Does Voting Solve the Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma?

Shun Katsuki; Yoichi Hizen

doi:10.3390/su12166311

Does Voting Solve the Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma?

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12166311 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (16) ◽

pp. 6311 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Shun Katsuki ◽

Yoichi Hizen

Keyword(s):

Laboratory Experiment ◽

Small Groups ◽

Future Generations ◽

Voting Rules ◽

Proxy Voting ◽

Successive Generations ◽

Two Alternatives

Does voting solve the intergenerational sustainability dilemma? Do voting rules matter when trying to induce people to collectively select a sustainable alternative that leaves more resources for future generations? To answer these questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment using an intergenerational sustainability dilemma game in which players are asked to choose between two alternatives. Choosing the alternative that maximizes the players’ immediate benefit decreases the resources left for subsequent generations. The choice is made by the votes cast within small groups representing successive generations. We compare three voting rules: ordinary voting, whereby each person in the group has one vote; proxy voting, whereby some but not all of the players are given an extra vote to cast on behalf of subsequent generations; and two-ballot voting, whereby all players are given an extra vote. We observe that both proxy voting and two-ballot voting increase the frequency at which the sustainable alternative is selected; however, the frequency of such a choice remains low. This suggests that voting individually is a relatively ineffective way to elicit sustainable choices from successive generations even if the rules of voting are modified.

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Voting on Behalf of a Future Generation: A Laboratory Experiment

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su11164271 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (16) ◽

pp. 4271 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Yoshio Kamijo ◽

Yoichi Hizen ◽

Tatsuyoshi Saijo ◽

Teruyuki Tamura

Keyword(s):

Laboratory Experiment ◽

Voting Behavior ◽

Future Generation ◽

Future Generations ◽

Proxy Voting ◽

Voting Rule ◽

The Future ◽

Voting Scheme ◽

Intergenerational Inequality

This paper investigates a new voting rule wherein some people are given extra votes to serve as proxies for future generations. We predict that this voting scheme affects the voting behavior of those who do not receive an extra vote (i.e., single-ballot voters) because they are less likely to become a pivot, while proxy voters are expected to behave in support of the future generation. To test this prediction, we compare three scenarios wherein single-ballot voters would cast a vote: (a) one-voter-one-vote scenario wherein all voters cast only a single ballot; (b) a standard proxy-voting scenario wherein other voters cast two ballots, and the second vote is to cast for the benefit of a future generation; and (c) a non-proxy-voting scenario wherein other voters cast two ballots with no explanation for the second vote. The result shows that single-ballot voters are less inclined to vote for the future-oriented option in (c) than in (a). This indicates the potential drawback of the new voting scheme. However, there is no difference in the single-ballot voters’ decision between (a) and (b), indicating that the explanation of the second ballot as the proxy is important for reducing the intergenerational inequality through this voting reform.

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Costly Voting

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/000282804322970706 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 94 (1) ◽

pp. 57-66 ◽

Cited By ~ 145

Author(s):

Tilman Börgers

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Majority Voting ◽

Voluntary Participation ◽

Voting Rules ◽

Value Model ◽

Private Value ◽

Two Alternatives ◽

Costly Voting

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Pareto-dominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

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Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research ◽

10.1613/jair.1.12388 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 70 ◽

pp. 1413-1439

Author(s):

Laurent Bulteau ◽

Gal Shahaf ◽

Ehud Shapiro ◽

Nimrod Talmon

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Social Choice ◽

Metric Space ◽

Metric Spaces ◽

Solution Concept ◽

Abstract Model ◽

Participatory Budgeting ◽

Voting Rules ◽

Ideal Element ◽

Proxy Voting

We present a unifying framework encompassing a plethora of social choice settings. Viewing each social choice setting as voting in a suitable metric space, we offer a general model of social choice over metric spaces, in which—similarly to the spatial model of elections—each voter specifies an ideal element of the metric space. The ideal element acts as a vote, where each voter prefers elements that are closer to her ideal element. But it also acts as a proposal, thus making all participants equal not only as voters but also as proposers. We consider Condorcet aggregation and a continuum of solution concepts, ranging from minimizing the sum of distances to minimizing the maximum distance. We study applications of our abstract model to various social choice settings, including single-winner elections, committee elections, participatory budgeting, and participatory legislation. For each setting, we compare each solution concept to known voting rules and study various properties of the resulting voting rules. Our framework provides expressive aggregation for a broad range of social choice settings while remaining simple for voters; and may enable a unified and integrated implementation for all these settings, as well as unified extensions such as sybil-resiliency, proxy voting, and deliberative decision making. We study applications of our abstract model to various social choice settings, including single-winner elections, committee elections, participatory budgeting, and participatory legislation. For each setting, we compare each solution concept to known voting rules and study various properties of the resulting voting rules. Our framework provides expressive aggregation for a broad range of social choice settings while remaining simple for voters; and may enable a unified and integrated implementation for all these settings, as well as unified extensions such as sybil-resiliency, proxy voting, and deliberative decision making.

