scholarly journals Decision-Making and Performance Analysis of Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Recycling Modes and Channel Power Structures

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gong ◽  
Chen ◽  
Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
System Efficiency ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Channel Power ◽  
And Performance

The recycling and remanufacturing of e-waste is linked to a worldwide emphasis on the establishment and implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility system (ERP), which has become an important problem in the process of cycling economy. Meanwhile, with the development and expansion of large-scale retail enterprises, the power structure of supply chain channels is showing a tendency towards diversity as well. However, few studies on closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) have considered both recycling modes and channel power structures. We aim to explore the influence of different recycling modes and channel power structures on the optimal decisions and performance of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), considering three recycling channels including manufacturer recycling, retailer recycling and hybrid recycling of retailer and manufacturer and two dominant modes including manufacturer-led and retailer-led. We construct six closed-loop supply chain models under different combinations of three recycling channels and two dominant modes. We analyze the effect of different recycling channels on company decision-making under the same dominant mode, whether participating in recycling has an impact on company decision-making under different dominant modes, and the effect on supply chain members and supply chain system under different dominant modes and recycling channels. The results show that the hybrid recycling strategy is always optimal for both supply chain members; the sub-optimal recycling strategies are both recycled by the subordinate enterprise, and the worst recycling strategies are both recycled by the leading enterprise. Moreover, it is always the worst strategy for manufacturer to participate in a closed-loop supply chain dominated by retailer and recycled by retailer; participating in a closed-loop supply chain dominated by manufacturer and recycled by manufacturer is always the worst strategy for retailer. From a system point of view, system efficiency is the highest under hybrid recycling, and system efficiency is the lowest if leading company recycles separately.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

Dynamic Pricing Game Under Different Channel Power Structures in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050052
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Hui Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Channel Power ◽  
Advantageous Position

The importance of closed-loop supply chains has been widely recognized both in academic communities and in industrial sectors. This paper starts from the traditional supply chains and the new self-supply chain of GREE to extract realistic problems, to mainly investigating two noncooperative dynamic pricing policies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, it studies the influence of different channel power structures on dynamic decisions and their complexities. Furthermore, the reference price affects the purchase decisions of consumers. Therefore, the model takes into account the influence of reference price of the market demands. Results show that the manufacturer who opens up a direct channel can make a huge profit in the game. In the dynamic game evolution process, the game leader is in a more advantageous position when the system is in a stable region; once entering into the bifurcating region or chaotic region, the game follower needs to adjust his price to follow the leader’s decision in order to make a profit. In addition, the system’s stable region becomes smaller when the market demand becomes more sensitive to the difference between the reference price and the actual price. In this model, if the manufacturer acts as a leader, he is in a more advantageous position when the market is sensitive to channel competition in the stable stage while the result is opposite in the unstable stage.

scholarly journals Modeling and performance analysis of a closed-loop supply chain using first-order hybrid Petri nets

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 168781401664958 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imane Outmal ◽  
Ali Kamrani ◽  
Emad S Abouel Nasr ◽  
Mohammed Alkahtani
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Performance Analysis ◽  
Petri Nets ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
First Order ◽  
Hybrid Petri Nets ◽  
And Performance

Optimal pricing for a multi-echelon closed loop supply chain with different power structures and product dual differences

2020 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 120281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Liu ◽  
Dingzhi Qin ◽  
Ningning Shen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Mingzhou Jin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain
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