scholarly journals The End of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the North Korea’s Strategic Responses: Focusing on Vietnamese Materials

2014 ◽  
Vol null (48) ◽  
pp. 93-133
Author(s):  
DOTHANHTHAOMIEN
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
Strategic Responses ◽  
The North ◽  
The Vietnam War

Why the North Won the Vietnam War (review)

2003 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 638-639
Author(s):  
Erik B. Villard
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
The North ◽  
The Vietnam War

Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phil Haun ◽  
Colin Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Air Power ◽  
The North ◽  
South Vietnam ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
North Vietnam ◽  
Air Control

Most traditional accounts identify the Linebacker I and Linebacker II campaigns as the most effective and consequential uses of U.S. air power in the Vietnam War. They argue that deep interdiction in North Vietnam played a central role in the defeat of the Easter Offensive and that subsequent strategic attacks on Hanoi forced the North Vietnamese to accept the Paris accords. These conclusions are false. The Linebacker campaigns were rather ineffective in either stopping the Communist offensive or compelling concessions. The most effective and consequential use of U.S. air power came in the form of close air support and battlefield air interdiction directly attacking the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. The success of these air strikes hinged on the presence of a U.S.-operated tactical air control system that incorporated small numbers of ground advisers, air liaison officers, and forward air controllers. This system, combined with abundant U.S. aircraft and a reasonably effective allied army, was the key to breaking the Easter Offensive and compelling Hanoi to agree to the Paris accords. The effectiveness of close air support and battlefield air interdiction and the failure of deep interdiction and strategic attack in the Vietnam War have important implications for the use of air power and advisers in contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Provoking America: Le Duan and the Origins of the Vietnam War

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 86-108
Author(s):  
Zachary Shore
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
The North ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
The 1950S

This article concentrates on the North Vietnamese official who became the driving force within the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) and was crucial in shaping the Vietnamese Communists’ protracted war strategy. A great deal has been written about the personality and policies of Ho Chi Minh, but Le Duan's powerful influence on strategy has been largely overlooked. The article covers Le Duan's background and rise to power as the VWP First Secretary, as well as his strategic thinking about the United States from the 1950s through the deployment of U.S. ground troops in 1965. Although other VWP leaders influenced wartime strategy, Le Duan as First Secretary carried the greatest weight within the Politburo and exerted the strongest influence over the southern Communists, who were pivotal in fighting both U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. In his role as head of the southern Communists Le Duan developed strategies for defeating the United States and then implemented them as his power grew. The article spotlights several recurrent themes in his thinking: the nature of a protracted war, the role of casualties, and U.S. global standing. Each of these subjects influenced how the North Vietnamese intended to defeat the United States over the long term and offers insights into how Hanoi understood its enemy.

Beyond Betrayal: Beijing, Moscow, and the Paris Negotiations, 1971–1973

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz M. Lüthi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Paris Agreement ◽  
East European ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
The North ◽  
The Vietnam War

Contrary to later Vietnamese allegations, China did not “sell out” the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during the last two years of the Paris negotiations (1971–1973). North Vietnamese, Chinese, Soviet, East European, and American sources show that Hanoi could have gotten from Washington an agreement similar to the final Paris Agreement (January 1973) as early as the spring of 1971. Sino-American rapprochement did not help the United States in the negotiations, as claimed by the North Vietnamese, because the Chinese side made no concessions at all on Vietnam. In fact, China increased military aid to the DRV. Similarly, U.S.-Soviet detente did not damage the North Vietnamese effort, although Moscow unsuccessfully tried to mediate between Hanoi and Washington. In the end, U.S. success in rebuffing the DRV's Easter Offensive and Hanoi's miscalculations about U.S. domestic developments in 1972 prolonged the Vietnam War unnecessarily.

scholarly journals Military Logistics Efforts during the Vietnam War Supply Chain Management on Both Sides

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-66
Author(s):  
Hermann Gruenwald
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Climate Conditions ◽  
Military Logistics ◽  
The North ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Vietnam War

This paper analyses the role of military logistics operations during the Vietnam War. It looks at the technical and strategic role of logistics, and the physical obstacles that had to be overcome in Vietnam. The US had highly sophisticated war machinery that was deployed in a country that lacked not only the transportation infrastructure (roads, ports, airports) but also had extreme terrain and climate conditions. On the other hand the Vietnamese had a well-oiled supply chain which often was carried on bicycles and literally on the backs of humans not only along the Ho Chi Minh Trail but throughout the north and south of Vietnam. On the US side helicopters played an important transportation role substituting land transport with air transport. The war effort escalated so rapidly that there was literally no time for logistics advancement operations and prepositioning of assets which resulted in a parallel run of war fighting and logistics operations. Naval operations had to provide their own landing crafts due to the lack of deep seaports with adequate lifting equipment. At the same time airlifts required runways and aircontrol facilities which needed to be provided by the US. Even the US Department of Defense (DOD) food supply chain was supported from abroad while local war fighters could live off the land. The Vietnam War logistics effort reached over to neighboring countries, and Thailand played an important role with its naval and airbases close to Sattahip, U-Tapao and northern parts of Thailand. There are valuable lessons to be learned for both military logistics as well as private sector supply chain management.

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