scholarly journals The Impact of Warranty Efficiency of Remanufactured Products on Production Decisions and Green Growth Performance in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: Perspective of Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Green Growth ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Warranty Service ◽  
The Impact

Consumers cannot fully assess the quality of remanufactured products prior to purchase. To reduce consumer risk, closed-loop supply chains adopt a warranty strategy to enhance perceived value among customers and stimulate green growth. Based on Stackelberg game theory and considering consumers’ low-carbon and remanufactured product preferences, this paper aims to explore the decision-making efficiency of closed-loop supply chains with warranty services. The results of the study show that consumers’ confidence in purchasing remanufactured products has increased the demand for new products and remanufactured products, in turn also increasing the interest of the member companies of the supply chain, and stimulating the realization of the potential value of remanufacturing, which is conducive to green growth. When a remanufactured product warranty period meets certain conditions, the member companies of the supply chain can obtain optimal profit. The optimal warranty entity selection of a closed-loop supply chain with a warranty service depends on the warranty efficiency of each entity, thus making it necessary to examine the products of each warranty party.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

Consumer value considerations and adoption of remanufactured products in closed-loop supply chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (2) ◽  
pp. 480-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yacan Wang ◽  
Benjamin T. Hazen ◽  
Diane A. Mollenkopf
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Perceived Risk ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Perceived Value ◽  
Perceived Quality ◽  
Consumer Acceptance ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains

Purpose The success of closed loop supply chains is contingent upon consumer acceptance of remanufactured products, yet little is known about how consumers value such products. The purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical grounding for understanding consumers’ value perceptions as related to remanufactured products. Design/methodology/approach Diffusion of innovation theory and customer perceived value literature help form the theoretical model, which is tested empirically using survey data of consumers. Structural equation modeling was employed to test the hypotheses. Findings Perceived value of remanufactured products is measured as a function of perceived benefits (environmental benefits; price advantage) and perceived sacrifices (perceived quality; perceived risk), all of which are shown to impact perceived value. Additionally, perceived risk is found to partially mediate the relationship between perceived quality and perceived value. Originality/value This research makes two significant contributions. First, mid-range theory that is contextualized to the closed loop supply chain is developed to aid researchers and practitioners in better understanding the consumer’s role in the closed loop supply chain, as related to the acceptance of remanufactured products. Second, consumer acceptance of remanufactured products represents a form of supply chain demand risk that has previously been unrecognized. The results provide a foundation for incorporating this type of demand risk in to future research efforts.

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

scholarly journals How Retailer Co-Opetition Impacts Pricing, Collecting and Coordination in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 10025
Author(s):  
Xinyi Li ◽  
Guoxuan Huang ◽  
Jie Chu ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Kai Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Manufacturing ◽  
Sustainable Performance ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact

The cooperative and competitive (i.e., co-opetition) behavior between retailers plays a significant role in the development of operations and marketing strategies in a supply chain. Specifically, retailers’ co-opetition relationship pivotally influences the sustainable performance in a closed-loop supply chain. This study examines the impact of retailer co-opetition on pricing, collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Based on observations in some industries (e.g., electronic manufacturing, fabric and textile, etc.), the cooperative and competitive relationships between retailers can be classified into the following three different modes: Bertrand competition, Stackelberg competition, and Collusion. In this paper, we establish a centralized and three decentralized game-theoretic models under these three co-opetition modes and characterize the corresponding equilibrium outcomes. The results indicate that the Bertrand competition mode yields the highest return rate, which is also superior to the other two modes for both the manufacturer and the supply chain system in terms of profitability. However, it can be shown that which mode benefits the retailers would depend on the degree of competition between the retailers and the relative remanufacturing efficiency. Interestingly, we find that the retailer’s first-move advantage does not necessarily lead to higher profits. In addition, we design a modified two-part tariff contract to coordinate the decentralized closed-loop supply chains under three different retailer co-opetition modes, and the results suggest that the optimal contractual parameters in the contracts highly rely on the remanufacturing efficiency and the competition degree between the two retailers. Several managerial insights for firms, consumers and policy makers are provided through numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Shuying Gong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Source ◽  
The Impact

Considering the impact of dual-source supply and low-carbon manufacturing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, this article constructs a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re-)manufacturer, then coordinates supply chain through cost-sharing contract. Based on the industrial case in the area of power battery, we analyze the optimal strategies under competition, cooperation, and coordination structures separately and then investigate the influences of emission reduction effort and collection efficiency on supply chain performance. The results reveal that collection of used products can positively affect the (re-)manufacturer’s profit but has opposite impact on the new component supplier. Besides, recycling is beneficial to both low-carbon consumers’ utility and social welfare, but hurts the total profit of CLSC because of the high investment cost of collection. Therefore, the paper designs a cost-sharing contract, which is of applicability and efficiency for both economic and environmental development. Furthermore, it can also increase the profit of CLSC up to cooperation case and improve each member’s profit, eliminating double marginal effect and achieving supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Measuring and eliminating the bullwhip in closed loop supply chains using control theory and Internet of Things

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christos I. Papanagnou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Bullwhip Effect ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Internet Of Things

AbstractClosed-loop supply chains are complex systems as they involve the seamless backward and forward flow of products and information. With the advent of e-commerce and online shopping, there has been a growing interest in product returns and the associated impact on inventory variance and the bullwhip effect. In this paper, a novel four-echelon closed-loop supply chain model is presented, where base-stock replenishment policies are modelled by means of a proportional controller. A stochastic state-space model is implemented, initially to capture the supply chain dynamics while the model is analysed under stationarity conditions with the aid of a covariance matrix. This allows the bullwhip effect to be expressed as a function of replenishment policies and product return rates. Next, an optimisation method is introduced to study the impact of the Internet of Things on inventory variance and the bullwhip effect. The results show that the Internet of Things can reduce costs associated with inventory fluctuations and eliminate the bullwhip effect in closed-loop supply chains.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document