scholarly journals Retail Services and Pricing Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 2373-2396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen-Zheng Zhang ◽  
Zong-Jun Wang ◽  
Li-Wen Liu
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.


2020 ◽  
Vol 255 ◽  
pp. 120241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh ◽  
Mina Nouri-Harzvili ◽  
Maryam Johari ◽  
Bhaba R. Sarker

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.


2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.


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