scholarly journals Research on the Transformation Path of the Green Intelligent Port: Outlining the Perspective of the Evolutionary Game “Government–Port–Third-Party Organization”

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 8072
Author(s):  
Bin Meng ◽  
Haibo Kuang ◽  
Erxuan Niu ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Zhenhui Li

While promoting the global economy and trade, ports impose serious pollution on the global ocean and atmosphere. Therefore, the development of ports is restrained by the policies and measures of governments and international organizations used to cope with climate change and environmental protection. With the development of information technology, the operation and expansion of ports is facing forms of green and intelligent reform. This research aims to link the development of green intelligent ports, government policies, and third-party organizations to find the most suitable evolutionary path for the development of green intelligent ports. This paper assumes that governments will push ports to transform into green intelligent ports from the perspective of benefiting long-term interests, that the goal of ports is to maximize their profits, and that third-party organizations will actively promote the development of green intelligent ports. Based on these assumptions, this paper has established an evolutionary game theory model of “government–port–third-party organization” regarding the development of green intelligent ports. The Jacobian matrix of the game theory system was constructed by using the replicator dynamic equation, and local stability analysis was performed to obtain the equilibrium stability point of the entire system. This research reveals the limitations of the development of green intelligent ports without government involvement and explores the ability of third-party organizations to promote the implementation of policies, confirming the role of government regulation and control in promoting the development of green intelligent ports. This paper may be helpful for the development of green intelligent ports in the future. The results show that: (1) The main factors affecting the choice of port strategy are the benefits of building a green intelligent port, the intensity of government regulation, and the quantitative influence of third-party evaluation results on the port strategy selection. (2) Government decision-making plays an important role in port transformation. If the relevant government chooses the wrong strategy, then the transformation of the port will be delayed. (3) Government regulation and control need to change with the change of the evolution stage. (4) Compared with the macro-control policies of the government, the influence of the third-party organization on the port is significantly smaller.

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 1057
Author(s):  
Xin

In recent years, China’s chemical industry has incurred frequent safety accidents which seriously impact the social environment and public safety. Traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to a lack of relevant professionals in the government regulation of chemical enterprise safety production. Thus, a new safety regulation mechanism should be conducted. In this paper, we constructed an evolutionary game model of chemical industry safety regulation based on limited rationality, and the influence of main parameters on the equilibrium evolution process is studied by system dynamics simulation. The results show that government regulation authorities play a leading role in the process of chemical industry safety regulation and increasing punishment will help to achieve an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). What is more, the feasibility and effectiveness of the third-party regulation service mechanism are verified, and the market access threshold of third-party regulation service needs to be improved to stop the occurrence of rent-seeking activities in the regulatory process. In summary, the introduction of third-party regulation service entities to the chemical industry safety regulation process has far-reaching implications for promoting the healthy development of China’s chemical industry.


Vaccines ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Xiaodong Wang ◽  
Xinfeng Wang

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-198
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bussiere

Sweeping across the social and political landscape of the northeastern United States during the late 1820s and early 1830s, the Antimasonic Party has earned a modest immortality as the first “third” party in American history. In pamphlets, speeches, sermons, protests, and other venues, Antimasons lambasted the fraternal order of Freemasonry as undemocratic, inegalitarian, and un-Christian, reviling it as a threat to the moral order and civic health of the Early Republic. Because they believed that the fraternal organization largely controlled all levels of government, antebellum Antimasons first created a social movement and then an independent political party. Even before the full emergence of modern mass democratic politics, Antimasons demonstrated the benefits of party organization, open national nominating conventions, and party platforms. Scholars with otherwise different perspectives on the “party period” tend to agree that Antimasonry had an important impact on what became the first true mass party organizations—the Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs—and helped push the political culture in a more egalitarian and populist direction.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 110-120
Author(s):  
Daniel Elvis Pontonuwu ◽  
Wilson Bogar ◽  
Marthinus Mandagi

The emergency status caused by Coronavirus Diseases (Covid-19) has prompted the government to implement Social Distancing as a measure to reduce the number of spreads of the Covid-19 virus. Social distance is a person's efforts not to interact at close range or avoid crowds. The community is asked to work at home, study from home and worship at home; even tourist attractions are not allowed to operate, this situation is a challenge for tourism actors. The purpose of this study is to find out how the tourism strategy is during the New Normal period after the COVID-19 pandemic with restrictions on community activities. This study uses a qualitative approach. Data analysis was carried out with qualitative-interpretive. The results of research conducted at the prayer hill religious area show that government policies through the implementation of Government Regulation No. 1 of 2021 concerning Improving Discipline and Law Enforcement of Health Protocols in the Prevention and Control of Corona Virus Disease 2019 have been well implemented in terms of four indicators, namely: communication, resources, disposition and bureaucratic structure.


Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.


2008 ◽  
pp. 2814-2829
Author(s):  
Robin L. Wakefield ◽  
Dwayne Whitten

Despite the fact that over half of U.S. residents are now online, Internet users hesitate to enter into transactions with e-retailers in the absence of certain assurances. Recent IS research shows that institution-based assurance structures, such as Web seals, are drivers of online trust. We extend the research in online trust to include the effect of third-party organization (TPO) credibility on both Internet users’ perceptions of assurance structures and purchase risk. Findings indicate that TPO credibility is positively related to the value that Internet users assign to assurance structures and negatively related to perceptions of purchase risk. Furthermore, perceptions of TPO credibility are strongly associated with users’ trusting attitudes toward the e-retailer. For some online consumers, trust may have less to do with privacy and security and more to do with the reputation of the TPO. These findings have important implications for the design of Web sites, the selection of assurance providers and services, and the reputation of both e-retailers and providers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 5306
Author(s):  
Songtao Xu ◽  
Zhifang Zhou ◽  
Ke Liu

The introduction of third-party governance models for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution has promoted the marketization, professionalization, and efficiency of pollution treatment, but also can result in distortions of relevant stakeholder relationships and conflicts of interest. The game relationship among the government, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies may solve the practical dilemma of comprehensive management of soil heavy metal pollution and establish a good cooperative mechanism. We constructed a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism of each agent’s strategy choice as well as the evolution of each agent’s strategy choice under different parameter trends and simulation analyses. The research showed that the amount of fines and supervision costs, rent-seeking costs and governance costs, and government subsidies and rent-seeking benefits were key factors affecting the evolution and stability strategies of government departments, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies. By cooperating with third-party governance companies, the government can effectively suppress the improper behavior of soil-polluting companies. The conclusions of the study are helpful to broaden the research boundary of soil heavy metal pollution treatment and provide theoretical guidance for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution in China.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140037 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Liao ◽  
Thea D. Tlsty

Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.


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