scholarly journals Could the Pay Ratio Disclosure Backfire?

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jillian Loh

At the signing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”), President Barack Obama asserted that, “We all win when investors around the world have confidence in our markets. We all win when shareholders have more power and more information. . . . And we all win when folks are rewarded based on how well they perform, not how well they evade accountability.” After the financial crisis in 2008, the Obama Administration recognized the need to reconstruct the existing American financial regulatory system to ensure that a financial meltdown would never happen again. It is quite clear that Congress’s purpose behind the Dodd-Frank Act is to redevelop the financial system to ensure that the 2008 financial crisis will never be repeated. However, the Dodd-Frank Act contains considerable provisions that add substantial new requirements for certain publicly traded companies based in the United States. Analysts have theorized that the creation of new regulations relating to executive compensation and corporate governance was due to assertions that large executive pay contributed to the financial crisis. There has been much debate over whether such changes to executive compensation and corporate governance practices under Title IX of the DoddFrank Act are meeting the intended goals of financial system reform.

Author(s):  
John Armour

According to a common narrative, the failure of banks in the financial crisis reflected poor corporate governance practices, as well as inadequate prudential regulatory safeguards. Yet it turns out that the “best” governance practices according to ordinary standards were the ones that did worst during the financial crisis. In the period leading up to the financial crisis, it was believed that regulation would cause banks to internalize the costs of their activities, meaning that what maximized bank shareholders’ returns would also be in the interests of society. Consequently, large banks used the same governance tools as non-financial companies to minimize shareholder-management agency costs, namely independent boards, shareholder rights, the shareholder primacy norm, the threat of takeovers, and equity-based executive compensation. Unfortunately, such tools had the adverse effect of encouraging bank managers to take excessive risks. Consequently, a significant rethink about the way in which banks are governed is required.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 56-63
Author(s):  
Jessica Hong Yang ◽  
Nada Kakabadse

This paper reviews the impact of the global financial crisis on financial system reform in China. Scholars and practitioners have critically questioned the efficiencies of the Anglo-American principal-agent model of corporate governance which promotes shareholder-value maximisation. Should China continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to financial reform? This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate governance literature, regulatory reports and news articles from the financial press. After examining the fundamental limitations of the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, the paper considers the risks in opening up China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies. The paper outlines a critique of shareholder-capitalism in relation to the German team-production model of corporate governance, promoting a “social market economy” styled capitalism. Through such analysis, the paper explores numerous implications for China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model. China needs to follow its own financial reform through understanding its particular economy. The global financial crisis might help China rethink the nature of corporate governance, identify its weakness and assess the current reform agenda.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Ballas ◽  
Alexandros Garefalakis ◽  
Christos Lemonakis ◽  
Vassiliki Balla

The financial system consists, without doubt, one of the most important determinants of the world national economies, which undergoes numerous changes and challenges with major impact on the economic growth prospects of a country. A healthy financial system is the steam engine of the economy, a major source for economic growth through which capitals are attracted for investments; hence, it is regarded as a trustee of financial stability. Given the difference in structure and function of the financial sector in various countries, we investigate the extent to which the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accompanied by Corporate Governance practices affected the quality of financial and narrative reporting offered within published statements of Greek banks for the period from 2008 to 2011. The originality of the work lies at the fact that it focuses on Greek financial institutions for a period that incorporates both the burst of global financial crisis and the beginning of the Greek sovereign debt crisis making inferences on quality of reporting as a result of IFRS and Corporate Governance practices adoption. Our analysis revealed the positive contribution of both of the above categories of variables to the accuracy and quality of the information offered to stakeholders.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-27
Author(s):  
Seyed Mehdian ◽  
Rasoul Rezvanian ◽  
Ovidiu Stoica

