The Western Balkans on its path to the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Silvana Mojsovska

EU membership has been a compelling goal for the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), related to the bloc’s stability, economic prosperity and higher standard of living. Each of these countries pursues its own process of EU accession while being also a part of the regional initiatives under the auspices of the EU. This paper provides an overview of the EU accession process of the Western Balkan countries, focusing on their individual achievements and challenges, as well as common features and problems. Also, the content andprospects of regional integration of the Western Balkans through the Regional Economic Area (REA) programme, along with the role of the EU in supporting the regional perspective are discussed. The parallel Western Balkans engagement in both processes supports arguments for the prioritisation of the individual countries’ accession to the EU over Western Balkans regional integration, distinguishing also the challenges of both processes. The methodology for the elaboration of this paper includes methods of analysis and synthesis, based on extensive desk research of available materials.

ICR Journal ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 536-539
Author(s):  
Christoph Marcinkowski

Turkey’s 22 July 2007 parliamentary elections resulted in a clear victory for the ruling Justice and Development Party, in Turkish known as Adaket ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP. AKP is part of the right-wing, conservative spectrum of the Turkish political arena. In the West (with the post 9/11 scenario of distrust of anything smacking of ‘Muslim revivalism’) as well as among Turkey’s secular-minded elites and many citizens, the AKP is often perceived as ‘Islamist’ and thus as a danger and detriment to Turkey’s EU membership, regardless of the fact that it had been the AKP government which carried out drastic reforms of its legal and economic, and institutional system. Based on what it views as merely lukewarm support for its accession to the EU and alleged double standards in its negotiations, the Turkish public has become increasingly ‘eurosceptic’ in recent times, as revealed by several surveys. Ankara has been trying desperately to comply with EU legislation and standards, but Brussels has so far refused to back 2013 as a deadline for Turkey’s EU membership. It is believed that the accession process will take at least 15 years, if not longer. In spite of Turkey’s impressive record in terms of moving towards regional integration, the issue of the country’s future EU accession constitutes to date the central controversy of the ongoing enlargement of the EU. Among the Turkish public as well as the present Turkish government (both of which had been rather enthusiastically supportive of the bid for EU membership in the past) significant changes of ‘mood’ in this regard are noticeable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-25
Author(s):  
Ivana Radic-Milosavljevic

The article deals with the problem of the Western Balkans countries? accession and association process impasse. The author finds the key causes of this problem in the very nature of an asymmetric relationship between the EU and these countries with the Stabilization and Association Process laying in its core. Both sides have contributed to this problem: the EU with its overambitious approach to the region, vaguely defined and ever-changing criteria, but also the countries participating in the Process with their uncritical approach to the possible membership, unclearly defined interests and aims, slow reforms, and weak democratic tradition. For the process to be successfully continued, the author discusses the idea of its substantial remodeling towards a flexible process. In light of the frequent discussions about the possible moving of the European integration towards more differentiation, the process of flexible association or accession would enable EU membership only in selected policy areas. The policy areas would be chosen in accordance with the previously clearly defined and thoroughly analyzed interests and capabilities of the candidate and potential candidate countries. The author argues that the association/accession process should be separated as much as possible from the political conditioning in order to decrease the possibility of taking arbitrary decisions on whether the countries have advanced in the process or not. For the Western Balkan countries, this kind of less demanding process would be easier to accomplish and would allow more autonomy in choosing areas of integration and pace of accommodation. For the EU member states, it would provide a way to regain the credibility of its once most successful foreign policy activity.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Wawrzyniec Banach

European Union towards Western Balkans in the Context of Migration Crisis 2015‑2019 The aim of the article is to analyse the actions taken by the European Union towards the Western Balkans in the context of the migration crisis. The study assumes that the migration crisis was an important factor accelerating the accession process of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union. In order to fulfil the research goal, an analysis of sources (European Union documents) was conducted. The paper uses elements of the theory of the regional security complex as a theoretical framework. Firstly, the activities of the European Union before the migration crisis are discussed. Next, the paper focuses on presenting the course of the crisis on the Western Balkan route. The further part of the study discusses the actions taken by the EU towards the countries of the Western Balkans in response to the migration crisis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Alena Dorakh

