scholarly journals Effectiveness of EU law and protection of fundamental rights - in search of balance in the context of the ne bis in idem principle

2019 ◽  
pp. 37-58
Author(s):  
Monika Szwarc
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Ne Bis In Idem ◽  
Full Effect ◽  
Article 50

The article undertakes the current and important issue of balancing between the Member States’ obligations to ensure effectiveness of EU law and to respect fundamental rights, taking as an example the ne bis in idem principle, enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The recent case law of the CJEU in Di Puma, Garlsson and others and Menci is analysed. These rulings exemplify the growing importance of the issue of how to balance the two obligations in a situation when the repression undertaken by a Member State in order to ensure the full effect of EU law may infringe a fundamental right provided for in the Charter. The main objective is thus to formulate proposals on how to balance these interests, as well as to define their consequences for national courts.

The Problems of Applying Both Criminal and Administrative Penal Sanctions in Light of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 161-173
Author(s):  
Jakub Kawka
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Mutual Influence ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Administrative Authority ◽  
Ne Bis In Idem ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Article 50

The aim of this study is to present the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the admissibility of parallel punishments in proceedings conducted separately before criminal courts and administrative authorities. Pursuant to Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law (the ne bis in idem principle). According to the CJEU, this principle does not constitute a legal obstacle to the application of sanctions for the same unlawful conduct of the same person in both criminal and administrative proceedings, if the sanction imposed by the administrative authority does not have the nature of a criminal penalty (the case C-617/10 Fransson). Assessment of such a nature in accordance with the case law of the CJEU (influenced by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Engel case) needs to be based on three criteria: the classification of a given procedure in domestic law, the existence of a repressive function of the measure adjudicated under the procedure and the degree of its severity (the case C-489/10 Bonda). In the opinion of the CJEU, the ne bis in idem principle mentioned in Article 50 of the Charter is also not absolute, because the restrictions on the use of the rights granted by the Charter are allowed pursuant to Article 52 (1) of the Charter. Therefore, according to the CJUE, it is possible to double sanction a given behaviour with measures of a penal nature, if it is justified by general objectives such as the protection of the tax system or of the regularity of stock exchange trading, provided that each of the proceedings performs its own specific additional objectives and that the accumulation of sanctions is based on the principle of proportionality. While administrative sanctions could be meant to counteract any transgressions, criminal sanctions should be limited to the most serious, culpable abuses. Moreover, the Member States should regulate the mutual influence of both proceedings, so as not to punish too severely the same behaviour and so that the sanctions applied jointly are absolutely necessary (the case C-545/15 Menci, the case C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate and Others). On the other hand, according to the CJUE, Article 50 of the Charter excludes the possibility of bringing a given entity to administrative responsibility in the event that it had already been legally acquitted of committing the same offence with a final court ruling, because the acquittal judgement definitively determines that no act has been committed, and thus it is pointless to consider whether an exception to the ne bis in idem principle in such a case is justified in the light of Article 52 (1) of the Charter (joint cases C-596/16 and C-597/16, Enzo Di Puma and Consob). Finally, the CJUE states that Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted in such a way that it does not preclude the application of the national provision which allows for conducting criminal proceedings, if a definitive administrative penalty for the same acts has been imposed on a company with a legal personality and criminal proceedings have been initiated against a natural person (joint cases C-217/15 and C-350/15, Orsi, Baldetti).

6. The law and institutions of the European Union (EU)

2020 ◽  
pp. 209-254
Author(s):  
Steve Wilson ◽  
Helen Rutherford ◽  
Tony Storey ◽  
Natalie Wortley ◽  
Birju Kotecha
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
National Courts ◽  
State Liability ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Supranational Institutions

The UK is a former member state of the European Union (EU). The EU is administered by several supranational institutions including: the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The main sources of EU law are primary legislation, i.e. the treaties; secondary legislation, including regulations and directives; and the case law of the CJEU. Where EU law and national law conflict, EU law is supreme. EU law may have direct effect, i.e. be enforceable by individuals before national courts, or indirect effect, where national courts are obliged to interpret national legislation and case law, so far as possible to conform with a relevant directive. State liability for breaches of EU law means that member states are obliged to compensate individuals for consequent loss or damage. The Withdrawal Act 2018 includes the key provisions for EU law in the UK post-Brexit.

6. The law and institutions of the European Union (EU)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Wilson ◽  
Helen Rutherford ◽  
Tony Storey ◽  
Natalie Wortley
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
National Courts ◽  
State Liability ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Supranational Institutions

The UK is currently a Member State of the European Union (EU). The EU is administered by several supranational institutions including: the European Council; the Council of the European Union; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The main sources of EU law are primary legislation, ie the treaties, secondary legislation, including regulations and directives, and the case law of the CJEU. Where EU law and national law conflict, EU law is supreme. EU law may have direct effect, i.e. be enforceable by individuals before national courts or indirect effect, where national courts are obliged to interpret national legislation and case law, so far as possible to conform with a relevant directive. State liability for breaches of EU law means that Member States are obliged to compensate individuals for consequent loss or damage.

scholarly journals Protection of fundamental rights in the private law of the European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-153
Author(s):  
Tatjana Josipović
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Optimal Balance ◽  
Private Autonomy

