scholarly journals Standing by or Standing Up?—How Philosophy Can (In)form Our Understanding of Bystander Behaviours in Workplace Bullying Dynamics

Societies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Declan Fahie ◽  
Gerry Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Workplace Bullying ◽  
Interdisciplinary Collaboration ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Subject Field ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
Standing Up ◽  
Traditional Scholarship

There is increasing awareness of the value of interdisciplinary collaboration within academia. Scholars argue that by drawing upon the conceptual, methodological, and interrogative paradigms of at least two disparate disciplines, researchers are challenged to re-evaluate and reconsider their own discipline-centric assumptions. A consequence of such purposeful boundary-blurring is an increased rigour and richness in the analysis of raw data, as well as the development of revealing insights through the novel application of discrete conceptual perspectives and theories. In such a way, dominant, taken-for-granted methodological and analytical assumptions are destabilised, as researchers are obliged to embrace contrasting perspectives while reassessing the epistemological foundations of their work. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of bystander responses to workplace bullying dynamics. While traditional scholarship into workplace bullying emanates from disciplines such as business, psychology, law, medicine and sociology, for example, this paper argues that philosophy, as a subject/field, may provide the researcher with a fresh interrogative lens through which to (re)view the phenomenon of workplace bullying, along with the consequential response of bystanders to such noxious behaviours. It suggests that, by drawing upon the philosophical concept of virtue ethics—which posits the question “What would a good or virtuous person do?”—we are afforded a robust theoretical framework to support a thoughtful and reasoned destabilization of contemporary perspectives on bystander behaviours and motivations.

scholarly journals Why helping the victims of disasters makes me a better person: Towards an anthropological theory of humanitarian action

Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleni M Kalokairinou
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Developmental Process ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Humanitarian Action ◽  
Anthropological Theory ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Right ◽  
Difficult Situations

AbstractIn this paper I examine which is the most appropriate moral theory for dealing with disaster bioethics contexts. It is pointed out that, contrary to what is usually believed, moral theories of right action cannot actually guide us in such difficult situations. Instead, it is claimed that a virtue ethics theory of an Aristotelian version, which gives emphasis not only on the virtuous person but also on the relevant developmental process of becoming virtuous, can provide us with the right theoretical framework for coping with the problems which the victims of such disastrous situations face.

scholarly journals Preoperative Considerations in Order to Resume Elective Surgery During COVID-19 Pandemic

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 42-43
Author(s):  
Bogdan I. Vintilă ◽  
Alina Simona Bereanu ◽  
Ioana R. Codru ◽  
Mihai Sava
Keyword(s):  
Elective Surgery ◽  
Interdisciplinary Collaboration ◽  
Health Care Facilities ◽  
Surgical Patient ◽  
The Novel ◽  
High Quality Medical Care ◽  
Therapeutic Procedures ◽  
Socio Economic Impact ◽  
Novel Coronavirus ◽  
Quality Medical Care

Abstract The alarming spread of the novel Coronavirus necessitated the cessation of elective therapeutic procedures in most health-care facilities. This strategy has limited the spread of the virus, but with a huge socio-economic impact. For this reason, the resumption of elective surgery in the context of the coronavirus pandemic is a difficult, but necessary process. Addressing this delicate situation requires interdisciplinary collaboration, so as to ensure high quality medical care for all patients, with consideration to protection of the staff involved in the care of the surgical patient.

scholarly journals A Tradução Intersemiótica na construção da personagem Holly Golithly em Breakfast at Tiffany’s: entre o romance e o cinema

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (44) ◽  
pp. 246-259
Author(s):  
Sinara De Oliveira Branco ◽  
Mariana Assis Maciel
Keyword(s):  
Image Analysis ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Film Adaptation ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Multimodal Corpus ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this text is to analyze the intersemiotic construction of Holly Golithly in two contexts: the novel and the film Breakfast at Tiffany's (1961). Along the film adaptation, the focus will be on the observation of how people and places influence her behaviour, taking into consideration the relationship between the imagetic and the verbal contexts (word-image relationship). The theoretical framework used is based on the Theory of Adaptation; the Intersemiotic Translation; Subtitling; Image Analysis and Film Narrative. The multimodal corpus compiled involves the selected scenes from the film, offering frames and subtitles, as well as excerpts from the novel. Results have shown how the character has changed in the film adaptation regarding her construction in the film narrative. With the application of intersemiotic translation, it was possible to observe how the analysis of the scenes and subtitles help with the construction and the interpretation of the character.

