scholarly journals Un análisis del contenido protoproposicional de Peacocke

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-194
Author(s):  
Nicolás Alejandro Serrano
Keyword(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

En su caracterización del contenido no conceptual, Christopher Peacocke realiza un esfuerzo constante por diferenciar el contenido no conceptual protoproposicional que propone del contenido de tipo conceptual. En este trabajo analizaré tales esfuerzos para concluir que resultan infructuosos, llevando al autor a lo que podría denominarse como una rotulación incorrecta del contenido protoproposicional como no conceptual. Para ello, reconstruiré la posición no conceptualista de Peacocke y señalaré, mediante los ejemplos que el mismo autor ofrece, la gran similitud que existe entre ciertos contenidos y procesos paradigmáticamente conceptuales, y los ejemplos de contenidos y procesos que el autor considera como protoproposicionales y presuntamente no conceptuales.

Esa Saarinen. Introduction. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. vii–xii. - Jaakko Hintikka. Language-games. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 1–26. (Reprinted with minor changes and added appendix from Acta philosophica Fennica, vol. 28 no. 1-3 (1976), Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright, pp. 105-125.) - Jaakko Hintikka. Quantifiers in logic and quantifiers in natural languages. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 27–47. (Reprinted from Philosophy of logic, edited by Stephan Körner, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, and University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976, pp. 208-232.) - Jaakko Hintikka. Quantifiers vs. quantification theory. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 49–79. (Reprinted from Dialectica, vol. 27 no. 3-4 (for 1973, publ. 1974), pp. 329-358; also in Linguistic inquiry, vol. 5 (1974), pp. 153-177.) - Jaakko Hintikka. Quantifiers in natural languages: some logical problems. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 81–117. (Sections 1–9 reprinted from Essays on mathematical and philosophical logic. Proceedings of the Fourth Scandinavian Logic Symposium and of the First Soviet-Finnish Logic Conference, Jyväskylä, Finland, June 29–July 6, 1976, edited by Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and Esa Saarinen, Synthese library, vol. 122, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 295-314; sections 10-19 reprinted from Linguistics and philosophy, vol. 1 (1977), pp. 153-172.) - Christopher Peacocke. Game-theoretic semantics, quantifiers and truth: comments on Professor Hintikka's paper. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 119–134. - Jaakko Hintikka. Rejoinder to Peacocke. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 135–151. - Jaakko Hintikka and Esa Saarinen. Semantical games and the Bach–Peters paradox. Game-theoretical semantics, Essays on semantics by Hintikka, Carlson, Peacocke, Rantala, and Saarinen, edited by Esa Saarinen, Synthese language library, vol. 5, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1979, pp. 153–178. (Reprinted from Theoretical linguistics, vol. 2 (1975), pp. 1-20.)

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 240-244
Author(s):  
James Higginbotham
Keyword(s):  
Los Angeles ◽  
Publishing Company ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Reidel Publishing Company ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
Christopher Peacocke ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Linguistic Inquiry

Truly Understood, by Christopher Peacocke.

Mind ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 120 (480) ◽  
pp. 1276-1280
Author(s):  
J. L. Bermudez
Keyword(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Christopher Peacocke

1989 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-360
Author(s):  
M. Frances Egan
Keyword(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

The Sources of Self-Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis Bermúdez
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Visual Perception ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Working Through ◽  
Christopher Peacocke ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Epistemic Dimension ◽  
Recent Account

We can think about the sources of self-consciousness in either a genetic or an epistemic sense. That is, we can think either about the origins of the capacity to think self-conscious thoughts or about the warrant that we have for our self-conscious judgments. These two sets of questions are independent but related. This paper explores the role that the genetic dimension of self-consciousness plays in understanding the epistemology of self-consciousness. I will take as my foil a recent account of some key features of the epistemic dimension of a particular type of self-conscious judgment – the account offered by Christopher Peacocke in his book Being Known (Peacocke 1999). Working through the example of how the bodily self is represented in visual perception shows how the primitive foundations from which self-consciousness emerges in the course of cognitive development are also the foundation for the epistemic status of full-fledged self-conscious thoughts.

How to Understand Perceptual Learning

2019 ◽  
pp. 3-37
Author(s):  
Kevin Connolly
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Learning ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Perceptual Development ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Long Term Changes ◽  
Christopher Peacocke ◽  
Perceptual Systems

This introductory chapter explains perceptual learning as long-term changes in perception that are the result of practice or experience. It distinguishes perceptual learning from other nearby concepts, including perceptual development and cognitive penetration. It then delineates different kinds of perceptual learning. For instance, some kinds of perceptual learning involve changes in how one attends, while other cases involve a learned ability to differentiate two properties, or to perceive two properties as unified. The chapter uses this taxonomy to distinguish different cases of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature, including by contemporary philosophers such as Susanna Siegel, Christopher Peacocke, and Charles Siewert. Finally, it outlines the function of perceptual learning. Perceptual learning serves to offload onto our quick perceptual systems what would be a slower and more cognitively taxing task were it to be done in a controlled, deliberate manner. The upshot is that this frees up cognitive resources for other tasks.

Variation and Change in Appearances

2020 ◽  
pp. 89-115
Author(s):  
M. G. F. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Apparent Size ◽  
Christopher Peacocke

Consider sentence (1): The boat looks immense, yet it also looks small. Predications of “is immense” and “is small” applied to the same object appear to be contradictory, but (1) need not be contradictory. When do appearances conflict with each other, and how can this be marked in our judgments about appearance? In 1953, G. E. Moore argued that the possible truth of (1) shows that there must be multiple senses of “looks.” Moore’s example prefigures by thirty years a much-cited discussion by Christopher Peacocke about trees and apparent size with which Peacocke illustrates a contrast between sensational and representational properties of experience. This chapter argues that Moore’s argument for different senses of “looks” is unsound, and hence that we need a different explanation of how we mark the contrast between appearances which conflict and those which do not. The essay closes by offering such an account.

Holistic Explanation by Christopher Peacocke

1984 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-118
Author(s):  
Akeel Bilgrami ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

Notebook

Philosophy ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 636-637
Keyword(s):  
Royal Institute ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Annual Lecture ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
Christopher Peacocke ◽  
The Will ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Classical Knowledge ◽  
Paul Boghossian

NotebookRoyal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture Series, 2000–2001Logic, Thought and Language200013 October Mark Sainsbury What Logic Should We Think With?20 October Gregory McCulloch Mental Representation27 October Julia Tanney Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction3 November Barry Smith Thought and Language10 November Alan Millar The Normativity of Intention and Meaning17 November Gabriel Segal On the Semantics of Proper Names24 November David Wiggins Indefinables1 December Jennifer Hornsby Linguistic Knowhow8 December Crispin Wright Relativism and Classical Knowledge15 December Paul Boghossian Rational Belief20015 January Christopher Peacocke Principles for Possibilia12 January A. W. Moore What Are These familiar Words Doing Here?26 January M. G. F. Martin Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought9 February Scott Surgeon The Conditionality of Thought16 February Timothy Williamson Possible Beings23 February S. G. Williams Ambiguity2 March Bob Hale Logical Knowledge9 March Charles Travis Rethinking PsychologismAll Lectures to be given at 14 Gordon Square, London WC1 on Fridays at 5.45 pm. Admission is free.The Fourth Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture will be given by Professor John Searle‘Freedom of the Will As a Problem in Neurobiology’Beveridge Hall, Senate House, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1, on Friday 2 February at 5.30. Admission is free.

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