AbstractThe 2008 financial crisis, originated by securitization of sub-prime mortgage loans, had a huge impact on U.S. financial institutions and markets. We hypothesize that due to this crisis, the commercial banking industry has changed their portfolio structures and risk-taking behavior. To shed light on the response of U.S. banks to the 2008 financial crisis, we use the non-parametric approach to measure and compare the overall efficiency of large U.S. banks pre- and post-2008 financial crisis. We then decompose the overall measure of efficiency into allocative, overall technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency measures to better understand the sources of banking inefficiencies. The results indicate that large U.S. banks indeed changed their portfolios structure, and the efficiency of large commercial banks in the United States declined substantially during the financial crisis. Although it has been recovering since then, it still has not reached to the pre-crisis efficiency level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Faitira Manuere ◽  
Precious Hove

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on various theories that are used in organisations today to determine executive compensation. This paper analyses the relevance of the theories that are used to determine CEO compensation in modern corporations. The paper makes an attempt to review extensively the literature on CEO compensation. This paper looks at the concerns of sixteen theories of executive compensation. This paper further analyses the special features that are associated with CEO pay. These features help us to understand the problems that experts on executive pay experience when they try to define the exact CEO pay when compared to other rewards that are non financial. The drivers of executive pay are quantified and qualified in order to provide the conceptual background needed to understand the core factors that determine executive pay. Therefore the role of institutional investors in driving managerial salary is explored in detail. Finally, the effects of firm size and good corporate governance on executive pay are carefully analysed.


Author(s):  
Guler Aras

Corporate governance is a central issue in business and economics. However, governance in financial institutions is more complicated than in other fields because of the nature of financial services and instruments. Financial organizations are similar to other businesses in terms of their purposes of establishment, but confidence in management and complex risk structures are more important in financial organizations than in other businesses. In financial institutions, there are various areas in which problems arise that are related to corporate governance, including the agency problem and stakeholder protection. The importance of good governance for sound performance of financial institutions was reconfirmed during the 2008 financial crisis, raising the need to understand the agency problems and the efficiency of various corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating them. International organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Basel Committee, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, have been working with regulators and policy makers to improve corporate governance practices both in nonfinancial and financial institutions. Corporate governance, especially in financial institutions, is essential in guaranteeing a sound financial system, capital markets, and sustainable economic growth. Governance weaknesses at financial institutions can result in the transmission of problems across the finance sector and the economy. Consequently, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms of financial institutions and capital markets after financial crises had significant importance in a period that witnessed an intensive discussion of corporate governance issues with new regulations and the related academic works.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic S Mishkin

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 can be divided into two distinct phases. The first and more limited phase from August 2007 to August 2008 stemmed from losses in one relatively small segment of the U.S. financial system—namely, subprime residential mortgages. Despite this disruption to financial markets, real GDP in the United States continued to rise into the second quarter of 2008, and forecasters were predicting only a mild recession. In mid-September 2008, however, the financial crisis entered a far more virulent phase. In rapid succession, the investment bank Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy on September 15, 2008; the insurance firm AIG collapsed on September 16, 2008; there was a run on the Reserve Primary Fund money market fund on the same day; and the highly publicized struggle to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) began. How did something that appeared in mid-2008 to be a significant but fairly mild financial disruption transform into a full-fledged global financial crisis? What caused this transformation? Did the government responses to the global financial crisis help avoid a worldwide depression? What challenges do these government interventions raise for the world financial system and the economy going forward?


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 178-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Garrido-Cumbrera ◽  
Jorge Chacón-García

The financial crisis of 2008 has had a greater effect on people with disabilities than on those without disabilities in Spain. In recent years, the number of persons with disabilities registered as part of the labor force and having a higher educational level has increased. However, the unemployment rate among people with disabilities has grown at a faster pace, especially for women and young people. A similar situation has occurred with respect to the annual gross average wage; the gap between those with and without disabilities has increased in the years following the crisis. The present study reveals that Spanish public policies aimed at improving levels of employment for people with disabilities have not achieved the expected results. Here, we explore the possible causes and compare the results with those obtained in the United States.


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