scholarly journals Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (24) ◽  
pp. 6900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liu ◽  
Shi ◽  
Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Distribution Method ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Alliance Partner ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Right

In a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the right alliance can help manufacturers better manufacture green products and make more profits. Choosing the most suitable alliance partner is also critical for manufacturers. In regard to product greenness and recycling competition, this paper considers the CLSC comprised of a dominant manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. Based on the Stackelberg game and equilibrium analysis, we discuss the optimal supply chain decision-making under four different models. Then, in order to ensure supply chain (SC) members’ enthusiasm to participate in the alliance, we design a profit distribution method to distribute the total profit to SC members. The results show that manufacturer’s optimal alliance decision is related to the degree of recycling competition. When less than the threshold, C alliance(the manufacturer make an alliance with the retailer and the third-party recycler at the same time) is optimal, otherwise, MR alliance(the manufacturer and the retailer make an alliance ) is more beneficial for the manufacturer.

scholarly journals Optimal Alliance Strategy and Its Impact in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain by considering Greenness and Service Effort

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Operation Efficiency ◽  
The Third

This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.

OPTIMAL STACKELBERG STRATEGIES FOR CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN WITH THIRD-PARTY REVERSE LOGISTICS

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (05) ◽  
pp. 1250026 ◽  
Author(s):  
NI-NA YAN ◽  
BAO-WEN SUN
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Stackelberg Strategies ◽  
Scrap Recycling

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), especially the reverse logistics system with the third-party reverse logistics providers (3PRLP) is very important for materials return, remanufacturing, repair, recovery, recycling, and reusing. In this paper, based on a one-leader and multi-follower Stackelberg game with the manufacturer being the leader, we model a multi-echelon CLSC with 3PRLP under the consideration of impacts of environmental legislation on scrap recycling. Furthermore, in order to encourage the 3PRLP to exert him to return activities we design a target rebate-punish contract between the manufacturer and the 3PRLP under both stochastic price-dependent demands and stochastic effort-dependent returns. We analyze the closed-form analytic expressions for both united optimization strategies in centralized closed-loop system and the Stackelberg strategies in decentralized system, and conclude that the wholesale price contract may not coordinate the forward supply chain and the target rebate-punish may coordinate the reverse chain under certain conditions. Finally, according to the practice of Chinese steel enterprises we carry out some simulation experiments to validate our theoretical analyses and gain some insights into the impacts of reverse logistics activities on the practitioners operations and decisions.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Zhaoqing Yu ◽  
Liang Shen ◽  
Runjie Fan ◽  
Rongyun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

Product Resynthesis as a Reverse Logistics Strategy for an Optimal Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinmay Sane ◽  
Conrad S. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Third Party ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Strategy ◽  
Logistics Strategy ◽  
Original Product

With continued emphasis on sustainability-driven design, reverse logistics is emerging as a vital competitive supply chain strategy for many of the global high-tech manufacturing firms. Various original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and multi-product manufacturing firms are enhancing their reverse logistics strategies in order to establish an optimal closed-loop supply chain through which they can introduce refurbished variants of their products back into the market. While a refurbished product strategy helps to mitigate environmental impact challenges as well as provide additional economic benefits, it is limited to an existing product market, possibly a subset of the existing market, and fails to commercialize/target new markets. In addition to refurbishing, the alternatives available for utilizing End-Of-Life (EOL) products are currently restricted to recycling and permanent disposal. In this work, the authors propose employing a new EOL option called “resynthesis” that utilizes existing waste from EOL products in a novel way. This is achieved through the synthesis of assemblies/subassemblies across multiple domains. The “newly” synthesized product can then be incorporated into the dynamics of a closed-loop supply chain. The proposed methodology enables OEMs to not only offer refurbished products as part of their reverse logistics strategy, but also provide them with resynthesized product concepts that can be used to expand to new/emerging markets. The proposed methodology provides a general framework that includes OEMs (manufacturers of the original product), retailers (distributors of the original product and collectors of the EOL products) and third-party firms (managers of the EOL products) as part of a closed-loop supply chain strategy. The proposed methodology is compared with the existing methodologies in the literature wherein a third-party supplies the OEM only with refurbished products and supplies products unsuitable for refurbishing to another firm(s) for recycling/disposal. A case study involving a multi-product electronics manufacturer is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodology.

scholarly journals Controlling Waste and Carbon Emission for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management under a Cap-and-Trade Strategy

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mowmita Mishra ◽  
Soumya Kanti Hota ◽  
Santanu Kumar Ghosh ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

Considering the increasing number of end-of-life goods in the context of improving the ambience and health of a population and their destructive impacts, recycling strategies are important for industries and organizations. In this article, a closed-loop supply chain management containing a single manufacturer, a single retailer, and a third party is introduced in which the manufacturer first propagates newly finished goods and then dispatches some of the finished goods to the retailer considering a single-setup multi-delivery policy. Due to shipping, carbon emission is taken into account as well as a carbon emission trading mechanism to curb the amount of carbon emissions by the retailer. For recycling through collection, inspection, remanufacturing, and landfill, the third party collects the end-of-life goods from its customers and ships perfect products to the manufacturer after a two-stage inspection. In this model, major sources of emissions such as shipping, replenishment orders, and inventory have been taken care of. The minimizing of the total cost relating to the container capacity, shipment numbers, and replenishment cycle length is the main objective of the closed-loop supply chain management for making the system more profitable. Expository numerical explorations, analysis, and graphic representations are conferred to elucidate this model, and it is observed that this model saves some percentage of the cost compared to the existing literature.

Semiotic Evaluation of Product Ontologies

2012 ◽  
pp. 1507-1522
Author(s):  
Joerg Leukel ◽  
Vijayan Sugumaran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Ontology Engineering ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Ontology Evaluation ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Quality Dimensions ◽  
The Right

Product-related information can be integrated with the help of a product ontology, which can provide consensual definitions of concepts and inter-relationships relevant in a product domain of interest. A product ontology is either given by a third party or results from ontology engineering. In both cases, the problem is how to assess its quality, and then select the “right” ontology. This chapter: (1) proposes a metrics suite for product ontology evaluation based on semiotic theory, and (2) demonstrates the feasibility and usefulness of the metrics suite using a supply chain model. The contribution of this research is the comprehensive metrics suite that takes into account the various quality dimensions of product ontology.

Semiotic Evaluation of Product Ontologies

2011 ◽  
pp. 64-79
Author(s):  
Joerg Leukel ◽  
Vijayan Sugumaran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Ontology Engineering ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Ontology Evaluation ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Quality Dimensions ◽  
The Right

Product-related information can be integrated with the help of a product ontology, which can provide consensual definitions of concepts and inter-relationships relevant in a product domain of interest. A product ontology is either given by a third party or results from ontology engineering. In both cases, the problem is how to assess its quality, and then select the “right” ontology. This chapter: (1) proposes a metrics suite for product ontology evaluation based on semiotic theory, and (2) demonstrates the feasibility and usefulness of the metrics suite using a supply chain model. The contribution of this research is the comprehensive metrics suite that takes into account the various quality dimensions of product ontology.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document