scholarly journals Increasing Transparency in Capital Markets after the Global Financial Crisis: The Case of Turkey

Author(s):  
Cüneyd Ebrar Levent

The need for financial transparency is way beyond reducing fluctuations on financial markets, the protection of small investors or fighting against money laundering. Asian crisis in 1997, Dot-com bubble in 2000, company crises such as Enron and the global financial crisis in 2008 have shown that a crisis caused by the lack of transparency in companies might not only affect the company and its stakeholders in a negative way but also the country and the region the company is in. After the financial crisis of 2008 many countries made various arrangements in capital accounts about increasing transparency and accountability which was seen as one of the reason of the crisis in addition the short and long term precautions. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act which came into force in the United States in July 2010 is one of the most significant arrangements. In this study, practices of increasing transparency in capital markets after global financial crisis have been discussed. In this context, in light of the new regulations and the Corporate Governance Principles, transparency and disclosure practices in Turkey have been examined. The results of these practices have been analyzed in the short term and its possible effects on capital markets, companies and shareholders have been discussed in the long term. Increasing transparency has been expected to help financial markets process more effectively and to provide benefits to all stakeholders.

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-52
Author(s):  
Shalendra D. Sharma

When the problems in the United States housing sector mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September 2008, it was assumed that Arab countries would remain immune: the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries because of their massive financial reserves, and the resource-poor countries because of their limited linkages to the global economic system – in particular, the global financial markets. However, this assumption has proven to be false. The US subprime mortgage collapse not only pushed the advanced economies into recession, but also it shattered global economic confidence, resulting in a massive financial contagion around the world. What explains the Arab World's vulnerability to the crisis? How has the crisis impacted both the resource rich and the resource poor? How have Arab countries responded to the crisis, and what must they do to insulate their economies better from the vagaries of global financial markets? This paper addresses these questions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linyue Li ◽  
Thomas D. Willett ◽  
Nan Zhang

This paper provides a brief review of the increasing importance of China in the world economy and discusses the spillover effects of the global financial crisis on China's financial markets and macroeconomy. It presents and critiques alternative ways of estimating these effects. Contrary to much popular discussion, China was hit fairly hard by the global recession generated by the financial crisis. It suffered a huge drop in exports, and these effects on the economy were only partially offset by China's huge stimulus program. While growth remained well above international averages, its drop was of the same order of magnitude as for the United States. The paper closes with a brief discussion of some of the major challenges facing China to rebalance its economy in order to sustain high growth.


Criminology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Rex ◽  
Spencer Headworth

No senior Wall Street executives were imprisoned for actions that contributed to the global financial crisis. The few criminal prosecutions for management were reserved for executives at small and regional financial firms. This stands in stark contrast to the approximately 1,000 executives jailed after the 1989 savings and loan crisis. It also runs counter to public support for criminal accountability post-crisis as well as the general trend toward criminal social control in the United States. Likewise, few firms faced criminal prosecution. Instead, the primary punishment resulted from civil penalties leveled against individuals and firms, with most of the largest banks paying billions in fines to regulatory agencies and in restitution to victims. Now that the five- or ten-year statute of limitations for the criminal fraud statutes most relevant to questionable pre-crisis behavior has passed, and the political salience and public outcry over financial misdeeds has subsided, the window of opportunity for criminal accountability is closed. Still, the lack of accountability raises important questions for financial regulation, the state of prosecution for white-collar crime, the nature of financial industry influence over politics, and the broader health of US democracy. What role did Wall Street, and the broader financial services industry, play in bringing about the crisis? What behaviors, if any, crossed the line from legitimate business activity intro criminal behavior? Is that distinction easily drawn? And if actors did behave criminally, why did state and/or federal prosecutors not pursue criminal charges more aggressively? What can be learned from countries that used criminal prosecutions more successfully? Even if criminal behavior occurred, is strong prosecution the appropriate remedy to deter future crime and prevent another financial crisis? There is substantial agreement that financial industry behavior contributed to, and amplified the severity of, the crisis. There is, however, much less agreement about whether white-collar crime occurred; if it did, why it went unpunished; and whether criminal punishment is the proper response on moral or practical grounds. The historical and political context for how white-collar crime was (re)framed, how this framing contributed to the deregulation of the financial industry, and the rise of its political power explain how the Wall Street’s behavior was understood, rationalized, and left largely unpunished.


