A Reserve Price Generation Agent for an Internet Auction System

2002 ◽  
Vol 9D (5) ◽  
pp. 955-962
Keyword(s):  
Reserve Price ◽  
Internet Auction ◽  
Generation Agent

REPUTATION IN AN INTERNET AUCTION MARKET

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia G. McDonald ◽  
V. Carlos Slawson
Keyword(s):  
Internet Auction ◽  
Auction Market

Internet auction sellers: does size really matter?

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane Halstead ◽  
Richard C. Becherer
Keyword(s):  
Internet Auction

Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.

Advanced Feedback Management for Internet Auction Reputation Systems

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 31-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kaszuba ◽  
Albert Hupa ◽  
Adam Wierzbicki
Keyword(s):  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Internet Auction

Brand Equity Effects on Bidding Strategies in an Online Environment

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson ◽  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Ching-I Teng
Keyword(s):  
Brand Equity ◽  
Information Resources ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Online Environment ◽  
Internet Auction ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Equity Effects

Internet auction bidders seldom have all the information resources upon which they have learned to comfortably rely. This raises the possibility that internet auction participants depend more on brand related knowledge and employ bidding strategies consistent with heightened valuations of brand related information. This study empirically examines how differences in brand equity affect consumer online auction behavior on eBay. Branded products with objective values (certified coins) are examined for differences in bidding behavior across auctions. The results indicate auction participants employ incremental bidding strategies for preferred brands that have higher prices except when those brands were for coins of the highest quality. Auctions that had sellers who were not power sellers or which did not take Paypal are more prone to attract late or last minute bidders.

scholarly journals Projection of Private Values in Auctions

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (10) ◽  
pp. 3256-3298
Author(s):  
Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch ◽  
Marco Pagnozzi ◽  
Antonio Rosato
Keyword(s):  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
English Auctions ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Optimal Reserve ◽  
Intensity Of Competition

We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate how similar others’ tastes are to one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, to overbid—irrespective of whether values are independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, the optimal reserve price is lower than the rational benchmark, and decreasing in the extent of projection and the number of bidders. With an uncertain common-value component, projecting bidders draw distorted inferences about others’ information. This misinference is stronger in second-price and English auctions, reducing their allocative efficiency compared to first-price auctions. (JEL D11, D44, D82, D83)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document