scholarly journals The Kalimantan Forest Fires: An Actor Analysis Based on Supreme Court Documents in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 2342
Author(s):  
Eko Priyo Purnomo ◽  
Abitassha Az Zahra ◽  
Ajree Ducol Malawani ◽  
Prathivadi Anand

Forest fires in Indonesia are of a local, national, and global concern, which is why the activities of local actors have emerged as a new problem in Indonesia, especially in Kalimantan. The current study employed a network content analysis method to examine the involvement of actors in forest fire cases based on Supreme Court decisions, complemented by several reputable online news sources such as kompas.com, detik.com, and tribun.com. By examining the cases, the actors involved were able to be identified as key actors, contest setters, and subject actors. Key actors, referring to companies and landowners, were found to have high correlations between one another. Moreover, key actors were observed to be involved in providing funds for land clearing or burning, yet they remained legally untouchable. Meanwhile, contest setters—permanent employees—were found to be the most involved in land burning/clearing, and they were often convicted in the Supreme Court rulings as they were merely commoners, farmers, and jobseekers in need of cash. Nevertheless, the subject actors, i.e., jobseekers and farm workers, were seen to have a weak relationship with key actors in the Supreme Court rulings, particularly in terms of forest burning and its operational funding.

Hawwa ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moussa Abou Ramadan

AbstractIn this paper we explore how Shari‘a Courts cope with the issue of custody, in light of two Supreme Court rulings concerning custody cases, in which the regional Shari‘a court suspected the mother of living a Christian way of life. The article aims at discerning the debate between the Shari‘a Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court concerning the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law and rulings in the issue of child custody, and at proposing an alternative line of interpretation that would help avoiding the debate. The article argues that Shari‘a courts have embarked on a “purification” process, removing secular elements from their legal discourse, both at the rhetoric and symbolic levels, and thus excluding any affinity to secular legislation. The Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law is a main focus of those “purification” efforts. This raises the question of why the Supreme Court actually reversed only so few Shari‘a court rulings. We suggest that it did not have to do so. Though explicitly not basing its rulings on civil law, the Shari‘a Court of Appeals actually imported the principle of the child’s best interest through the back door, by considering it to be a principle acknowledged by Shari‘a. The court reinterpreted religious legal literature and in fact Islamized Israeli law, in the sense of turning an Israeli legal principle into an Islamic one. Another softening of what appears to be a rigid position held by the Shari‘a court may be discerned in its rulings that allow drawing on social workers’ reports in order to determine a child’s best interest.


2003 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Thatcher ◽  
Cart J. Biver ◽  
Duane M. North

The 70-year-old Frye standards of “general acceptance” were replaced by the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert criteria of the scientific method, which established the standards for admissibility of evidence in Federal Court. The four Daubert criteria were: 1- Hypothesis testing, 2- Estimates of error rates, 3- Peer reviewed publication and 4- General acceptance ( Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 61 U.S.L.W 4805 (U.S. June 29, 1993)). The present paper starts with the Daubert four factors and then matches them, step by step, to the scientific peer reviewed literature of quantitative EEG (QEEG) in relation to different clinical evaluations. This process shows how the peer reviewed science of the Digital EEG and the Quantitative EEG (QEEG) meet all of the Daubert standards of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, the science and technical aspects of QEEG in measuring the effects of neurological and psychiatric dysfunction also match the recent Supreme Court standards of “technical” and “other specialized” knowledge ( General Electric Co v. Joiner, 1997; Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 1999). Finally, it is shown that QEEG scientific knowledge and QEEG “technical” and “other specialized” knowledge meet the trilogy standards of the Supreme Court rulings in support of QEEG's admissibility as a clinically valid method in the evaluation of the nature and extent of neurological and psychiatric disorders.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-34
Author(s):  
Kent W. Royalty ◽  
Dianna Ross

Members of the 50-year old Church of Scientology are currently enjoying a tax deduction for payments for religious training that other religions can perhaps only dream about. Scientologists are currently allowed a tax deduction for amounts spent for required religious training, whereas taxpayers of other religions have been denied attempts to deduct amounts spent on religious education. Startling to many, Scientologists were granted this deduction in a private IRS ruling, despite the Supreme Court holding that payments for Scientology auditing and training were not deductible as charitable contributions. This article discusses: • the conflict between the IRS and Scientology that resulted in the ability of Scientologists to deduct payments for “auditing and training” as charitable contributions, • the frustrated attempts by members of other religions to gain comparable treatment, • the Tax Court and the Supreme Court rulings on related issues, and • the needed change to the relevant standard to accomplish more equitable treatment among taxpayers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 200-215
Author(s):  
Kelsey R Ruszkowski

