scholarly journals Empirical Analysis of the Driving Factors of China’s ‘Land Finance’ Mechanism Using Soft Budget Constraint Theory and the PLS-SEM Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinhua Zhu ◽  
Yigang Wei ◽  
Yani Lai ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Sujuan Zhong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Driving Factors ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Land Transfer ◽  
Constraint Theory

“Land finance” refers to the key fiscal strategy in which local governments in China generate revenue through land grant premiums and land tax revenues. A burgeoning body of literature has focused on the driving factors of China’s land finance from different aspects including fiscal decentralization, revenue decentralization, competition among local governments, land marketization, infrastructure development, and economic development. However, little research has provided a comprehensive perspective integrating social, economic and institutional aspects to investigate the driving forces of these unique and profound issues in China. This study aims to investigate the driving factors and working mechanism of land finance. A theoretical and empirical model was proposed using soft budget constraint theory and least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). The panel data of 35 Chinese major cities were assessed between 2006 and 2015. The empirical results contend the following: (1) the land transfer and fiscal systems provide the key impetus for land financing because the land transfer system forms a stable modality, and the fiscal system is an important incentive for land financing; (2) the effects of the economic development and political system are insignificant; and (3) the political and land systems significantly influence economic development. Our contributions focus on two aspects. Firstly, a comprehensive framework of factors germane to land finance is constructed. Secondly, a new research methodology for land use study is proposed. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to employ the PLS-SEM method to delineate and verify the influence paths between multiple driving factors and land finance in different cities. Hence, research reliability can be improved.

scholarly journals Hardening the budget constraint: Institutional reform in the financial management of Hungarian local governments

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-592
Author(s):  
Tamás Vasvári
Keyword(s):  
Financial Management ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Financial Independence ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The One ◽  
Negative Messages

AbstractKornai (2014) described the problems of municipal indebtedness in Hungary and analysed the process of bailout carried out between 2011 and 2014. In the same period, the central government also reformed the local government system, which included serious limitations of their financial independence. This study re-examines the state of the soft budget constraint (SBC) of Hungarian local governments. To start, the general theoretical framework of SBC is introduced. Then, the budget constraint on the Hungarian local governments before the bailout is described briefly, followed by an assessment of the corresponding measures which were expected to offset the negative messages of the completed bailout and to harden the budget constraint. The study concludes that the central government decided to harden the budget constraint through the introduction of new hierarchical mechanisms, while the development of fiscal discipline stopped. On the one hand, this resulted in the consolidation of municipal budgets, but on the other, it was accompanied by a serious limitation of local autonomy, projects and borrowing in general, while the central government employs specific administrative tools to show favour to some settlements according to its (political) interests.

Public Finance and Soft Budgets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosella Levaggi
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Public Hospitals ◽  
Public Healthcare ◽  
Fiscal Competition ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint

The concept of soft budget constraint, describes a situation where a decision-maker finds it impossible to keep an agent to a fixed budget. In healthcare it may refer to a (nonprofit) hospital that overspends, or to a lower government level that does not balance its accounts. The existence of a soft budget constraint may represent an optimal policy from the regulator point of view only in specific settings. In general, its presence may allow for strategic behavior that changes considerably its nature and its desirability. In this article, soft budget constraint will be analyzed along two lines: from a market perspective and from a fiscal federalism perspective. The creation of an internal market for healthcare has made hospitals with different objectives and constraints compete together. The literature does not agree on the effects of competition on healthcare or on which type of organizations should compete. Public hospitals are often seen as less efficient providers, but they are also intrinsically motivated and/or altruistic. Competition for quality in a market where costs are sunk and competitors have asymmetric objectives may produce regulatory failures; for this reason, it might be optimal to implement soft budget constraint rules to public hospitals even at the risk of perverse effects. Several authors have attempted to estimate the presence of soft budget constraint, showing that they derive from different strategic behaviors and lead to quite different outcomes. The reforms that have reshaped public healthcare systems across Europe have often been accompanied by a process of devolution; in some countries it has often been accompanied by widespread soft budget constraint policies. Medicaid expenditure in the United States is becoming a serious concern for the Federal Government and the evidence from other states is not reassuring. Several explanations have been proposed: (a) local governments may use spillovers to induce neighbors to pay for their local public goods; (b) size matters: if the local authority is sufficiently big, the center will bail it out; equalization grants and fiscal competition may be responsible for the rise of soft budget constraint policies. Soft budget policies may also derive from strategic agreements among lower tiers, or as a consequence of fiscal imbalances. In this context the optimal use of soft budget constraint as a policy instrument may not be desirable.

