scholarly journals The Farmers’ Channel Selection and Sustainable Analysis under Carbon Tax Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Zheng ◽  
Quangui Pang ◽  
Tianpei Li ◽  
Guizheng Wang ◽  
Yiji Cai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Product Yield ◽  
Channel Selection ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Deterioration Rate ◽  
Dual Channels ◽  
The Government

This paper examines a farmer’s channel selection in a supply chain led by a retailer, considering carbon emissions and products’ deterioration. Three channels—online channels, retail channels, and dual channels—are proposed. The inventory model of perishable products and the two-stage Stackelberg game model are used to illustrate the operational process. To compare performances of the three channel structures, we further determine the critical points consisting of the profits and the carbon emissions among these channels. The results provide useful insights for supply chain members and the government. Farmers can choose a channel to optimize profit with respect to deterioration rate and product yield, but it might conflict with the aim of least carbon emissions. When the deterioration rate is high, the online channel is not a suitable choice. For the government, the carbon tax contributes to the reduction of carbon emissions, but it also leads to the loss of the farmer’s profit. Additionally, numerical results further illustrate that, from the perspective of the government, transporting and inventory processes are two major sources of emissions, and it is essential to implement carbon tax and exploit low-carbon transportation.

Decision and coordination of a low-carbon supply chain considering environmental tax policy on consumers

Kybernetes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Qiaoyu Peng ◽  
Lang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Environmental Tax ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government

Purpose This paper aims to explore how upstream supply chain companies will control the carbon emissions and price decisions of products when the government implements environmental tax policy on consumers. It provides some suggestions to control carbon emissions for the government and manufacturers. Design/methodology/approach This study establishes two-echelon Stackelberg game models with and without the implementation of environmental tax policy on consumers in a centralized scenario and a decentralized scenario. Through the comparative analysis of the four models, the optimal emission abatement and pricing strategies are obtained. Findings This paper concludes that implementing environmental tax policy on consumers within the market’s acceptable range is more beneficial to the retailer and the environment, as well as the overall social welfare, except for the manufacturer. Moreover, consumer’s low-carbon preference always has a broader impact on carbon abatement and corporate profits than environmental tax coefficient. Finally, the side-payment self-executing contract can effectively ensure that the supply chain members make rational decisions spontaneously while achieving a win-win solution of centralized scenario. Originality/value This paper first considers how the government’s environmental tax policy on consumers will affect the decision-making of supply chain companies, and proposes an improved side-payment self-enforcing contract to maximize environmental and economic benefits of centralized scenario. In addition, it provides a reference for the government to adopt both the carbon cap policy and the environmental tax policy.

scholarly journals Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bingquan Liu ◽  
Xuran Chang ◽  
Boyang Nie ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Lingqi Meng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinjie Zhang ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Liangcheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
The Government

The low-carbon economy has become the focus of global attention and scientific measurement standards with the concepts of low energy consumption, low pollution, and sustainable development. More and more attentions are paid to the research of low-carbon supply chains. Based on a two-level low-carbon supply chain in the context of carbon trading, a Stackelberg game model was established for government subsidies to determine a coordinated and balanced solution for supply chains in situations dominated by manufacturers. The optimal strategies for low-carbon technology innovation are analyzed within the context of governmental subsidies. This study’s conclusions are as follows: (1) When government subsidies are in place, regardless of who the government subsidies are meant for, manufacturers and retailers that do not generate carbon emissions will transfer the subsidies to the companies that generate carbon emissions by adjusting wholesale prices and retail prices to maximize their own profits. (2) When consumer prices are sensitive, the government’s optimal subsidy intensity increases as consumers’ low-carbon preferences increase. When consumer prices are not sensitive, the government should not provide any subsidies. (3) When consumers’ low-carbon preferences are weak, the retail price of products will decrease with the increase in subsidies; when consumers’ low-carbon preferences are strong, the opposite dynamic occurs.

Low Carbon Footprint

2015 ◽  
pp. 324-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Green Building ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain Networks ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government

Malaysia has committed to a 40% reduction of carbon emissions by 2020. The government has encouraged industry, society, and non-government organizations to work together to achieve this objective. The government has provided incentives through several energy programmes such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, green technology, and green building. One key area that has been targeted is logistics and supply chain, which has been contributing to high carbon emissions in manufacturing industries. Scholars and practitioners have only recently begun to pay attention to creating a low carbon supply chain. Furthermore, Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have faced several challenges in adopting low carbon activities. SMEs are unable to take the advantage of energy initiatives because of a lack of knowledge, a shortage of funds, and inadequate facilities. Almost 90% of firms are in the service industry working with large manufacturing firms and some SMEs working in manufacturing industry are working closely with their supply chain networks; achieving low carbon targets is hampered by the readiness of the manufacturing itself. This chapter discusses the challenges and future agenda of creating low carbon supply chains in manufacturing in Malaysia. Possible solutions are provided at the end of the chapter.

scholarly journals A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (14) ◽  
pp. 4878
Author(s):  
Chi-Jie Lu ◽  
Tian-Shyug Lee ◽  
Ming Gu ◽  
Chih-Te Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Inventory Model ◽  
Sustainable Production ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Production Inventory ◽  
Dependent Demand ◽  
Tax Regulation

This paper investigated a multistage sustainable production–inventory model for deteriorating items (i.e., raw materials and finished goods) with price-dependent demand and collaborative carbon reduction technology investment under carbon tax regulation. The model was developed by first defining the total profit of the supply chain members under carbon tax regulation and, second, considering a manufacturer (leader)–retailer (follower) Stackelberg game. The optimal equilibrium solutions that maximize the manufacturer’s and retailer’s total profits were determined through the method analysis. An algorithm complemented the model to determine the optimal equilibrium solutions, which were then treated with sensitivity analyses for the major parameters. Based on the numerical analysis, (a) carbon tax policies help reduce carbon emissions for both the manufacturer and retailer; (b) most carbon emissions from supply chain operations negatively impact the total profits of both members; (c) the retailer may increase the optimal equilibrium selling price to respond to an increase in carbon emissions from supply chain operations or carbon tax; and (d) autonomous consumption positively affects both members’ optimal equilibrium policies and total profits, whereas induced consumption does the opposite. These findings are very managerial and instructive for companies seeking profits and fulfilling environmental responsibility and governments.