In the last few decades, US Supreme Court rulings have made strides for the advancement of the LGBT community. However, this community has yet to enjoy equality in the workplace due to its exclusion from Title VII protection. This article details the recent conflict between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Justice in interpreting Title VII and how this conflict may make it difficult for the Supreme Court to reach a broad ruling concerning sex discrimination under Title VII. The EEOC relies on Supreme Court precedent concerning sex stereotyping to extend Title VII protection to sexual orientation while the Justice Department employs a textualist argument to support a narrow interpretation of sex. However, changing societal norms and advancing neuroscientific research support the conclusion that sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression is included under “sex” even when using textualism to interpret Title VII. Given that the Supreme Court is unlikely to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation, these arguments stemming from the social sciences may provide the support the Court needs to justify a decision to end employment discrimination against the LGBT community and gender nonconformists in a way that is consistent with the positions of both the EEOC and the Justice Department.


Author(s):  
Novrika Novrika

ABSTRAKTujuan penulisan artikel ini yakni untuk mengetahui pertimbangan putusan Pengadilan Negeri Pelalawan Nomor 19.Pid.Sus.LH/2016/PN.Plw terhadap pelaku tindak pidana yang berkedudukan sebagai manager operasional yang di dakwa dengan perbuatan yang mengakibatkan kerusakan lingkungan hidup dan untuk mengetahui pertimbangan putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 2284 K/Pid.Sus.LH/2016 terhadap pelaku tindak pidana yang berkedudukan sebagai manager operasional yang di dakwa dengan perbuatan yang mengakibatkan kerusakan lingkungan hidup serta perbandingan antara keduanya. Metode penelitian ini penulis menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif atau yang dikenal dengan istilah legal research, yang menekankan pada studi dokumen kepustakaan yang berhubungan dengan permasalahan dan tujuan penelitian ini. Pendekatan yang digunakan yakni berupa pendekatan asas hukum dan perbandingan hukum. Kesimpulan berdasarkan penelitian ini penulis uraikan berupa perbandingan putusan Pengadilan Negeri Pelalawan dan Putusan Mahkamah Agung, bahwa terdapat Perbedaan pertimbangan hakim terkait unsur kesengajaan, unsur sarana dan prasarana pencegahan kebakaran hutan, Hakim Pengadilan Negeri Pelalawan berpendapat bahwa unsurnya tidak terbukti, sedangkan Hakim Mahkamah Agung berpendapat sebaliknya. Majelis Hakim Pengadilan Negeri Pelalawan baik ketua ataupun masing-masing anggota majelisnya tidak memiliki sertifikasi Hakim lingkungan hidup sebagaimana diatur Keputusan Mahakamah Agung Nomor 134/KMA/SK/IX/2011, tanggal 5 September 2011, tentang setifikasi Hakim Lingkungan Hidup. Sedangkan Hakim Mahkamah Agung telah memiliki sertifikat lingkungan sesuai yang dikehendaki oleh Keputusan Mahakamah Agung tersebut. Hal ini menjadi masukan penulis terkait penegasan model pertimbangan kompetensi hakim dalam mengadili perkara tindak pidana lingkungan hidup di Indonesia. Kata kunci: putusan; tindak pidana lingkungan hidup; kompetensi hakimABSTRACTThe purpose of remembering this article includes the discussion of the decision of the Pelalawan District Court Number 19.Pid.Sus.LH / 2016 / PN.Plw against opposing the follow-up of those who are located as operational managers charged with research related to the Supreme Court Number 2284 K / Pid.Sus. LH / 2016 against executors of criminal acts who are domiciled as operational managers who are charged with the perpetrators who oppose environmental destruction and reverse the transition. This research method uses normative legal research methods or known as legal research, which are agreed upon in the study of library documents relating to the topic and purpose of this study. The advice used consists of legal principles and replaces law. The conclusion of this court involved a description of the decisions of the Pelalawan District Court and the Supreme Court Decision, which refers to court considerations relating to intentions, lack of facilities and infrastructure that can address forest fires, District Court Judges. The Panel of Judges of the Pelalawan District Court or their respective chairpersons did not have the certification of Environmental Judges agreeing to the Supreme Speech Decree Number 134 / KMA / SK / IX / 2011, dated September 5, 2011, concerning the certification of Environmental Judges. While the Chief Justice has an environmental certificate according to what is desired by the Supreme Court's Decision. This is an input that is proposed to affirm the judge's competency assessment model in judging cases of environmental crime in Indonesia.Keywords: decision; environmental crime; judge’s competency.


