scholarly journals Corporate Data Sharing, Leakage, and Supervision Mechanism Research

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 931
Author(s):  
Haifei Yu ◽  
Xinyu He
Keyword(s):  
Data Sharing ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Technical Level ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Gradual Rise ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Mechanism Research ◽  
Supervision Mechanism ◽  
The Stability

Data sharing helps to make full use of each other’s data and enable the digital economy. With the gradual rise of corporate data sharing, the frequent occurrence of data leakage events highlights the dilemma of data sharing, leakage and supervision, which infringes on the data assets of the leaked party. Our paper aims to design an effective data supervision mechanism and achieve the stability of data sharing alliance. Therefore, this paper considers the data technology capabilities of both parties of the data sharing alliance and the benefits and loss of data leakage, establishes the game model and supervision mechanism of data sharing, leakage and supervision under the condition of complete information, and analyzes the game equilibrium and the influence of different supervision levels on the company’s data sharing and leakage behavior. The results show that the company sharing and leaking behavior is affected by both the level of data supervision fines and the relative technical level. Our model can make up for the weakness of the low-tech company, control the company’s choice of leaking behaviors, and ensure the stability of data sharing alliance by designing reasonable data supervision mechanism, especially the severe data supervision strategy.

A Dynamic Game Model of Reverse Logistics for End-of-Life Electronic Products Based on Complete Information

2012 ◽  
Vol 472-475 ◽  
pp. 3399-3404
Author(s):  
Jing Min Zhang ◽  
Chang Zai Chen
Keyword(s):  
End Of Life ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Logistics System ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Abstract: End-of-life electronic products have become a major environmental issue among countries. This is due to the growing number of end-of-life electronic products and their hazardous contents. The improper handling of their components not only causes the waste of resources, but also brings serious environmental pollution. Therefore, a reasonable construction of reverse logistics system for end-of-life electronic products is an urgent problem at present. This article introduces the importance of reverse logistics for end-of-life electronic products, and builds complete information dynamic game model about the government, manufacturers, third party reverse logistics provider and consumers. It discuss game equilibrium in the context of complete information in accordance with a certain sequence of actions, and finally obtains the decision of all participating subjects in the reverse logistics system for end-of-life electronic products. Keywords: reverse logistics; end-of-life electronic products; dynamic game

Federated Learning Meets Blockchain: State Channel based Distributed Data Sharing Trust Supervision Mechanism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Fan Zhang ◽  
Shaoyong Guo ◽  
Xuesong Qiu ◽  
Siya Xu ◽  
Feng Qi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Data Sharing ◽  
Distributed Data ◽  
Supervision Mechanism

Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Cooperation Contract under Asymmetric Information

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 794-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability

The stability of cooperation contract is the result of abandon opportunistic behavior in the process of repeated games among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain from long-term interests, and is also the foundation of healthy development for the whole supply chain. But in real life cooperation contract instability everywhere for a variety of reasons, such as ethical considerations, institutional factors, cultural factors and special reasons during the transition period and so on. From the perspective of information economics and game theory, the main game process of cooperation between enterprise and the other subjects in supply chain is not only the game of information, but also the game of interests. Information structure and the interesting structure are the important factors for the subjects of the game of the implementation of decisions and the basic contractual constraints for cooperative game equilibrium. Cooperation behaviors among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain were studied on the basis of game theory, and the stability of cooperation contract is also being discussed in this paper.

scholarly journals Dynamic Analysis of Duopoly Price Game Based on Low-Carbon Technology Sharing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Fengshan Si ◽  
Zhengkun Yan ◽  
Jing Wang ◽  
Daoming Dai
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Technology Research ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Price Game ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Technology Level

Taking the carbon emissions per unit product as the standard to measure the low-carbon technology level of the enterprise, this article analyzed how the technology supplier enterprises realize low-carbon production and achieve a win-win situation for both supply and demand through technology sharing through technology research and development. Based on the positive effect of low-carbon technology level on product demand, we studied the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal low-carbon technology level in the technology supply enterprises under the Stackelberg game in 3 conditions (i.e., without technology research and development or technology sharing, with technology research and development but no technology sharing, and with both technology research and development and technology sharing). We also drew a comparative analysis of the optimal product price, the optimal low-carbon technology level, and the optimal profit in the three scenarios. Besides, by constructing a delayed differential price game model, we studied the equilibrium strategy of price competition between technology supply and demand companies and the local asymptotic stability of the game system at the equilibrium point. In addition, the effects of delay strategy on game equilibrium strategy, the influence of the degree of adjustment of decision variables on the stability of the game system, and the stability of the game system on the evolution trend of the game are also explored. By comparing and analyzing the game results of the oligopoly enterprises in the stable system and the unstable system, it confirmed that the system instability usually causes serious harm to the enterprise.

scholarly journals DIGITALIZATION OF LABOR LAW:

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Larisa S. Kirillova ◽  
Andrey M. Lushnikov ◽  
Marina V. Lushnikova ◽  
Askhat A. Bikeev
Keyword(s):  
Labor Relations ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Labor Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Labor Legislation ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Comprehensive Study

The article discusses some aspects of the digitalization impact on labor relations. It is concluded that the digital economy could not but affect the labor legislation, since it is economic relations and the nature of labor organization that largely determine the content and specific nature of labor legislation. It is noted that many scientific materials on this issue affect only certain aspects of the digitalization of labor relations. This is largely due to the fact that the digital economy development process in Russia began somewhat later, and therefore the first works appeared only at the beginning of XX century. However, there is already a reason to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem at the moment. The authors offer to start by highlighting some trends in the development of labor law that are caused by the digital economy. It seems that further work shall be carried out with the definition of trends to identify the risks of digital changes and develop the most optimal proposals for legislation. Based on the trend consideration results, their positive or negative impact on labor relations is noted. It is noted that digitalization opens up new opportunities for the organization of labor and employment, but it carries a huge number of threats to the stability of labor relations at the same time.

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

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