scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic Framework to Preserve Location Information Privacy in Location-based Service Applications

Sensors ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mulugeta Kassaw Tefera ◽  
Xiaolong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Privacy Protection ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Location Based Service ◽  
Selfish Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic

Recently, the growing ubiquity of location-based service (LBS) technology has increased the likelihood of users’ privacy breaches due to the exposure of their real-life information to untrusted third parties. Extensive use of such LBS applications allows untrusted third-party adversarial entities to collect large quantities of information regarding users’ locations over time, along with their identities. Due to the high risk of private information leakage using resource-constrained smart mobile devices, most LBS users may not be adequately encouraged to access all LBS applications. In this paper, we study the use of game theory to protect users against private information leakage in LBSs due to malicious or selfish behavior of third-party observers. In this study, we model a scenario of privacy protection gameplay between a privacy protector and an outside visitor and then derive the situation of the prisoner’s dilemma game to analyze the traditional privacy protection problems. Based on the analysis, we determine the corresponding benefits to both players using a point of view that allows the visitor to access a certain amount of information and denies further access to the user’s private information when exposure of privacy is forthcoming. Our proposed model uses the collection of private information about historical access data and current LBS access scenario to effectively determine the probability that the visitor’s access is an honest one. Moreover, we present the procedures involved in the privacy protection model and framework design, using game theory for decision-making. Finally, by employing a comparison analysis, we perform some experiments to assess the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed game-theoretic model over the traditional solutions.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Choosing a Valuable Good via a Short List Heuristic

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 199 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Search Procedure ◽  
Short List ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
High Level

The Internet gives access to a huge amount of data at the click of a mouse. This is very helpful when consumers are making decisions about which product to buy. However, the final decision to purchase is still generally made by humans who have limited memory and perception. The short list heuristic is often used when there are many offers on the market. Searchers first find information about offers via the Internet and on this basis choose a relatively small number of offers to view in real life. Although such rules are often used in practice, little research has been carried out on determining, for example, what the size of the short list should be depending on the parameters of the problem or modelling how the short list heuristic can be implemented when there are multiple decision makers. This article presents a game theoretic model of such a search procedure with two players. These two players can be interpreted, for example, as a couple searching for a flat or a second-hand car. The model indicates that under such a search procedure the roles of searchers should only be divided when the preferences of the players are coherent or there is a high level of goodwill between them. In other cases, dividing the roles leads to a high level of conflict.

Scheduling Multi-Workflows Over Heterogeneous Virtual Machines With a Multi-Stage Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wu ◽  
Yuandou Wang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Scientific Workflow ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Heterogeneous Cloud ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

Cloud computing, with dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to geographically distributed computational capabilities, is becoming an increasingly popular platform for the execution of scientific applications such as scientific workflows. Scheduling multiple workflows over cloud infrastructures and resources is well recognized to be NP-hard and thus critical to meeting various types of Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. In this work, the authors consider a multi-objective scientific workflow scheduling framework based on the dynamic game-theoretic model. It aims at reducing make-spans, cloud cost, while maximizing system fairness in terms of workload distribution among heterogeneous cloud virtual machines (VMs). The authors consider randomly-generated scientific workflow templates as test cases and carry out extensive real-world tests based on third-party commercial clouds. Experimental results show that their proposed framework outperforms traditional ones by achieving lower make-spans, lower cost, and better system fairness.

Strategic promotion, reputation, and responsiveness in bureaucratic hierarchies

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinyu Fan ◽  
Feng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Supportive Evidence ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
The Future ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Promotion Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Government Responsiveness

While existing studies usually model promotion as a bilateral interaction between promoter and promotee, it is not uncommon that the promoter is under the influence of a third party. For instance, authoritarian rulers may consider how their interactions with local agents change the way that citizens view them. Similarly, a mid-tier officer in a bureaucratic hierarchy often concerns herself with her image in the eyes of her superior when managing her subordinates. In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model to investigate promotion strategies when promoters have reputation concerns. We show that promoters can use promotion as a signaling tool, where she can deliberately postpone promoting the subordinate to enhance her own reputation. Furthermore, the promoter has extra incentives to shirk, knowing that she can manipulate promotion in the future. Thus, strategic promotions decrease government responsiveness. Counter-intuitively, such a decrease is more severe when intra-bureaucracy information is more transparent. In other words, transparency may do more harm than good. We conduct a case study of the Chinese bureaucracy and provide supportive evidence.

Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

scholarly journals An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Guarnaschelli ◽  
Richard D. McKelvey ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Group Data ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Jury Decision

We present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatment variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vote deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule: A large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contrary to Feddersen and Pesendorfer, in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium.

Explaining the Schwarzenegger Phenomenon: Local Frontrunners in Climate Policy

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 82-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Urpelainen
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
Private Information ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Local Climate ◽  
National Regulation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The surge of local climate policy is a puzzling political-economic phenomenon. Why have local policy-makers, incapable of mitigating global warming through individual emissions reductions, adopted ambitious policies while national governments refrain from action? I construct a game-theoretic model of two-level climate policy with incomplete information over political benefits. In equilibrium, the government selects a lax national regulation, and local policy-makers with private information on high local benefits choose more ambitious policies despite incentives to free ride. The analysis also suggests that even though local policy-makers prefer not to reveal information to the government, they must do so to pursue short-term political gains. Counterintuitively, new information can lead to more ambitious national regulation even if the government learns that the local political benefits are likely lower than expected. As an empirical application, I study the evolution of climate policies in the United States.

Group Size and Collective Action

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARUN AGRAWAL ◽  
SANJEEV GOYAL
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Distinctive Aspect ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Large Groups

This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.

The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROGER B. MYERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem ◽  
Constitutional State ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Credibility Problem

A political leader's temptation to deny costly debts to past supporters is a central moral-hazard problem in politics. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to probe the consequences of this moral-hazard problem for leaders who compete to establish political regimes. In contests for power, absolute leaders who are not subject to third-party judgments can credibly recruit only limited support. A leader can do better by organizing supporters into a court which could cause his downfall. In global negotiation-proof equilibria, leaders cannot recruit any supporters without such constitutional checks. Egalitarian norms make recruiting costlier in oligarchies, which become weaker than monarchies. The ruler's power and limitations on entry of new leaders are derived from focal-point effects in games with multiple equilibria. The relationships of trust between leaders and their supporters are personal constitutions which underlie all other political constitutions.

A game-theoretic approach to evaluating the competitiveness of container carriers in the Northeast Asian shipping market

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 854-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byung-In Park ◽  
Hokey Min
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Actual Case ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Northeast Asian ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Purpose In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics. Findings This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand. Originality/value This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

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