2020 ◽  
pp. 81-149
Author(s):  
Joshua N. Aston

The chapter deals with the legal framework in India against torture and custodial violence and the response and role of the Indian police force in such crimes. It also gives statistical data on violence taking place in the country at the hands of the police and armed forces. It provides a summary of the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on arbitrary and extra-judicial executions. The chapter also discusses the right to protection against torture and the views and verdicts of the Supreme Court of India, and highlights the role of statutory bodies and commissions such as the Law Commission of India and the National Police Commission in preventing torture and custodial violence. Therefore, this chapter has reference to several laws of the country and the Constitution of India and its provisions, and it cites some cases and Supreme Court rulings for preventing torture and custodial violence, which provides India’s response towards the prevention of torture and custodial violence and protecting victims as well as every citizen from such crimes.


Author(s):  
V.A. Vatras

The scientific article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of the Supreme Court’s legal conclusions regarding the application of family law rules and their place in the system of family law sources of Ukraine. The views of Ukrainian and foreign legal scholars on this issue are analyzed, as well as the legislative regulation of this issue, a number of examples of the Supreme Court’s legal positions are highlighted. It is substantiated that the Supreme Court’s legal conclusions on the application of family law are a source of family law because they have the properties of a source of law: binding on all bodies, including courts applying the applicable law (except physical and legal persons not bound by a legal opinion, albeit in court, but which may invoke it to substantiate their position; the courts may also withdraw their opinion in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 403 and 404 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine) regulatory, availability, formality and publicity, legality, ensuring the means of state coercion, law-making significance. It is also determined that the legal position of the Supreme Court exists in the form of a specific legal order, which has a corresponding official form of expression and consolidation, law­making significance. In the system of family law sources issued by the courts, legal opinions on the application of family law rules as issued by the highest authority in the system of courts of general jurisdiction are hierarchically above the acts of local and appellate courts, as well as other Supreme Court rulings after the adoption of the resolution containing the relevant legal opinion, except in cases of deviation from it in accordance with Art. 403 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine. Legal positions can actually get legal expression not only in the decisions of the Supreme Court, but also the decisions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-340
Author(s):  
Peter Martin Jaworski

It is often said that the Constitution does not interpret itself, that we are in need of a theory of interpretation for constitutions. This need has led to a flourishing literature on constitutional interpretation. Statutes, also, stand in need of a theory of interpretation, and that obvious need has led to a robust literature on that subject. What is said too infrequently is that Supreme Court rulings do not interpret themselves, that we are in need of a theory of interpretation for rulings. In this essay, I assess the question of what is an appropriate doctrine of ruling interpretation by applying the arguments of the living constitutionalists to Supreme Court rulings. Contemporary proponents of a progressive doctrine of interpretation for constitutions—variously called the ‘living tree,’ ‘living force,’ or ‘living constitution’ doctrines of interpretation—appear to embrace two theses. The first thesis, which we can call the ‘progressive thesis,’ is the view that the Supreme Court ought to ensure that our highest laws are in compliance with contemporary values. The second thesis is the ‘doctrine of judicial supremacy’ which maintains that all lower judicial and non-judicial actors are to accept and adhere to the rulings of the Supreme Court.I argue that these two theses—the progressive thesis and the doctrine of judicial supremacy—are in tension with one another. Embracing the second thesis requires abandoning the first, while embracing the first thesis requires abandoning the second. Contemporary living constitutionalism, as defended by prominent advocates like Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, Justice Ian Binnie, Australian Justice Michael Kirby, legal scholar Peter Hogg, and others, is incoherent. In the end, those who embrace the progressive thesis must rely on the claim that the Supreme Court ought to have a monopoly on the use of progressive interpretation, and that lower courts and non-judicial actors must use originalist methods for interpreting the text of Supreme Court rulings. To make this argument, the advocates of progressive constitutional interpretation must be advocates of originalism—not half-hearted supporters, but enthusiastic, full-on supporters, however much they may, elsewhere in their writings, condemn originalism as a practically-flawed, unworkable, or unenlightened method of interpretation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Winslow ◽  
Alec Baker ◽  
Charles Goehring

Neoliberalism is an anti-democratic ideology. It takes decisions about the allocation of scarce resources out of the hands of public institutions and places them in the hands of private actors. Despite a distrust of democratic institutions immanent to neoliberalism, its reach within those same institutions reveals potent ideological lessons. Even the courts, ostensibly a bulwark against anti-democratic impulses, have incorporated neoliberal arguments into their rulings. As the courts have adopted neoliberal discourse they have reimagined society as a market populated by consumers. Accordingly, in this article we examine five Supreme Court rulings that illuminate how the publicly interested citizen is replaced by the self-interested consumer as the basic unit of democracy. We argue these rulings rhetorically predispose voters to think of social problems in the neoliberal language of privatization and profit through three themes: (1) elevating the market, (2) expanding the market, and (3) advertising the market. Broader implications are discussed including a more comprehensive explanation for how neoliberal judicial discourse has played a vital role in orienting the public to accept policies designed to concentrate public resources and decisions into the hands of private actors.


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