A canonical model of migration to cities

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
Shekhar Mukherji
Keyword(s):  
Canonical Model

scholarly journals Single Canonical Model of Reflexive Memory and Spatial Attention

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Saumil S. Patel ◽  
Stuart Red ◽  
Eric Lin ◽  
Anne B. Sereno
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Attention ◽  
Canonical Model

scholarly journals A canonical model for interactive unawareness

2008 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 304-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aviad Heifetz ◽  
Martin Meier ◽  
Burkhard C. Schipper
Keyword(s):  
Canonical Model

Eco-Labels as a Signal of Quality

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lester M.K. Kwong
Keyword(s):  
Jel Classification ◽  
Canonical Model ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
General Properties ◽  
Quality Dimension ◽  
The Cost

AbstractUsing a canonical model of signaling, we show that if the cost of organic viticulture is strictly increasing in the quality dimension, then the use of eco-labels as a signal for quality cannot possibly occur as an equilibrium outcome. Conditions for the existence of such a signalling equilibrium as well as some general properties regarding its configuration are herein characterized. (JEL Classification: L15, L66, M3)

The Hare Question in Assurance Games: Practical Problems and Insights From Robotic Surgery

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-30
Author(s):  
Roger Lee Mendoza
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Robotic Surgery ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Canonical Model ◽  
Health Care Economics ◽  
Robotic Technology ◽  
Cooperative Action ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Practical Implications

We examine in this article a frequently overlooked, if not ignored, premise underlying the canonical assurance game model: Hunters could potentially bag more than a single hare (or two) in place of the prized stag. Whether a risk-dominant equilibrium is necessarily inefficient or inferior to one that is assumed to be payoff-dominant is the question we seek to address. In doing so, we suggest plausible variations of the model with different game-theoretic realizations. Single-play illustrations drawn from robotic surgery underscore their practical implications for health care economics and management. The robotic technology revolution amplifies the rational and interactive choices available to players under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Like the canonical model, our illustrations involve insulated, self-interested actions arising from the presence or absence of trust and coordination among players. They differ from the canonical model by allowing for multiple, potentially cooperative equilibrium payoffs. Any cooperative action can be considered optimal if players coordinated on it, taking fully into account the quantifiable and multiplicable value of their second best strategies. Nonetheless, we suggest that any dominant solution/s should accommodate best evidence in health care to provide patients with the most suitable treatments and services. There lies the challenge in reconciling theory and practice in health economics. JEL Classifications: C70, C71, I11, I12

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