scholarly journals Moderating Effects of Agency Problems and Monitoring Systems on the Relationship between Executive Stock Option and Audit Fees: Evidence from Korea

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 4041
Author(s):  
Sang Cheol Lee ◽  
Jaewan Park ◽  
Mooweon Rhee ◽  
Yunkeun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Monitoring Systems ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
The Relationship

Since executive stock options may give rent-seeking incentives to CEOs, CEOs with stock options are likely to misallocate corporate resources to seek personal gains, which in turn may lead to a decrease in firm value. High-quality audit services can reduce the negative impacts of executive stock options on firm value and help firms to ensure sustainable growth. However, while most of the existing accounting literature related to executive stock options (ESO) is mainly focused on earnings management, there are relatively few studies that investigate the relation between ESO and audit fees. At the same time, while previous studies on ESO have been conducted in advanced countries, few studies have identified the relationship between ESO and audit fees in emerging markets. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the effect of ESO under circumstances different from those of developed countries. To fill this gap, we investigated the association between executive stock options and audit fees and examine the moderating effects of agency problems and monitoring systems on the relationship. Using 462 observations from 110 nonfinancial Korean listed companies, for the period of 2000 to 2005, we found that executive stock options are positively related to audit fees. In addition, we found that the effects of executive stock options on audit fees are even higher in firms with high agency problems, effective internal monitoring systems, and major accounting firms. This study can help regulatory agencies to validate audit fee regulations, such as the International Standard on Auditing, that consider ESO a significant risk factor. In addition, these results can help external auditors to set up the specific guidelines for pricing audit fees. Furthermore, the results of this study will contribute to the construction of more desirable corporate governance structure in Korean companies, which in turn would not only enhance firm value but also strengthen the sustainability of companies belonging to the emerging markets.

scholarly journals Kinerja Perusahaan sebagai Pemediasi Pengaruh Penerapan Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) pada Nilai Perusahaan

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 993
Author(s):  
Ni Ayu Wisma Dewi ◽  
Ida Bagus Putra Astika
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Employee Stock Option ◽  
Employee Stock Ownership ◽  
Cooperative Relationship ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Positive Effect

Limited liability company (Ltd) based on a contract cooperative relationship which is the basis of agency theory with the risk of conflict. The solution to minimize is the employee stock ownership program with the Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) strategy. The purpose of this study is to obtain empirical evidence of the relationship of stock options granted’s number to the firm value through firm performance. This research was conducted at companies listed in the BEI and conducted ESOP grants in 2014-2018. Samples obtained using purposive sampling were 48 observations. Data analysis technique used is path analysis. The results showed that the number of stock options granted had a positive effect on firm performance, firm performance had a positive effect on firm value, the number of shares options granted had a positive effect on firm value, and firm performance mediated the relationship between the number of shares options granted and firm value. Keywords: Employee Stock Option Plan; Firm Performance; Firm Value.

The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Mark J. Kohlbeck ◽  
Thomas J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Pricing Behavior ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between aggressive income-increasing real earnings management (REM) and current and future audit fees. Managers pursue REM activities to influence reported earnings and, as a consequence, alter cash flows and sacrifice firm value. We posit that the implications of REM are considered in auditors' assessments of engagement risk related to the client's economic condition and result in higher audit fees. We find that, with the exception of abnormal reductions in SG&A, aggressive income-increasing REM is positively associated with both current and future audit fees. Additional analyses provide evidence consistent with increased effort combined with increased risk contributing to the current pricing effect, with increased business risk primarily driving the future pricing effect. We, therefore, provide evidence that aggressive income-increasing REM activities have a significant influence on auditor pricing behavior, consistent with the audit framework associating engagement risk with audit fees. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

scholarly journals A Review of Employee Stock Option Plans: Panacea or Pandora’s Box for Firm Performance

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1201-1207
Author(s):  
Neha Kalra ◽  
Dr. Rajesh Bagga
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Research And Practice ◽  
Employee Stock Option ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

