scholarly journals A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (21) ◽  
pp. 5911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Jian ◽  
Yu Guo ◽  
Lin Jiang ◽  
Yanyan An ◽  
Jiafu Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Environmental Objectives

Whether the upstream and downstream members in a supply chain (considering environmental objectives) simultaneously stabilize economic benefits has become an important problem in the process of green development. However, few quantitative studies on green supply chains have considered environmental and economic benefits to realize multi-objective optimization. To study operation and cooperation strategies with a consideration of the different objective on the level of supply chain, we first establish a green supply chain game model with profit and environment objectives simultaneously considered by the manufacturer. Then, we analyze the multi-objective decisions of the supply chain members under centralized control using a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and revenue-sharing contract. Using the manufacturer’s environmental preference as a variable, the effects of environmental benefits on the supply chain are also investigated. Finally, this study determines that the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced after considering the objective of environmental benefits, while the retailer’s profit, product greenness, and environmental benefits will be improved. Meanwhile, the total profit of the green supply chain will first increase and then decrease. In particular, a revenue-sharing contract can facilitate the coordination of multiple objectives; in this way, both the manufacturer and the retailer achieve higher profits and environmental benefits compared to a decentralized control condition, which is of great significance in achieving a win–win situation for the economy and the environment.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Cooperative Pricing of Apparel Supply Chain Based on API

2011 ◽  
Vol 58-60 ◽  
pp. 28-35
Author(s):  
Ge Fu Zhang ◽  
Dong Hui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimization Model ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Research Result ◽  
Response Strategy ◽  
Quick Response ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Excess Profit

The purpose of this paper is to construct a multi-objective optimization model for cooperative pricing in the management of apparel supply chain. Firstly, by using Apparel Popularity Index (API) model, a kind of pricing model for supply chain has been built. Then, by introducing cooperation and other constraint conditions, a kind of cooperative pricing model was constructed. This model is a kind of Stackelberg game. The manufacturer and the retailer obtained their excess profits through the game. Lastly, this paper gave a numerical example which demonstrated that the excess profit of the cooperative supply chain was constant, and when the constraint conditions changed, the excess profit space would change at the meantime. This research result can help partners on apparel supply chain to practice Quick Response strategy.

Evaluation of multi-objective optimization approaches for solving green supply chain design problems

Omega ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 168-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miłosz Kadziński ◽  
Tommi Tervonen ◽  
Michał K. Tomczyk ◽  
Rommert Dekker
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Design ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Multi Objective

Price premium effect, supply contracts and strategic decision making under environmental considerations

2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinay Ramani ◽  
Sanjeev Swami ◽  
Debabrata Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Technological Adoption ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings. Findings A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Originality/value This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

scholarly journals Reverse Revenue Sharing Contract versus Two-Part Tariff Contract under a Closed-Loop Supply Chain System

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zunya Shi ◽  
Nengmin Wang ◽  
Tao Jia ◽  
Haoxun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Closed Loop System ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Economic Improvement

The importance of remanufacturing has been recognized in research and practice. The integrated system, combining the forward and reverse activities of supply chains, is called closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system. By coordination in the CLSC system, players will get economic improvement. This paper studies different coordination performances of two types of contracts, two-part tariff (TTC) and reverse revenue sharing contract (RRSC), in a closed-loop system. Through mathematical analysis based on Stackelberg Game Theory, we find that it is easy for manufacturer to improve more profits and retailer’s collection effects by adjusting the ratio of transfer collection price through RRSC, and we also give the function to calculate the best ratio of transfer collection price, which may be a valuable reference for the decision maker in practice. Besides, our results also suggest that although the profits of the coordinated CLSC system are always higher than the contradictory scenario, the RRSC is more favorable to the manufacturer than to the retailer, as results show that the manufacturer will share more profits from the system through RRSC. Therefore, RRSC has attracted the manufacturers more to closing the supply chain for economic consideration.

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