scholarly journals Standing in the Way of Our Goals

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-593
Author(s):  
Jessica Nation Holtman

Currently in Texas, standing options for third-party nonparents seeking to file suits affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCRs”) are extremely limited. And, even though the standing options are codified, the evidence necessary to meet the threshold elements may be drastically different depending on the case’s location. These third parties, who have previously exercised parental responsibilities, must make showings to the court that most divorced parents could not make; and this is just for a chance to bring a claim in court. While this seems unfair, and Texas should absolutely resolve the split among its appellate courts, there is one extremely important part that has yet to be mentioned: the child. Standing determinations do not involve a best interest of the child inquiry; this must be changed. This Comment uses a San Antonio Court of Appeals case to highlight both the Texas appellate-court split and the lack of a best interest of the child consideration. Using the case’s facts, this Comment breaks down the general third-party standing option by venue to show just how different the requirements are depending on where in Texas the party resides. In most cases, the outcome spotlights that the child is the true victim of these standing limitations. Professor James Dwyer explains that relationships have a far greater impact on children than on adults. Courts should consider this when determining the best interest of the child. More importantly, the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration, not one that is considered after the plaintiff establishes standing. Allowing a third-party parent to file suit is highly likely to serve the child’s best interest. Once judges apply the best-interest standard at the appropriate stage, judges should then look through the child’s lens for making recommendations on the child’s behalf. Too few judges have said too few words about the lack of the best interest of the child consideration when issuing standing determinations. But with our nation’s evolving familial structure, the time has come to reconsider how courts determine who may bring suits affecting children.

Author(s):  
Brealey Mark ◽  
George Kyla

This chapter focuses on the rights of third parties to intervene in competition proceedings in the High Court (and appellate courts) and in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). It first considers intervention by third parties in the High Court under Rule 19.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), intervention in judicial review proceedings, and intervention in appeal proceedings. It then discusses intervention in CAT, placing emphasis on appeals and reviews (applying for permission to intervene, the time limit for making an application to intervene, the role played by intervener at the hearing). It also explains how compensation claims are made under CAT rule 16 before concluding with an analysis of intervention by competition authorities, namely the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the European Union Commission.


Author(s):  
Serena Olsaretti

The justification of the parent-child relationship that lies at the core of the family raises two main challenges for liberal egalitarianism: the challenge of authority and the challenge of partiality. These point, respectively, to the burdens of justifying to children their parents’ having rights over them, and to third parties parents’ favoring of their children in ways that negatively affects others. This paper examines some recent attempts at justifying the family and meeting these two challenges by appealing to the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship. It argues that these accounts do not capture some important convictions about the moral status of the parent-child relationship and thereby do not fully meet the two stated challenges. The paper also offers an alternative basis for justifying the parent-child relationship on which parents, by virtue of being morally responsible for their children’s existence, have an obligation to enter a relationship with them.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Barbara Preložnjak

In ideal circumstances, parents are the most devoted advocates for their children. They have first-hand information about their children and care passionately about their welfare. Therefore, the law recognizes parents as guardians of children’s welfare and gives them substantial autonomy in making the decision for their children. Sometimes the actions of well-meaning parents, as in the case of the immediate medical intervention, could be a subject of testing limits of parental autonomy. It is especially noticeable when parental decisions represent a risk for child well-being, and the state has to intervene in order to protect it. However, the decision whether the state intervention into the parent-child relationship is legitimate is quite difficult since it is necessary to take into account a specific legal character of the parent-child relationship and balance between the parental autonomy and the best interest of the child. With an aim to evaluate the legitimacy of limiting parental autonomy in case of immediate medical intervention, the author will analyse the extent to which parental autonomy should be free of coercive intrusion of the state.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-205
Author(s):  
choeffel Amy

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a federal district court ruling granting summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in a case in which Presbyterian Medical Center (PMC) challenged Medicare's requirement of contemporaneous documentation of $828,000 in graduate medical education (GME) expenses prior to increasing reimbursement amounts. DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala denied PMC's request for reimbursement for increased GME costs. The appellants then brought suit in federal court challenging the legality of an interpretative rule that requires requested increases in reimbursement to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. PMC also alleged that an error was made in the administrative proceedings to prejudice its claims because Aetna, the hospital's fiscal intermediary, failed to provide the hospital with a written report explaining why it was denied the GME reimbursement.


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