scholarly journals Green Innovation Mode under Carbon Tax and Innovation Subsidy: An Evolutionary Game Analysis for Portfolio Policies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengzhong Zhang ◽  
Yingmin Yu ◽  
Qihong Zhu ◽  
Chun Martin Qiu ◽  
Aixuan Tian
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Mode

Previous literature has shown that manufacturers’ choices between radical and incremental green innovation modes can greatly impact the tradeoff between industry growth and carbon emission reduction. Yet, how the government can motivate manufacturers to implement radical green innovations to reduce carbon emission is unclear. In this paper, the researchers construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the joint impacts of carbon tax and innovation subsidy on manufacturers’ choices of green innovation mode. We derive the conditions for manufacturers’ stable strategies. Based on those results, we find that four factors—carbon tax, innovation subsidy, consumer green preference, and manufacturers’ capabilities of absorbing and adopting new technologies—may facilitate the choice of radical innovation. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations to verify the theoretical results, and further illustrate how the synergy of carbon tax rate and subsidy level affects the evolution of the green innovation mode choices. Specifically, we demonstrate the superiority of portfolio policy in the early stage of green innovation over single policy. In contrast, in the later stage, it is carbon tax but not innovation subsidy that remains effective. We discuss the insights for the government to formulate appropriate environmental policies to effectively promote the adoption of green innovation and reduce carbon emission.

scholarly journals Analysis on Evolutionary Stability Strategies of Carbon Emission of Logistics Enterprises Based on Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Wu ◽  
Peng Liu ◽  
Qi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
The Government

In view of the problem of high carbon emissions of logistics enterprises, the government’s carbon tax policy, consumers’ willingness to purchase low-carbon services, and the carbon emission reduction behavior of logistics enterprises, the evolutionary game model between the government, consumers, and logistics enterprises is established by using the theory and method of evolutionary game, and the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the three parties under different parameters are analyzed. The research results show the following. (1) When setting the carbon tax rate, the government can ignore the impact on consumers and give more consideration to the influencing factors of logistics enterprises, which is conducive to the formulation of carbon emission reduction policies for logistics enterprises. (2) When the government sets a lower carbon tax rate, it can not only promote the carbon emission reduction of logistics enterprises but also be conducive to government supervision. (3) The evolution direction of the government’s final decision will not change due to the size of Y and Z. The government’s final decision is to adopt a regulatory strategy. The study provides theoretical guidance for the government to formulate carbon tax policies, guides consumers to purchase low-carbon services, and promotes carbon emission reduction in logistics enterprises.

Carbon Taxes and Innovation without Commitment

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Golombek ◽  
Mads Greaker ◽  
Michael Hoel
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Climate Mitigation ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Mitigation Policy ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
The Government ◽  
Future Policy ◽  
Lack Of Commitment

Abstract Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur innovation of new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentration economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies than the first-best subsidy. If the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) carbon tax rate exceeds the first-best carbon tax rate.

scholarly journals Will Port Integration Help Reduce Carbon Emissions and Improve Social Welfare?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhuoqi Teng ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yuantao Fang ◽  
Hailing Fu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Government

In the context of competition between two ports in Cournot, we studied optimal decision-making processes for the government and the port in four different situations before and after the integration of the port based on the subsidy and carbon tax mechanism. We analyzed the impacts of the carbon tax rate and emission reduction subsidy rate on social welfare and determined the optimal carbon tax rate, the optimal emission reduction subsidy rate, the optimal carbon emission level, and the optimal social welfare level in different situations. We also compared the optimal social welfare level and the optimal carbon emission level of the four situations before and after the integration. This research can be used as a policy reference for the government for the formation of environmental policies based on the goal of maximizing social welfare, and it could also be used for the port’s internal decision-making when the environmental policy has been set.

Analysis on Trilateral Game of Government Agency, Emission-Dependent Firm and Carbon Verification Institutions under Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2015 ◽  
Vol 1092-1093 ◽  
pp. 1585-1590
Author(s):  
Mei Wen ◽  
Jun Zeng ◽  
Ming Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Environmental Regulations ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Government Agency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Abatement ◽  
The World ◽  
Reduce Carbon Emission ◽  
The Government

To reduce carbon emission, cap-and-trade (C&T) is regarded as one of the effective environmental regulations around the world, which brings huge challenges to generating firms. In this paper, a tripartite game model on carbon abatement is built to analyze their optimal strategies under the C&T scheme. Based on the equilibrium of the game, some suggestions are presented to give the government agency to promote the efficiency of C&T scheme, that is, introducing carbon verification institution and doing heavier fine to firm will decrease the probability of firm deception and relieve the burden of the government agency; setting reward to carbon verification institution and an appropriate increase in fine of carbon verification institution will decrease the probability of supervisor inspection, further saving supervision costs.

scholarly journals The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Xiangxiang Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang
Keyword(s):  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Distribution Operations ◽  
The Government

Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

scholarly journals A Carbon Emission Measurement Method for Individual Travel Based on Transportation Big Data: The Case of Nanjing Metro

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (16) ◽  
pp. 5957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Yu ◽  
Tao Wang ◽  
Yujie Xiao ◽  
Jun Chen ◽  
Xingchen Yan
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Smart Cards ◽  
Complex Method ◽  
Emission Measurement ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
The Government

With the strengthening of environmental awareness, the government pays much more attention to environmental protection and thus implements carbon trading schemes to promote the reduction of global carbon dioxide emissions. The carbon Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is an incentive mechanism for citizens to value their energy conservation and carbon reduction. Individual travel needs to rely on various means of transportation, resulting in energy consumption. Carbon tax or subsidy can only be carried out after carbon GSP accurately measures individual carbon emissions. The big data acquired from the smart cards of passengers’ travels provide the possibility for carbon emission accounting of individual travel. This research proposes a carbon emission measurement of individual travel. Through establishing the network model of the Nanjing metro with a complex method, the shortest path of the passengers’ travels is obtained. Combined with the origination–destination (OD) records of the smart cards, the total distance of the passengers’ travels is obtained. By selecting the operation table to estimate the carbon emissions generated by the daily operation of the subway system, the carbon emissions per kilometer or per time of passenger travel are finally obtained. With the accurate tracking of carbon emissions for individual travel, the government may establish a comprehensive monitoring system so as to establish a carbon tax and carbon supplement mechanism for citizens.

scholarly journals Carbon Tax, Subsidy, and Emission Reduction: Analysis Based on DSGE Model

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Haoran Li ◽  
Wei Peng
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Coordinated Development ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dynamic Stochastic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Application Fields ◽  
The Impact

Carbon emission has negative externalities, which will cause severe natural and social problems. In recent years, more and more attention has been paid to carbon emission reduction issue both in academic and application fields. This paper aims to explore the impact of punitive carbon tax and incentive carbon emission reduction subsidy on economy and environment through the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. The results show that both carbon tax and carbon emission reduction subsidy policies can help to reduce carbon emissions and to improve environment quality. In addition, carbon emission reduction subsidy has a positive impact on economy, while carbon tax has the opposite impact. It follows that the incentive carbon emission reduction policy is more conducive to the coordinated development of economy and environment. This research can be a guideline for the government to formulate carbon emission abatement policies from the perspective of coordinated development.

scholarly journals AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACTS OF CARBON TAX ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA

2015 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
Alhassan Mohammed ◽  
Aminu Aminu
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Causality Tests ◽  
Bound Test

This study is designed to investigate the anticipated impact of carbon tax on economic growth in Nigeria using the scenario of the proposed tax rate on the primary carbon emission-related activities. This study therefore employed ARDL bound test and Toda-Yamamoto causality tests to show the existence of long-run relationship between carbon tax and economic growth. The study therefore revealed that: carbon tax has positive impact on economic growth; governance has negative impact on economic growth: non-existence of causal relationship between carbon tax and economic growth in Nigeria. Hence, the study recommended among others, upward review of carbon tax and strict adherence to the regulation of tax rate on carbon emission be enforced, as well as consideration for application of tax rate on other non-primary emitters of carbon in Nigeria.

scholarly journals THE IMPACTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CARBON TAX ON FOSSIL FUELS: A HYBRID CGE ANALYSIS FOR INDONESIA

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-105
Author(s):  
Herbert Wibert Victor Hasudungan
Keyword(s):  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Revenue Recycling ◽  
Energy Economy ◽  
Ministry Of Finance ◽  
The Government

This paper investigates the environmental and economic impacts of introducing the CO2 taxation on carbon-based fuels using a detailed disaggregation of energy-economy-environmental CGE model for Indonesia. The carbon tax has yet to be implemented in Indonesia. However, this instrument has been considered in the Ministry of Finance report as one of the governments fiscal strategic framework to finance the countrys action plan in commitments to reduce the GHG emissions. Suppose that the government levies the tax of Rp. 100,000/ton CO2e under two possible revenue-recycling scenarios: the carbon tax revenue is recycled through a reduction of labour income tax rate or an increase of government spending on commodities. For comparison purpose, we also implement the non-compensated scenario of which the additional revenue from carbon tax is kept as government savings to run budget surplus. Overall, the results suggested that the carbon tax reduces the national emissions but adding more costs to the economy,resulting a fall in GDP. In terms of income distribution, the carbon tax tends to be progressive in both scenarios of revenue-recycling. However, when there is no compensating mechanism, the carbon tax tends to be regressive - the poorer households carry a higher share of the carbon tax burden.

scholarly journals Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model

Vaccines ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang ◽  
Xiaodong Wang ◽  
Xinfeng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Success Rate ◽  
Manufacturing Process ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Regulatory Authorities ◽  
The Government ◽  
Regulation Model

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers.

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