2016 ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Marcin Jan Flotyński

The global financial crisis in 2007–2009 began a period of high volatility on the financial markets. Specifically, it caused an increased amplitude of fluctuations of the level of gross domestic products, the level of investment and consumption and exchange rates in particular countries. To address the adverse market circumstances, governments and central banks took actions in order to bolster the weakening global economy. The aim of this article is to present the anti-crisis actions in the United States and selected member states of the European Union, including Poland, and an assessment of their efficiency. The analysis conducted indicates that generally the actions taken in the United States in response to the crisis were faster and more adequate to the existing circumstances than in the European Union.


Author(s):  
Steven L Schwarcz

Securitisation represents a significant worldwide source of capital market financing. European investors commonly invest in asset-backed securities issued in U.S. securitisation transactions, and vice versa One of the key goals of the European Commission's proposed Capital Markets Union (CMU) is to further facilitate securitisation as a source of capital market financing as a viable alternative to bank-based finance for companies operating in the EU. To that end, this chapter explains securitisation and attempts to put its rise, its decline after the global financial crisis, and its recent CMU-inspired revival into a global perspective. It examines not only securitisation's relationship to the financial crisis but also post-crisis comparative regulatory approaches in the EU and the United States.


Thesis Eleven ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 072551362110533
Author(s):  
Henry Maher

The survival of neoliberal forms of governance after their apparent repudiation during the Global Financial Crisis is a problem that continues to generate significant scholarly controversy. One of the most influential accounts of the survival of neoliberalism in the crisis draws on Michel Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics to claim that states intervening to support financial markets during the crisis was simply the neoliberal system working as expected. Returning to Foucault’s original text, I argue this account constitutes a systematic misreading because it treats Foucault as having developed an instrumentalist theory of the neoliberal state, a possibility Foucault explicitly rejected. I suggest that the reasons that led Foucault to reject an instrumentalist theory of the state remain just as relevant today, and accordingly argue for a return to Foucault’s methodological decision to treat neoliberalism not as a theory of state but as a discourse which constructs a novel bio-political governmentality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susie Khamis

The concept of consumer restraint has had a popular makeover. This is seen in the worldwide popularity of books, video tutorials and online discussion groups devoted to de-cluttering, and specifically the stunning success of professional organizer Marie Kondo and her best-selling book, The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying. De-cluttering sits on a broad continuum of alternative consumption that champions the benefits of consumer restraint, on multiple fronts: economic, environmental, psychological, and so on. Through Kondo, this is framed in positive, uplifting ways. This is distinct from the more critical, nuanced, or anti-consumerist rhetoric associated with more subversive advocates of alternative consumption, such as voluntary simplifiers or Occupy Wall Street. That said, just as the Occupy movement channeled growing frustration with how the reigning tenets of capitalist culture had shackled and misled the “99%,” de-cluttering finds cultural traction in the midst and wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Unlike Occupy though, Kondo’s appeal rests less on the logic and language of political economy than the more emotive vernacular of pop psychology. In this way, de-cluttering positions restraint as reflective of a highly developed and sophisticated sensibility, whereby individuals “own” their consumption choices and in turn craft carefully curated spaces. Therein lies the aestheticization of restraint: freed of any negative connotations (dour, miserly or miserable), the de-cluttered subject is autonomous, self-aware, and chic. Crucially, it also pivots on the slippery assumptions of the (new) neo liberal economy, which requires individuals to be agile, creative, and empowered.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92
Author(s):  
Hasan Tekin ◽  
Ali Yavuz Polat

We investigate the change in adjustment speed of debt maturity for East Asian firms between 1990 and 2017 by including two exogenous shocks: the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 (AFC) and the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 (GFC). We employ the least square dummy variable correction and find that East Asian firms have a slower adjustment of long-term debt over time. Besides, the decrease in adjustment speed of long-term debt after the GFC is more compared to the decrease after the AFC. Further analysis shows the optimal debt maturity differs across countries and industries. Another important implication of our results is that firms in high governance countries are more likely to close the gap between the actual and target debt maturity in time. Overall, debt holders and investors should consider financial uncertainties.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (06) ◽  
pp. 1250065 ◽  
Author(s):  
LADISLAV KRISTOUFEK

We investigate whether the fractal markets hypothesis and its focus on liquidity and investment horizons give reasonable predictions about the dynamics of the financial markets during turbulences such as the Global Financial Crisis of late 2000s. Compared to the mainstream efficient markets hypothesis, the fractal markets hypothesis considers the financial markets as complex systems consisting of many heterogenous agents, which are distinguishable mainly with respect to their investment horizon. In the paper, several novel measures of trading activity at different investment horizons are introduced through the scaling of variance of the underlying processes. On the three most liquid US indices — DJI, NASDAQ and S&P500 — we show that the predictions of the fractal markets hypothesis actually fit the observed behavior adequately.


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