The Development of Legal Principles on Trademark Assignment in the U.S. Trademark Law and Comparative Legal Review with Domestic Trademark Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 515-558
Author(s):  
Joo Hwan Lee ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
Jelena Ćeranić-Perišić

Secondary liability, according to the general rules on liability, is based on the issue of conscientiousness, in other words whether the intermediary knew or should have known that the right was infringed through his service. In U.S. law, the secondary liability standard is a result of case law. This paper presents the evolution of case law regarding the interpretation of secondary liability standard in U.S. trademark law. This standard was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories Inc. regarding the liability of manufacturers and distributors. In the decades that followed, the U.S. Courts, with their creative interpretations, extended the scope of application of this standard, first to intermediary market operators, and later to online service providers (internet intermediaries). Also, the development of digital technology has influenced the case law to adapt the secondary liability standard for trademark infringement to the new circumstances in the digital environment. The most significant cases in this context are Hard Rock Café Licensing v. Concession Services, Inc., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. and Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc. Finally, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc. demonstrates a slight turn of the U.S. Courts' practices towards a more flexible interpretation of secondary liability standard to online service providers.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-694
Author(s):  
David E. Graham

Much has been written over the past several years regarding the increased U.S. employment of UAVs as a weapon system against both combatants on a battlefield and terrorists far removed from an active zone of military operations. As an element of this dialogue, there has occurred a growing discussion as to whether, given what some view as the appearance of new threats to national security—existing in the form of al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations—there is now a need for enhanced clarity and transparency concerning the legal principles applicable to when, where, and how such systems might be used. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, if, in fact, uncertainty exists as to the legal norms to be applied in the employment of UAVs against those who threaten U.S. security interests—it is an uncertainty of a U.S. self-inflicted nature. In truth, the old law, i.e., currently existing codified and customary international legal principles, can quite sufficiently regulate the lawful use of these systems. Any confusion surrounding this subject is, in reality, due to the consistently self-serving and highly questionable manner in which the U.S. government has both interpreted and applied these norms. Before turning to a discussion of the relevant legal issues, however, it would be helpful to briefly examine the basic nomenclature of commonly U.S.-deployed UAVs.


Author(s):  
Annette Kur

Colors and product designs face increasingly high hurdles against registration in the EU. However, such marks exist and continue to be registered, not least on the national level. Measuring the scope of protection of such signs therefore remains a key issue in EU trademark law. The appraisal is informed by a number of legal principles and guidelines which are neither completely clear nor uniform in their application by the national courts and authorities. The recent EU trademark law reform has added complexity to the picture by introducing a new limitation permitting to (fairly) use a non-distinctive sign. The meaning and effect of this novel clause still have to be tested in practice.


2009 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Ann Bambach

The figures of both Moses and Muhammad stand in the United States Supreme Court, included among the great lawgivers of history depicted in two friezes along the North and South walls of the Courtroom. Moses, who is seen carrying the Ten Commandments, is honored as the “prophet, lawgiver, and judge of the Israelites,” with the Supreme Court's tourist information sheet explaining that “Mosaic Law” is “based on the Torah, the first five books of the Old Testament.” Muhammad is described as the “Prophet of Islam” and carries both a sword and the Qur'an, the “primary source of Islamic law.”Yet the parallel depictions of these two prophets in the U.S. Supreme Court belie the very different respect that the laws they are associated with have received in the U.S. judicial system. Jewish law or legal principles are generally cited by courts with approval, often to add perceived moral and ethical authority to a court's decision. For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court's well-known Miranda v. Arizona decision, the Court declared that the privilege against self-incrimination was an ancient right, with analogues that could be found in the Bible, quoting the great medieval Jewish scholar Maimonides for support: “To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-304
Author(s):  
Russ VerSteeg

This article examines such names and symbols that appear on a variety of ancient objects and attempts to draw conclusions about their nature. More specifically, this article offers suggestions about the purposes of such marks and considers how the nature of commerce in ancient Egypt may have influenced the development—or lack thereof—of trademarks there. And although there is a decided paucity of what we today might consider true trademarks, we can be certain that both the legal principles and the well-developed use of symbolic communication of the ancient Egyptians planted the seeds for the later growth of modern trademarks and trademark law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 16-34
Author(s):  
Anuttama Ghose ◽  
S. M. Aamir Ali

Trademarks of an establishment cannot solely be associated with identification of origin or source. It performs an imperative task of building brand name and value. The dilution theory rejects the opinion that the role of a trademark is solely based on the recognition of the root or source of its origin and that it is not only a figurative representation but carries a creative aspect as well. For the most recent decade, the greatest inquiry in trademark law has been the manner by which to demonstrate weakening or dilution. Dilution has turned out to be a dauntingly slippery idea. The principal issue with dilution law is that it gives a cure without a supportable hypothesis of the harm or damage. Even though lately the concept has been recognized in International as well as domestic jurisdiction putting an immense responsibility on domestic jurisdiction to protect trademarks against dilution, very little has been discussed or clarified regarding the theory of dilution. Ambiguity of such nature facilitated this research trying to spot some light on the theory of dilution comparing it from divergent angles in different jurisdictions. The paper also highlights the interpretation mechanism of the courts of the dilution provision and explains the concept further with reference to important cases under the U.S. laws and European judgments in the context of the Dilution laws and draws a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the legal framework present in India with that of the USA.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document