Despite recent concerns about the increasing influence of outside investors on the European Union (EU) and Western Balkans, the developed European countries are still a dominant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region, confirming the benefits of EU membership. At the same time, fast-growing connectivity and lower trade costs in accession and neighboring countries determine the FDI growth from China, particularly via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By applying panel data over 2000-2019 for 34 countries, which form 89% of all European FDI, we first examine FDI patterns around Europe, compare the EU, NMS, and Western Balkans; verify the importance of EU membership for FDI, caused reducing trade costs and improving connectivity. Thus, the new EU member states (NMS) and Western Balkans appear both as a home country and as a pre- entry destination to the EU. Then, we calculate trade costs indices for each selected country and partners over time and find that Europe and China are closely interconnected through trade and FDI. It means that stronger ties with China can be realized for the sample countries at the cost of easing relations with the EU. Finally, incorporating trade costs indices into the FDI model; we evaluate the impact of connectivity on FDI and estimate how BRI affected FDI in Europe. Additionally, we validate that the old framework of horizontal and vertical FDI not representative well and even new complex vertical or export-oriented FDI strategies are shifting today.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 284-318
Author(s):  
Mohamed Riyad M. Almosly

The current era is witnessing a proliferation of challenges of a transnational character that do not recognize the geographical limits of sovereign States, such as human traficking and pollution. Therefore, States have to establish new regional cooperative methods to find effective solutions for these challenges. Although the Maghreb States (i.e. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) have been suffering from the negative impacts of such challenges over the last few decades, they have not yet created an effective regional cooperative framework. In this respect, since its establishment in 1989 among the Maghreb States, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU, Union) has not been successful in stimulating Maghreb regional integration. The current study addresses a topic that has not yet been fully exploited by legal studies in the English language. It examines, first, the genesis and institutional structure of the AMU as well as the constitutional aspects of the 1989 AMU Treaty; second, the role of the EU’s multilateral and bilateral instruments in promoting Maghreb regional integration; and third, the dispute on Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario Front and its effect on Maghreb regional integration. The article concludes that Maghreb regional integration has so far failed due to the institutional and constitutional limits of the AMU Treaty and the political division among the Maghreb States resulting from the Western Sahara conflict. In addition, the EU so far has not followed a consistent and single approach in promoting the Maghreb integration nor did it play any role in solving the dispute on Western Sahara.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 883-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Reichel

One of the reasons for introducing a “Union” citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty was to provide a direct channel between the citizens of the Member States and the EU. In contrast to many other international organizations, the role of the individual has been central to the European project since its inception. In its famous 1962 judgment given inVan Gend en Loos,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) underscored the importance of the “vigilance of individuals concerned” seeking to protect their European rights in the new legal order through judicial control.2 The right to directly vote on the representatives of the European Parliament had already been introduced in the 1970s. The citizens of the Member States were thus equipped with two classic forms of political participation even prior to the introduction of Union citizenship: law making and the legal adjudication of individual cases. Nonetheless, whether these channels are sufficient to guarantee the citizens effective democratic means to influence legislation and exercise control of EU institutions in the rather complex multilevel legal system of the EU has been continuously debated.


