimally based not only on their own cost functions (which each knows) but also on their opponent's cost structure (which is known only in probability). Entrants (other than the first) can learn something about the Incumbent's cost structure from decisions they have made in the past. It turns out that, depending on a would-be Entrant's cost structure, a record of preemption by the Incumbent can have either a deterrent or provocation effect. Understanding the basis for each of these contradictory effects is critical to designing an optimal counterproliferation strategy.

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