Elisabeth Fouquoire-Brillet, La Chine et le nucléaire, Que-sais-je?; Solomon M. Karmel, China and the People's Liberation Army, Great Power or Struggling Developing State?; China Debates the Future Security Environment,; Susan Puska éd.. People's Liberation Army After Next

2001 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-75
Author(s):  
Valérie Niquet
2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 68-78
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

The overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army will move it away from its Soviet-style command and control structures towards the American model, which is believed to be more adapted to the new security environment and facilitates long distance power projection to protect China’s far-flung national interest abroad. The Communist Party’s organisational presence is reaffirmed to ensure the loyalty of the military as the Party considers it the ultimate source of its power and final defence of its rule.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 315-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Teufel Dreyer

In early 1975, in a speech to the cadres of the headquarters of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Deng Xiaoping delivered his blueprint for the military of the future. The radical restructuring of the military and its officer corps that it entailed was purportedly proposed by Mao Zedong himself. However, the fact that the speech was not made public until 1983, allegedly because it had been suppressed by the Gang of Four, makes it more likely that the architect of the reorganization, with its far-reaching implications for the PLA's officer corps, was Deng himself. Two decades later, at the close of the Deng era, it is important to examine the thrust of this document in assessing trends for the officer corps of the future.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 10-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The partyarmy relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP. These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*


2014 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Zhiyue BO

Since he became commander-in-chief in November 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted altogether 11 generals in three batches. The promotion of the third batch came in the shadow of expelling Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member, from the Party. In the future, Xi Jinping will have to strike a balance between the anti-corruption campaign in the military and the establishment of a core support group in the People's Liberation Army.


2018 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 713-734
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Cabestan

AbstractChina has been much more involved in Africa's economy and trade than in its security. However, over the past decade or so, China has increased its participation in the United Nation's Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs), particularly in Africa. It has also taken steps to better protect its overseas nationals and, in 2017, established a naval base in Djibouti. This article focuses on the participation of China's People's Liberation Army in the United Nation's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since 2013. It aims to unpack the diplomatic process that led China to take part in this mission and to analyse the form of this participation. Mali was the second time (the first being in South Sudan in 2012) that China opted to deploy combat troops under the UN banner, underscoring a deepening involvement in PKOs and an increasing readiness to face risks. Finally, this article explores the implications of China's participation in the MINUSMA for its foreign and security posture as a whole. Often perceived as a realist rising power, by more actively participating in UN PKOs China is trying to demonstrate that it is a responsible and “integrationist” great power, ready to play the game according to the commonly approved international norms. Is this really the case?


Author(s):  
Xiaobing Li

This article seeks to elucidate the recent changes to the Chinese military by examining the new characteristics of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its newly adopted approaches for modernization between 2003 and 2008. It includes diachronic discussions to explore various social and political factors for the changes, domestic and international constraints on the implementation of military modernization, and the outcomes of these endeavors. The main findings indicate that the Chinese military has changed its main feature as two important transitions have emerged: first, the PLA has been transformed from a manpower intensive army to a technology oriented force; and second, from a national security army to an internationally operated force. Consequently, the high command begins to consider the PLA as a part of the global military cooperation.


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