Low Carbon Footprint

2017 ◽  
pp. 1414-1437
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Green Building ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain Networks ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government

Malaysia has committed to a 40% reduction of carbon emissions by 2020. The government has encouraged industry, society, and non-government organizations to work together to achieve this objective. The government has provided incentives through several energy programmes such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, green technology, and green building. One key area that has been targeted is logistics and supply chain, which has been contributing to high carbon emissions in manufacturing industries. Scholars and practitioners have only recently begun to pay attention to creating a low carbon supply chain. Furthermore, Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have faced several challenges in adopting low carbon activities. SMEs are unable to take the advantage of energy initiatives because of a lack of knowledge, a shortage of funds, and inadequate facilities. Almost 90% of firms are in the service industry working with large manufacturing firms and some SMEs working in manufacturing industry are working closely with their supply chain networks; achieving low carbon targets is hampered by the readiness of the manufacturing itself. This chapter discusses the challenges and future agenda of creating low carbon supply chains in manufacturing in Malaysia. Possible solutions are provided at the end of the chapter.

scholarly journals Impact of Asymmetric Carbon Information on Supply Chain Decisions under Low-Carbon Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Yang ◽  
Jingna Ji ◽  
Chenshi Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
High Carbon ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Asymmetric Carbon

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.

Governmental subsidy policies and supply chain decisions with carbon emission limit and consumer’s environmental awareness

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1675-1689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Zhuang Miao ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Government ◽  
Sustainability Initiatives ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Governmental Subsidy

The carbon emission reduction has become an inevitable trend. Under the low-carbon environment, the government has been acting as an important role in the operation and management of supply chain. This paper considers four different governmental subsidy strategies, which includes none of members is subsidized (NS Scenario), only retailer is subsidized (RS Scenario), only manufacturer is subsidized (MS Scenario) and both members are subsidized (SS Scenario). A Stackelberg game model, which incorporates both governmental regulation and consumer’s awareness of carbon emission, is developed to present the pricing and emission reduction behaviors for the supply chain members as well as the subsidy policies of government under different governmental subsidy strategies, and analyze the impact of relevant coefficients on the decisions and supply chain profits. It can be concluded that subsidizing to both members is more profitable for supply chain members and government in terms of environment protection and economic development. The results provide some managerial insights for the decision-makers and policy-makers to implement sustainability initiatives.

scholarly journals Green Procurement Relationships Development under Carbon Emissions Regulations: A Bi-Level Programming Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (10) ◽  
pp. 2183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-Ying Bao ◽  
Lei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Green Procurement ◽  
Multiple Sourcing ◽  
Upper Level

A multi-period Stackelberg game is adopted to study a green procurement relationship between manufacturers and suppliers in a supply chain. The manufacturers are considered as leaders, while the suppliers are modelled as followers in this Stackelberg game. Accordingly, a mixed binary linear bi-level programming model is developed to elaborate the game in consideration of carbon tax scheme. The upper level (the leader) aims at selecting a proper number of suitable suppliers to provide heterogeneous raw materials at the lowest operational cost. The objective of the lower level (the follower) is to find optimal purchasing quantities of raw materials. In addition, two lemmas are introduced to transform the mixed linear bi-level programming model into a single level linear programming model. The numerical example illustrates that: (1) the manufacturer prefers to adopt the multiple sourcing strategy due to the flexibility; (2) keeping stable supplies and large order volumes could effectively reduce carbon emissions for the suppliers and make the supply chain greener.

On green market segmentation under subsidy regulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang Li ◽  
Yongjian Li
Keyword(s):  
Market Segmentation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Green Market ◽  
Multi Objective Programming ◽  
The Government

Purpose This study aims to provide a better understanding of the market balance between regular (high-carbon) and green (low-carbon) products. Further, this study analyses the role of government subsidy policy, based on the results of the government’s optimal green subsidy decision and its implication for green market segmentation and social welfare. Design/methodology/approach This study adopts a Stackelberg game framework to study the interaction between the government’s subsidy regulations and the firms’ marketing regimes. When considering government subsidy decision, we use multi-objective programming theory and turn the problem into weighted single-objective optimisation programming. Findings This study explores three marketing regimes and identifies the conditions under which each regime should be adopted by a firm. Further, investigating the optimal subsidy decision problem for the government reveals three subsidy regimes corresponding to the three marketing regimes. The government may be stuck in a regime of useless subsidy and the reason for this phenomenon is analysed as well. Research limitations/implications Developing the model into a more complex supply chain situation will enhance the applicability of the framework. Incorporating other environmental regulations, such as carbon tax, can be interesting research extensions of this study. Practical implications This study provides a quantitative framework, which can help the regulator gain a deeper understanding of green subsidy policies and assist focal companies in acquiring a better appreciation of green marketing segmentation. Originality/value The study is one of the first few works to explore the optimal design of green subsidy regulation for the government and its impact on market segmentations of high- and low-carbon products by using quantitative modelling approaches and deriving vital managerial insights.

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