scholarly journals Green Technology Investment in a Decentralized Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 3752
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
Zongbao Zou ◽  
Shidao Geng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
And Performance

Green technology investment is an important factor that influences the sustainability and performance of the supply chain. In this paper, we use the game-theoretic approach, which is quite suitable to operation decision research, to model a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and discuss who should invest in green technology in a decentralized supply chain under demand uncertainty. An important result we found is that the retailer has a stronger investment motivation and higher investment efficiency compared to the supplier. The retailer also tends to invest in green technology himself when customers are not so sensitive to the product’s retail price. We analyze the supply chain sustainability, and find that high levels of green technology investments are not always necessarily good for environmental sustainability, it depends on the environmental impact’s sensitivity to green technology. Lastly, a joint investment mechanism is designed to induce the retailer to join in the green technology investment when he has no investment intention, and that realizes a Pareto improvement of the supply chain. Based on the results, we recommend designing more incentive mechanisms to induce the retailers to join in the green technology investment according to supply chain conditions.

scholarly journals The Implications of Vertical Strategic Interaction on Green Technology Investment in a Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7441
Author(s):  
Simeng Wang ◽  
Yongsheng Cheng ◽  
Xiaoxian Zhang ◽  
Chenchen Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Right

Numerous studies on supply chains have indicated that vertical strategic interactions usually involve the classical double marginalization problem, leading to a downward distortion in profitability. However, at present, the implications of vertical strategic interactions for green technology investment in a supply chain are not all that clear. In particular, such a vertical interaction not only can translate into profits between different parties, but usually also involves differentiated environmental performance. A question which arises is: who is the right undertaker for green technology investment in a supply chain, the supplier or retailer? To answer this question, we highlight the implications of vertical strategic interaction for green technology investment in a supply chain. To fill this gap, using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate two models: (a) Model M, in which an upstream manufacturer adopts technologies to meet consumer demand; and (b) Model R, where a retailer integrates environmental concerns into their supply chain decisions. We find that the retailer, who is closer to the customer, is the more effective undertaker for green technology investment, as this not only creates higher profitability for both parties, but also achieves a more sustainable scheme for our environment. When green technologies are invested in by the manufacturer, the double marginalization effect not only may downward-distort their economic performance but can also reduce the equilibrium of product greenness.

Supply chain encroachment with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 693-718
Author(s):  
Musen Xue ◽  
Jianxiong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Investment ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper studies a supply chain with manufacturer encroachment and different power structures where product quality is an endogenous decision. We investigate the effects of encroachment and power structure on quality and profits for chain members. Employing a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, in a manufacturer-led supply chain, encroachment makes both manufacturer and retailer better off when the quality investment efficiency is relatively high. And, the manufacturer’s profit exhibits nonmonotonicity with respect to the extent of consumers acceptance on the direct channel in a retailer-led setting. Second, our result shows that the pure equilibrium outcomes are driven by the quality investment efficiency and the extent of consumers’ acceptance on the direct channel. An interesting result is that, for the manufacturer, establishing encroachment channel and occupying the leader position simultaneously are always not the optimal choice. Additionally, the options of encroaching and striving for leader position can lead to lose-win, win-win, and win-lose situations for the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, a prisoner’s dilemma may occur with a low quality investment efficiency, a moderately fixed encroachment cost and a high extent of consumers’ acceptance on the direct channel when a fixed encroachment cost is considered.

scholarly journals Environmental Sustainability By Recycling of PET Plastic Bottles And Reusing Them In Textile Industry: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamed Jafari
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Textile Industry ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Setup Cost ◽  
Recycled Materials ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Cleaning Technology ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract This study considers a sustainable supply chain including the collector, cleaner, and recycler for recycling of PET plastic bottles and reusing them in textile industry. In the market, some suppliers of textile industry purchase cleaned and non-fragmented bottles and then they fragment them, whereas others prefer to buy recycled materials (i.e., cleaned and fragmented bottles). The collector collects used plastic bottles. To meet demand of the recycled materials, the collector transfers a portion of the collected bottles to the recycler and then the recycler cleans and fragments them. Furthermore, the collector cleans another portion of the collected bottles himself or via a cleaner to meet demand of the cleaned and non-fragmented bottles. In this setting, two different structures are established for transferring the cleaned bottles to suppliers. Under the first structure, the collector cleans the collected bottles through the cleaner by giving a share of the profit to him, while he is equipped with the bottles cleaning technology by paying a setup cost under the second structure. Moreover, the game-theoretic models are developed including Nash, Stackelberg, and Centralized to make decisions under two considered structures.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

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