scholarly journals PRIORITIES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERBUDGETARY TRANSFERS UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN UKRAINE

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 35-45
Author(s):  
Yana Sarnetska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Main Instrument ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

The article is devoted to the problem of the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Ukraine, taking into account fiscal decentralization trends. To perform the delegated functions, local governments need to have sufficient funding. However, the revenues of local budgets are insufficient to cover all necessary expenses. Therefore, inter-budget transfers, which in Ukraine are the main instrument of financial equalization, play an important role in ensuring the implementation of delegated powers by local governments. The aim of the article is determination of the priorities for the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in Ukraine in the context of fiscal decentralization. The research methodology combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Using quantitative methods, the principles of fiscal decentralization in Ukraine are observed through the mechanism of distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Using high-quality methods and based on the analysis, the priorities of the distribution of inter-budget transfers in the context of fiscal decentralization are formulated. An analysis of foreign publications on fiscal decentralization has shown that the uncertainty of priorities in this area reduces the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization and inhibits the economic development of regions. Prioritization of the distribution of intergovernmental transfers is preceded by the definition of principles for the distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Based on the results of a quantitative analysis, namely, the identified dynamics of fiscal decentralization indicators and the impact of the distribution of intergovernmental transfers on economic development, the following priorities for the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in fiscal decentralization are identified: supporting the prevalence of targeted transfers over non-targeted transfers, increasing the share of capital transfers, increasing the accountability of local authorities self-government regarding the use of funds received in the form of intergovernmental budget transfers.

scholarly journals SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY OF BUSINESS ENTITIES ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION OF UKRAINE

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksii Kulakov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Black Sea ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
The Black Sea ◽  
Gross Regional Product ◽  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Black Sea Region ◽  
Regional Product

Different countries invest in the Ukrainian economy by investing in regional development programs, various enterprises and so on. Investments develop the Ukrainian economy by improving the economic environment, upgrading infrastructure, improving public authorities, improving the humanitarian situation, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, introducing resource and energy-saving technologies, strengthening human rights, training workers and more. It is extremely important to intensify foreign investment in the Black Sea (southern) Region. The study shows the importance of fiscal decentralization, which is often a weak or even absent link of decentralization. One of the most common problems of fiscal decentralization is the mismatch between the responsibilities of local governments and the resources available to local governments. Thus, a well-organized system of fiscal decentralization is vital to the success of the decentralization process. It was found that most foreign direct investment in Donetsk and Odessa regions, which indicates the development of investment attractiveness of the Black Sea region of Ukraine. But in the Mykolaiv and Kherson regions there are less direct foreign investments that needs increase of investment attractiveness of the Black Sea Region of Ukraine. It is analyzed that the best indicators of capital investment in Donetsk and Odessa regions, which indicate the attraction of capital investment in the economy of the Black Sea Region of Ukraine. In Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts there are small volumes of capital investments, which demonstrate insufficient investment efficiency and it is necessary to increase the efficiency of investment projects implementation. It is investigated that the best indicators of gross regional product in Donetsk and Odessa regions, which show the development of the economy of the Black Sea region of Ukraine. In Mykolaiv and Kherson regions, the volumes of gross regional product are smaller, which show insufficient economic development and it is necessary to support small and medium business, attract new foreign investments, raise the image of the Black Sea Region of Ukraine, etc.

Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An Empirical Test

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 154-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Pettersson-Lidbom
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Soft Budget Constraint ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Empirical Framework

This paper develops an empirical framework for the problem of soft budgets which is explicitly based on a dynamic commitment problem, i.e., the inability of a supporting organization to commit itself not to extend more resources ex post to a budget-constrained organization than it was prepared to provide ex ante. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since the central government distributed a large number of fiscal transfers. The estimated soft-budget effect is economically significant: on average, a local government increases its debt by more than 20 percent by going from a hard to a soft budget constraint. (JEL D82, G32, L32)

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Fiscal Decentralization: Case Studies of European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-92
Author(s):  
Neringa Slavinskaite ◽  
Miloslav Novotny ◽  
Dainora Gedvilaitė
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Theoretical Aspect ◽  
The State ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive Effect

Fiscal decentralization has been widely discussed at various levels and from various perspectives. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD), similar to the World Bank, also pays great attention to it. Fiscal decentralization has always been an interesting investigation topic, and the researchers, in addition to considering the future of the economy, study this problem from different perspectives, i.e. geographic, political and others. The effect of fiscal decentralization on the economic development of the state has been investigated by various authors. Three different hypotheses provide the proofs of the positive effect of fiscal decentralization. The main advantage of fiscal federalism are efficient and adequate public services which are provided locally through the mobility of the citizens, voting power and competition between the local governments in the created ecosystem. The potential advantages of the competition among the local government powers are similar to the advantages associated with the competition on the private markets. The paper is focussed on fiscal decentralization of the state. It aims to investigate the theoretical aspect of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economic development to calculate the index of fiscal decentralization and to evaluate the effect of fiscal decentralization on the economic development in the particular states of the European Union. Thus, Bulgaria and Lithuania have the lowest fiscal decentralization index of EU-13 (0.28), while the Czech Republic has the highest index (0.46). The researchers have proved the effect of fiscal decentralization on the economic development of the EU-13 states to be statistically significant and positive. The originality of this paper is that it introduces a theoretical model for evaluating the fiscal decentralization effect on the economic development and assesses the fiscal decentralization effect on the economic development of the particular EU-13 states.

Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies

2004 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
A. Chernyavsky ◽  
K. Vartapetov
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Finance Reform ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Subnational Government ◽  
Tax Autonomy

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.

Asymmetrical Attribution of Performance in China

Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 978-1003
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Chen Chen ◽  
Jun Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Cultural Theory ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Mediation Model ◽  
Multilevel Mediation ◽  
Dual Pathway ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Existing studies of the impact of economic development on political trust in China have two major gaps: they fail to explain how economic development contributes to the hierarchical trust pattern, and they do not pay enough attention to the underlying mechanisms. In light of cultural theory and political control theory, we propose adapting performance theory into a theory of “asymmetrical attribution of performance” to better illuminate the case of China. This adapted theory leads to dual pathway theses: expectation fulfillment and local blaming. Using a multilevel mediation model, we show that expectation fulfillment mainly upholds trust in the central government, whereas local blaming undermines trust in local governments. We also uncover a rural–urban distinction in the dual pathway, revealing that both theses are more salient among rural Chinese.

The Rise of Anchor Institutions and the Threat to Community Health: Protecting Community Wealth, Building Community Power

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence T. Brown ◽  
Ashley Bachelder ◽  
Marisela B. Gomez ◽  
Alicia Sherrell ◽  
Imani Bryan
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Health Research ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Anchor Institutions ◽  
Health Related Research ◽  
Research Parks ◽  
Wealth Building

Academic institutions are increasingly playing pivotal roles in economic development and community redevelopment in cities around the United States. Many are functioning in the role of anchor institutions and building technology, biotechnology, or research parks to facilitate biomedical research. In the process, universities often partner with local governments, implementing policies that displace entire communities and families, thereby inducing a type of trauma that researcher Mindy Thompson Fullilove has termed “root shock.” We argue that displacement is a threat to public health and explore the ethical implications of university-led displacement on public health research, especially the inclusion of vulnerable populations into health-related research. We further explicate how the legal system has sanctioned the exercise of eminent domain by private entities such as universities and developers.Strategies that communities have employed in order to counter such threats are highlighted and recommended for communities that may be under the threat of university-led displacement. We also offer a critical look at the three dominant assumptions underlying university-sponsored development: that research parks are engines of economic development, that deconcentrating poverty via displacement is effective, and that poverty is simply the lack of economic or financial means. Understanding these fallacies will help communities under the threat of university-sponsored displacement to protect community wealth, build power, and improve health.

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