scholarly journals A RISC-V Processor Designed For Security

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arsath K. F ◽  
Rahul Bodduna ◽  
Neel Gala ◽  
Vinod Ganesan ◽  
Lavanya Jagan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Cache Memories ◽  
Differential Power Analysis ◽  
Software Vulnerabilities ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
Memory Protection ◽  
Least Privilege ◽  
Timing Attacks

A microprocessor is as secure as its weakest module. Depending on the application, the weakest module may be present in the hardware, micro-architecture, or a vulnerability in the software. For instance in a web-server, the biggest threats occur due to software vulnerabilities and due to information leakage in shared micro-architecture components. On the other hand, in an end-point IoT device, invasive and non-invasive hardware attacks such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA), are arguably the biggest threats. In this paper we highlight some aspects of the development of a secure processor called Shakti-S. The processor is configurable and can cater to vulnerabilities in multiple layers. To protect against memory vulnerabilities that are common in applications, hardware enabled memory protection schemes are implemented. Fine-grained compartment capabilities permit the secure least-privilege software design methodology. In the micro-architecture, shared modules like cache memories are protected by moving target randomization mechanisms which can prevent most variants of cache timing attacks. In the hard-ware, critical information is masked to break correlation with the device’s power consumption, thus hardening the processor against strong side-channel attacks like the Differential Power Analysis.

Improving Power Analysis Peak Distribution Using Canberra Distance to Address Ghost Peak Problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-41
Author(s):  
Hridoy Jyoti Mahanta ◽  
Ajoy Kumar Khan
Keyword(s):  
Power Consumption ◽  
Power Analysis ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Differential Power Analysis ◽  
Power Analysis Attacks ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
Canberra Distance ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Cryptographic Techniques

This article describes how differential power analysis has laid the foundations of such an attack that has challenged the security of almost all cryptosystems like DES, AES, and RSA. This non-invasive attack first extracts the power consumption details from devices embedded with cryptographic techniques and then uses these details to mount attacks on the cryptosystems to reveal the secret key. However, at times there appears multiple similar power peaks at the same points. This raises confusion in distinguishing the actual and the fake peaks named “ghost peaks.” This ghost peak problem affects the efficiency of power analysis attacks as it increases the number of power traces to be evaluated to identify the actual peak. In this article, the authors present an approach which uses the Canberra distance with Euclidean similarity to address this ghost peak problem. The proposed solution diminishes the values of all these ghost peaks, leaving only the actual peak behind that could reveal the secret key.

Attacks on Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithms

2018 ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian ◽  
M. Rajakani
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Electromagnetic Analysis ◽  
Physical Protection ◽  
Power Analysis Attacks ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
Timing Attacks ◽  
Probing Attacks

This chapter investigates the implementation attacks on cryptographic algorithms. The implementation attacks can be defined as invasive or non-invasive. The major attack types are Probing attacks, Fault Induction attacks, timing attacks, Power analysis attacks and Electromagnetic analysis attacks. The attacks target either the physical leakage of a device in which case they are considered physical attacks or try to observe some parameters of the algorithm which constitute logical attacks. The Various countermeasures for the attacks include physical protection against tampering of the device or use redundant computation in the algorithm to prevent observation of the parameters.

scholarly journals Normalized Differential Power Analysis - For Ghost Peaks Mitigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juncheng Chen ◽  
Jun-Sheng Ng ◽  
Nay Aung Kyaw ◽  
Ne Kyaw Zwa Lwin ◽  
Weng-Geng Ho ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Analysis ◽  
Differential Power Analysis

scholarly journals End-to-end automated cache-timing attack driven by Machine Learning

10.29007/nwj8 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastien Carré ◽  
Victor Dyseryn ◽  
Adrien Facon ◽  
Sylvain Guilley ◽  
Thomas Perianin
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Language Processing ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Cache Memories ◽  
Function Calls ◽  
Timing Data ◽  
Timing Attack ◽  
End To End ◽  
Timing Attacks

Cache timing attacks are serious security threats that exploit cache memories to steal secret information.We believe that the identification of a sequence of operations from a set of cache-timing data measurements is not a trivial step when building an attack. We present a recurrent neural network model able to automatically retrieve a sequence of function calls from cache-timings. Inspired from natural language processing, our model is able to learn on partially labelled data. We use the model to unfold an end-to-end automated attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on the secp256k1 curve. Contrary to most research, we did not need human processing of the traces to retrieve relevant information.

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