The paper considers and comments on the instruments of protection of the fundamental rights of the Union in private law relationships that are in the scope of applicable EU law. Special attention is paid to the influence of fundamental rights of the Union on private autonomy and the freedom of contract in private law relationships depending on whether fundamental rights are protected by national law harmonized with EU law, or by horizontal effects of the Charter of general principles. The goal of the paper is to determine the method in private law relationships that can attain the optimal balance between the protection of fundamental rights of the Union and the principle of private autonomy and the freedom of contract regulated by national law of a member state. The author favors the protection of fundamental rights in private law relationships by applying adequate measures that create indirect horizontal effects of the provisions of EU law on fundamental rights. These concern national measures that can also secure adequate protection of fundamental rights via interpretation and application of national law in line with EU law in private law relationships.

scholarly journals Swoboda przemieszczania się studentów w Unii Europejskiej — prawo dostępu do szkolnictwa wyższego i stypendiów w kontekście transnarodowym

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 261-290
Author(s):  
Monika Szwarc
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
Access To Higher Education ◽  
Access To Education ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Right To Education ◽  
Migrant Students

FREE MOVEMENT OF STUDENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION — RIGHT TO EDUCATION, ACCESS TO EDUCATION AND ACCESS TO GRANTS IN THE TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXTThe right to education, recognised by Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be analysed and interpreted in the light of the previous evolution of EU law in this domain, as well as of the preceding jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. In the present state of EU law there is no doubt that access to higher education as well as access to student grants or loans falls within the scope of EU law. Therefore the article contains the overview of where EU law stands at present in the domain of mobility of students. The main two fields of interest are: access to education of migrant students, when they move from their home Member State to a host Member State in order to undertake studies, as well as access to social benefits, namely student grants or loans, which enable or make easier the mobility of students. The second field of interest concerning student grants or loans is divided into two parts: the first concerns access to grants or loans accorded by the host Member State to migrant student; the second concerns access to grants or loans accorded by the home Member State to its own citizens in order to encourage them to study abroad. The analysis, on the one hand, reveals that the scope of application of EU law to the situation of migrant students, due to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, is very wide, which means the wide scope of rights accorded to students and the narrow scope of freedom left to the Member States. On the other hand, the analysis leads to a conclusion that the case of migrant students is an exemplification of the challenges faced by the Union in the field of free movement, in particular the pressure to limit the social benefi ts for EU citizens exercising their right to free movement.

scholarly journals The Relationship Between the Charter and General Principles: Looking Back and Looking Forward

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Emily HANCOX
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Transformative Potential ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.

Preliminary References

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten Broberg ◽  
Niels Fenger
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
National Court ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Appeal

A reference for a preliminary ruling is a request from the national court of a Member State to the Court of Justice of the European Union to give an authoritative interpretation of an EU act or a decision on the validity of such an act. In this situation, the Court of Justice does not function as a court of appeal that rules on the outcome of the main proceedings before the referring court: it makes judgment neither on the facts in the main proceedings nor on the interpretation and application of national law. Moreover, in principle it does not itself pronounce on the concrete application of EU law in the main proceedings before the referring court. Finally, while a preliminary ruling is normally given in the form of a judgment, the ruling is addressed to the referring court and not to the parties to the main proceedings. Only the referring court’s subsequent decision can be enforced against those parties. The preliminary reference procedure is therefore an expression of the interplay and allocation of tasks between national courts and the Court of Justice.

Travauxto the EU Treaties: Preparatory Work as a Source of EU Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuli MIETTINEN ◽  
Merita KETTUNEN
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Dynamic Interpretation ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Preparatory Work ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe Court of Justice of the European Union has historically rejected references to preparatory work in the interpretation of EU Treaties. However, the preparatory work for the EURATOM, Maastricht, and Constitutional Treaties have played a role in recent judgments. The ‘explanations’ to the Charter of Fundamental Rights are expressly approved in the current Treaties. We examine the emerging case law on preparatory work. Reference to the drafters’ intent does not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially even ossify historical interpretations. Even if the consequence of their introduction is a conservative interpretation, their use raises questions of transparency and democracy, and complicates the already difficult task of interpreting the EU constitution.

scholarly journals The Relationship between EU Law and Fundamental Principles of Estonian Substantive Criminal Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 174-182
Author(s):  
Kaie Rosin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.

scholarly journals The Application of EU Law by Polish Courts. General Remarks on 15 Years of Experience

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-32
Author(s):  
Monika Domańska ◽  
Dawid Miąsik ◽  
Monika Szwarc
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Individual Member ◽  
Years Of Experience ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Minimum Requirements

The Court of Justice of the European Union operates on a case-by-case basis. This means that its decisions normally relate to specific problems occurring in a specific Member State. Consequently it is often hard to ‘translate’ this case law into the national legal system of a different Member State. Nevertheless the case law of the Court of Justice has consequences not only for the individual Member States. It also has harmonising effects. In this sense, the principles of primacy and of direct effect of EU provisions, as well as the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law, operate as the minimum requirements which the legal systems of Member States must fulfil. Poland joined the European Union in May 2004. At that time the number of Member States increased to 25. The existence of avenues of judicial protection in the EU raised a number of questions from the very beginning. Now, after 15 years of experience it is time to consider the standard of application of EU law by Polish courts.

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