Significance Turkey's faltering EU accession process looks more at risk than ever, following Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn's warning that Ankara had "clearly chosen to move away from Europe, not closer to it". Hahn was presenting the European Commission's 2016 Enlargement Package, which is much more critical of Turkey than of the six Western Balkans countries that are either accession candidates like Turkey or potential candidates. Yet when it comes to terminating Turkey's candidacy, both the Turkish and EU authorities want the other to make the move. In the short term, some EU capitals fear a wave of migrants should Ankara stop cooperating in policing the Aegean; in the longer term, Turkey's economy could suffer. Impacts The EU's interest in Western Balkan security, stability and prosperity will keep enlargement to these countries on track, at least formally. However, the Dutch referendum vote against Ukraine's association agreement shows popular feeling spreading in the EU against enlargement. Turkey's customs union with the EU underpins its recent economic upturn; it is hard to see it continuing without the prospect of membership. Resumed use of the East Mediterranean route depends on Turkey but also on migrants' hopes of being able to cross borders further north.


Author(s):  
Milenko Petrovic

Fifteen years after the European Union (EU) promised all the Western Balkan states an EU future by adopting the Thessaloniki agenda in 2003,1 Croatia is the only Western Balkan state to have succeeded in joining. Although Croatia’s journey to EU accession was not quick and smooth (especially when compared with that of its ex- communist counterparts from East Central Europe and the Baltics who joined in 2004 and 2007), Serbia and other Western Balkan neighbours of Croatia have had an even harder and (much) bumpier road to the EU. Western Balkan accession had been effectively stalled for several years due to the emergence of enlargement fatigue in the mid-2000s. It was briefly re-activated with Croatia’s accession and the launch of the so-called Berlin Process in 2014 (Juncos and Whitman, 2015; Petrovic and Wilson 2018; and Mtchedlishvili, 2018 in this Special Issue). However, the accession process stalled again in 2016 and early 2017 with the shock of Brexit and the migration crisis. As of 2018, Western Balkan accession has returned to a prominent place on the EU enlargement agenda.


2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-106
Author(s):  
Jelena Todorovic-Lazic

The EU Summit in Thessaloniki in 2003 is often referred to as a milestone in the relations between the Western Balkans and the European Union because the region was given strong promises of a prospective European perspective through the Stabilization and Association Process. However, the initial enthusiasm that followed has melted over the coming years because the expectations of most countries in the region have not been met (with the exception of Croatia that became an EU member in 2013). Even though we get assurances from the Brussels that they will not give up on enlargement, it is obvious that this issue is not on the list of priorities of the EU at the moment. Not only that its decisiveness to encompass with enlargement the Western Balkans is on shaky grounds due to the numerous challenges that the EU is facing at the moment, but such decline in interest leads to a decline in interest in the countries of the mentioned region that are currently in the accession process. This further leads to the rise in Euroscepticism for which the Western Balkans is a breeding ground. The reasons for Euroscepticism existed even before the enlargement has been brushed aside from the Union agenda (those were mostly reasons related to pre-accession strategy for candidate countries/potential candidates and were present even in the case of countries of Eastern and Central Europe, even though there were also reasons specific for each of these countries.). However, it seems they have become stronger with the new developments in the Union. Incertitude of membership affects the rise of negative attitudes towards the Union in the public opinion of these countries which becomes manifest if we look at numerous public opinion polls. The focus of this paper will be the interpretation of the results of the research that the Institute for Political Studies conducted on an annual basis from 2015 to 2018.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (199) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
María Victoria Alvarez

Literature on opposition to regional integration has concentrated on the European Union (EU). So far, very few systematic attempts have been pursued to explain opposition to regional integration in Latin America or to identify its main influential factors. Based on Latinobarometer surveys, two main findings emerge from this paper. First, it confirms that opposition to regional integration is not a generalised attitude among Latin Americans. Secondly, the way in which citizens across Latin America evaluate regional integration is strongly influenced by the same predictors as in the EU. Together, citizens’ assessments of economic performance (both at the individual and national level) enjoy a preponderance to account for their position regarding regionalism. Others variables, i.e. age, ideological position, and level of education have a more limited explanatory value while occupation is not significant. Thus, economic variables such as citizens’ perceptions of their national and individual economy have proven to be directly linked to support for/opposition to economic integration.


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