Would a Virtuous Person Grandstand?

Grandstanding ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi ◽  
Brandon Warmke
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
General Character ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
Slave Revolt ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Moral Talk ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.

Virtue ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Good Life

Virtue ethics has its origin in the ancient world, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It has been revived following an article by G. E. M. Anscombe critical of modern ethics and advocating a return to the virtues. Some have argued that virtue ethics constitutes a third option in moral theory additional to utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarians and Kantians have responded vigorously, plausibly claiming that their views already incorporate many of the theses allegedly peculiar to virtue ethics. Virtue theory, the study of notions, such as character, related to the virtues, has led to the recultivation of barren areas. These include: What is the good life, and what part does virtue play in it? How stringent are the demands of morality? Are moral reasons independent of agents’ particular concerns? Is moral rationality universal? Is morality to be captured in a set of rules, or is the sensitivity of a virtuous person central in ethics? From virtue ethics, and the virtue theory of which it is a part, have emerged answers to these questions at once rooted in ancient views and yet distinctively modern.

Virtue ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Good Life

Virtue ethics has its origin in the ancient world, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It has been revived following an article by G.E.M. Anscombe critical of modern ethics and advocating a return to the virtues. Some have argued that virtue ethics constitutes a third option in moral theory additional to utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarians and Kantians have responded vigorously, plausibly claiming that their views already incorporate many of the theses allegedly peculiar to virtue ethics. Virtue theory, the study of notions, such as character, related to the virtues, has led to the recultivation of barren areas. These include: What is the good life, and what part does virtue play in it? How stringent are the demands of morality? Are moral reasons independent of agents’ particular concerns? Is moral rationality universal? Is morality to be captured in a set of rules, or is the sensitivity of a virtuous person central in ethics? From virtue ethics, and the virtue theory of which it is a part, have emerged answers to these questions at once rooted in ancient views and yet distinctively modern.

Relationality, Reciprocity, and Flourishing in an African Landscape

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hannis ◽  
Sian Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics

The chapter considers the environmental ethics underlying certain practices and beliefs observed in the course of field research with primarily ||Khao-a Dama people in west Namibia. ||Khao-a Dama perspectives embody a type of “relational environmental ethics” that refracts anthropocentric/ecocentric dichotomies, and is characterized by respect for, and reciprocity with, agency and intentionality as located in entities beyond the human (ancestors, spirits, animals, healing plants and rain). The chapter connects this worldview with contemporary environmental virtue ethics, arguing that it is compatible with a theoretical framework of “ecological eudaimonism” as a fitting response to a complex contemporary world of “wicked” environmental problems.

Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-97
Author(s):  
JEREMY REID
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Seminal Article ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Taking Responsibility

AbstractIn her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions.

LANCE ARMSTRONG AND THE SCARLET C

Think ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (36) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Alan Belk
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Good Society ◽  
Tour De France

Cyclist Lance Armstrong cheated his way to seven Tour de France ‘victories’. Such cheating is wrong because it harms society. To explain how that harm affects all of us, I use Aristotle's ideas of virtue ethics to argue that Armstrong, despite his charitable work, is not a virtuous person. Virtue is to some extent determined by society, so we need to be clear that Armstrong is not a person to emulate. A society which does not clearly disapprove of vice is less than it might otherwise be because a good society is one that encourages virtue in its citizens.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document