On Fregean Sense and Mental Content1
Fregeans follow Frege (1892) in accepting informativeness and substitution failure as reliable criteria for the existence of senses as objects of thought. In this paper I show that if we accept this, we must also accept the existence of an infinite hierarchy of senses as objects of thought. This is a bad result since it turns Fregeanism into a doctrine according to which object-related thoughts either have an infinite number of objects as contents or none at all. This shows, against the Fregean, that senses cannot themselves be constituents of thought.
2018 ◽
Vol 10
(1)
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pp. 31-51
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1989 ◽
Vol 03
(15)
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pp. 1185-1188
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2016 ◽
Vol 31
(26)
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pp. 1630043
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