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Effect of proxy voting for children under the voting age on parental altruism towards future generations

Futures ◽

10.1016/j.futures.2020.102569 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 122 ◽

pp. 102569 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Yoshio Kamijo ◽

Teruyuki Tamura ◽

Yoichi Hizen

Keyword(s):

Future Generations ◽

Proxy Voting ◽

Parental Altruism ◽

Voting Age

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Complying with the SEC’s new proxy voting rules

Journal of Investment Compliance ◽

10.1108/15285810310812960 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 22-25

Author(s):

Kathleen K. Clarke ◽

Paul M. Miller

Keyword(s):

Voting Rules ◽

Proxy Voting

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Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/2938819 ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 87 (4) ◽

pp. 856-869 ◽

Cited By ~ 227

Author(s):

Roger B. Myerson

Keyword(s):

Simple Model ◽

Small Groups ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Scoring Rules ◽

Game Model ◽

Approval Voting ◽

Voting Rules ◽

Single Transferable Vote ◽

Sincere Voting ◽

Multicandidate Elections

A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.

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A repeated cross between inbred lines of poultry

The Journal of Agricultural Science ◽

10.1017/s0021859600049546 ◽

1951 ◽

Vol 41 (4) ◽

pp. 367-370 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Alan W. Greenwood ◽

J. S. S. Blyth

Keyword(s):

Small Groups ◽

Degenerative Change ◽

Inbred Lines ◽

The Other ◽

Commercial Poultry ◽

Parental Lines ◽

Successive Generations

In view of the present interest in the development of commercial poultry flocks by crossing inbred lines, at least two questions of importance arise. One is, how well does a successful cross between two inbred lines repeat itself with successive generations of the particular parental lines involved? The other, bound up with the manifest degenerative change that seems to be the fate of most inbred lines, is related to the possibility of determining minimal and/or optimal degrees of inbreeding necessary to produce commercially satisfactory offspring.As a preliminary to a major investigation of these problems it would perhaps be useful to record briefly observations on small groups of pullets derived from such a cross, which has been repeated at intervals over 11 years within the Centre's flock of Brown Leghorn fowls, and to compare them with the parental lines.

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Methods for Restricting Maximum Exposure Rate in Computerized Adaptative Testing

Methodology ◽

10.1027/1614-2241.3.1.14 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 14-23 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Juan Ramon Barrada ◽

Julio Olea ◽

Vicente Ponsoda

Keyword(s):

Measurement Accuracy ◽

Computerized Adaptive Testing ◽

Computation Time ◽

Adaptive Testing ◽

Exposure Rate ◽

Control Parameters ◽

The Impact ◽

Two Alternatives ◽

Selection Of ◽

Maximum Exposure

Abstract. The Sympson-Hetter (1985) method provides a means of controlling maximum exposure rate of items in Computerized Adaptive Testing. Through a series of simulations, control parameters are set that mark the probability of administration of an item on being selected. This method presents two main problems: it requires a long computation time for calculating the parameters and the maximum exposure rate is slightly above the fixed limit. Van der Linden (2003) presented two alternatives which appear to solve both of the problems. The impact of these methods in the measurement accuracy has not been tested yet. We show how these methods over-restrict the exposure of some highly discriminating items and, thus, the accuracy is decreased. It also shown that, when the desired maximum exposure rate is near the minimum possible value, these methods offer an empirical maximum exposure rate clearly above the goal. A new method, based on the initial estimation of the probability of administration and the probability of selection of the items with the restricted method ( Revuelta & Ponsoda, 1998 ), is presented in this paper. It can be used with the Sympson-Hetter method and with the two van der Linden's methods. This option, when used with Sympson-Hetter, speeds the convergence of the control parameters without decreasing the accuracy.

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