scholarly journals Identifying Collaborative Actions to Reduce Today’s Nuclear Dangers

2021 ◽  

Key propositions, findings, and recommendations from the UNIDIR dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Deterrence, and Strategic Arms Control.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Dunn ◽  
Andrey Baklitskiy ◽  
Tong Zhao

Who are the proponents of strategic arms control? Why do they advocate it? What are their major assumptions? What are the important uncertainties of arms control? What is the relationship between strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? This paper, the fifth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, explores these questions building on the perspectives of US, Chinese and Russian experts—Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy and Tong Zhao—and drawing in the views of diverse and informed participants in UNIDIR’s Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Dunn ◽  
Andrey Baklitskiy ◽  
Tong Zhao

Who are the proponents of strategic arms control? Why do they advocate it? What are their major assumptions? What are the important uncertainties of arms control? What is the relationship between strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? This paper, the fifth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, explores these questions building on the perspectives of US, Chinese and Russian experts—Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy and Tong Zhao—and drawing in the views of diverse and informed participants in UNIDIR’s Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control.


Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa

Did the nuclear revolution contribute to an era of peace? ‘Nuclear deterrence and arms control’ looks at the post-World War II stalemate and Cold War détente. The concept of deterrence did not come up until the second decade of the nuclear age. The introduction of thermonuclear weapons and nuclear-tipped, long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles turned foreign policy on its head. Mutual deterrence was less of a policy than a reality. With the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow mounted a show of defiance at a moment when it was relatively weak. The Carter and Reagan administrations were beset by external and internal disagreements, but prudence and luck prevailed.


Author(s):  
Michael Sheehan

This chapter discusses the continuing importance of military security, noting how International Relations has historically seen security almost entirely in terms of the military dimension. It first examines the impact of the broadening of the concept of security on approaches to the study of its military dimension before considering the key aspects of the traditional approach to military security and some of the most common ways in which states have sought to acquire it historically, such as war, alliances, and nuclear deterrence. The chapter then explores some of the difficulties in acquiring military security and how its pursuit can sometimes reduce, rather than increase, security. In particular, it analyses arms control as a means of achieving military security. Finally, it shows that military security remains an important field to study, even within a significantly broadened understanding of security as a multifaceted concept.


Author(s):  
Daniel Deudney

In the wake of the development of nuclear weapons, the survival of civilization, and perhaps humanity, hinges on answering the “nuclear political question”: Which political arrangements are needed to provide security from large-scale nuclear violence? Over the course of the nuclear era, a great debate on this question has occurred in three quite different rounds. In the first round, “nuclear one world” ideas about the obsolescence of the state-system and necessity of a world state predominated, but reached both conceptual and practical impasses. In the second round, across much of the Cold War, a trinity of deterrence-centered approaches, simple deterrence, war strategism, and arms control, prevailed. In the currently unfolding third round, proliferation and leakage have weakened confidence in nuclear deterrence, while both war strategism and arms control have become more radical, offering opposite “bombs away” answers of coercive counter-proliferation and preventive war, and deep arms control and nuclear abolition.


Author(s):  
Alexander Savelyev

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.


2022 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falk

In such a complex and uncertain world, it may help to think like a Hindu, and accept contradiction as more in keeping with social and political reality than is finding a right answer to complex policy puzzles. What is almost impossible for those trained within Western frames of reference is to grasp that there are diverse perspectives of understanding that may result in seemingly contradictory recommendations despite shared values and goals. Civilizational perspectives and personal experience inevitably color what we feel, think, and do, and so being likeminded when it comes abolishing nuclear weapons is often coupled with somewhat divergent views on what to advocate when it comes to tactics and priorities. In this spirit, this paper tries to depict a set of reasons why the goal of nuclear disarmament will never be reached so long as arms control and nonproliferation of nuclear weaponry are seen as the pillars of global stability in the nuclear age.


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa

The nuclear revolution, it is argued, caused an era of relative peace. Not all agree. Some suggest that nuclear weapons were actually irrelevant to keeping the peace because a world war had become too costly. ‘Nuclear deterrence and arms control’ considers both sides of the argument. Not until the second decade of the nuclear age was the danger of nuclear weaponry and the perception of this danger enough to give impetus to the concept of deterrence and cause a Cold War stalemate. Deterrence did not emerge as a military strategy, it was just a political reality. Nuclear stability prevailed due to good luck and mutual prudence.


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