Employee stock option Plans (ESOPs) have gathered enormous attention in recent decades and have become the most controversial component of the compensation package. Organizations around the globe have been using ESOPs to compensate their employees at managerial and non-managerial levels. While traditionally the stock options were reserved for top management employees, lately there has been strong growth of broad-based plans primarily to increase firm value. Recent literature examining the effects of broad-based stock options are not limited to executive but available for all employees (Core and Guay, 2001; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005; Hallock and Olson, 2010, etc.). However, the shareholders have become increasingly apprehensive about the size and proliferation of adoption of stock option plans. Accordingly, they have been an issue of debate in both academic research and practice circles. The present paper outlines the theoretical foundations behind the use of ESOPs in the compensation mix and strives to address the controversy of whether or not stock options adoptions result in enhancement in firm value. Though the evidence is mixed on the implications of ESOPs, however, there exists robust support for a positive interrelationship between the adoption of these plans and firm performance for large sized firms. 

scholarly journals Executive stock options with a rebate: Valuation formula

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 76-79
Author(s):  
P.W.A. Dayananda
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Time ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Exercise Time ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
Exercise Period ◽  
Over Time

We examine the valuation of executive stock option award where there is a rebate at exercise. The rebate depends on the performance of the stock of the corporation over time the period concerned; in particular we consider the situation where the executive can purchase the stock at exercise time at discount proportional to the minimum value of the stock price over the exercise period. Valuation formulae are provided both when assessment is done in discrete time as well as in continuous time. Some numerical illustrations are also presented

scholarly journals Risk metrics: assessing executive stock options plans

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-413
Author(s):  
P.W.A. Dayananda
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Executive Stock Option

This paper considers deriving measures for assessing the benefits to firms as a result of granting executive stock option plans. The metrics developed relate to assessing the expected total earnings of the company attributed to executives due to executive stock option award. The paper derives metrics based on number of shares as well as on total value of assets. The values of these metrics can be used to compare and asses the benefits to the company in awarding stock option grants by comparing the metrics with actual realized changes in total earnings. The research work in the paper complements the empirical research of Murphy (1999) and others who found the pay-performance sensitivities due to executive stock option awards. Illustrations of the metrics are carried out to show their properties and in particular for the firm WAL-MART.

scholarly journals The Relationship Between Segment-Level Manipulations And Audit Fees

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 1243 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hurtt ◽  
Bradley E. Lail ◽  
Jason MacGregor
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Risk Assessments ◽  
Net Income ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Segment Reporting ◽  
The Relationship

We examine the auditorssensitivity to manipulative financial reporting by investigating the relationbetween audit fees and segment-level manipulations. Segment reporting provides an interestingsetting to examine auditor risk assessments because of the discretion affordedto management under existing regulations. Segment manipulations, a form of classificationsmoothing, are not in violation of accounting standards; nevertheless, thesemanipulations violate the spirit of faithful representation by distorting theperformance of a subset of the reporting unit at the expense of (or to thebenefit) of another subset. Because disaggregatedinformation is used by analysts and investors in bottom-upforecasting, these distortions can influence firm value even though they do notaffect bottom-line net income. Ourmeasure of classification smoothing measurescost shifting between core operating segments and non-core segments to proxyfor segment manipulation. We find thataudit fees, a proxy for the auditors risk assessment, have a positiveassociation with segment-level manipulations. Subsequent analyses suggest that higher auditfees are also due to the additional effort exerted in the presence of segment-levelmanipulations. Further, auditors appearjustified in charging higher fees to clients that engage in segmentmanipulations as we document evidence of a positive association betweenrestatements and segment-level manipulations. Collectively, these results suggest thatauditors are aware of the risk associated with companies that engage in segment-levelmanipulations and auditors respond appropriately by charging higher fees anddoing additional work.

Finance, corporate value and credit market freedom in overinvesting US firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1053-1072
Author(s):  
Alfonsina Iona ◽  
Marco Alberto De Benedetto ◽  
Dawit Zerihun Assefa ◽  
Michele Limosani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Finance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
The State ◽  
Corporate Value ◽  
Content Type ◽  
External Finance ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Using a sample of US firms more likely to be affected by agency problems, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate value and financial policies and to study whether credit market freedom (CMF) affects this relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors identify a sub-sample of non-financial US firms potentially affected by agency problems using a joint criterion of over-investment and high cash-holdings. A generalized method of moment econometric framework is then used to estimate the impact of cash-holdings and leverage policies on firm value for this sub-sample. This exercise is also performed by taking into account the level of CMF of the state where the firm operates. Findings The results show that the relationship between cash-holdings – or leverage – and firm value is “U-shaped.” In addition, when the authors focus on the role played by the level of CMF, the authors find a number of interesting facts: CMF facilitates the firms’ access to external finance, thereby relaxing the need of internal funds for investing; the relationship between cash-holdings and firm value is “U-shaped” only in states enjoying high levels of CMF; the probability of observing firms more likely to be affected by agency problems is higher in states with high levels of CMF. Research limitations/implications The empirical findings provide important insights to policymakers, shareholders and practitioners. To policymakers, the results suggest that providing institutional environments with greater CMF can enhance the firm access to external finance, the level of corporate investment and the economic growth. To shareholders, the findings highlight that the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders may be more severe in states with higher CMF; therefore, adequate financing policies and corporate governance mechanisms must be used to mitigate these conflicts and maximize the firm value. Finally, to practitioners, the evidence suggests that, in valuing a firm, they must take into consideration whether the economic environment provides managers with more freedom to stockpile cash and invest sub-optimally. Originality/value The paper contributes to the corporate finance and governance literature in two respects. First, it provides new evidence on the shape of the relationship between cash holdings and firm value for firms affected by empire-building managers. Second, at the best of the knowledge, it is the first corporate finance study, which analyzes the role played by the CMF at the state level on the capital structure and the level of investment of the firms.

scholarly journals Disproportionate Insider Control and the Demand for Audit Quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arno Forst ◽  
Barry R. Hettler
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
The Relationship

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between disproportionate insider control, enabled through dual-class share structures, and the demand for audit quality. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms, we find that, consistent with outside shareholders' increased demand for external monitoring, as well as self-bonding by entrenched insiders, disproportionate insider control is positively associated with the propensity to hire a Big 4 or industry specialist auditor, auditor independence, and audit fees. Corroborating a self-bonding explanation, additional analyses show that audit quality mitigates the negative association of disproportionate insider control and firm value. In expanded analyses, we also investigate the separate effects of insider voting and cash flow rights on the demand for audit quality in dual-class firms. Consistent with general agency theory, we find a decreased (increased) demand for audit quality from incentive-alignment (entrenchment) effects of ownership.

Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets, and Earnings Management

2008 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Lea McAnally ◽  
Anup Srivastava ◽  
Connie D. Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Annual Data ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Anecdotal Evidence ◽  
Strike Price ◽  
Earnings Targets

This paper examines whether stock-option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock-price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior option grant studies explore only general downward earnings management (Balsam et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2003), but our study is the first to explore whether option grants encourage missed earnings targets. Indeed, if missed targets drive the prior results, then the literature has failed to document an important negative outcome of stock-option incentives. We use quarterly and annual data for fixed-date options granted after firms announce they have missed earnings targets. We find that firms that miss earnings targets have larger and more valuable subsequent grants. Further, we find that the likelihood of missing earnings targets for firms that manage earnings downward increases with stock-option grants. To control for the possibility that firms miss earnings targets for operational reasons, we only include firms that likely managed earnings downward (Dechow et al. 1995; Phillips et al. 2003). Backdating or opportunistic timing of grants cannot explain our results because we include only fixed-date grants. While many studies explicitly consider whether and why managers meet or beat earnings targets, ours is the first study to find that some managers may seek to miss earnings targets (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).

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