scholarly journals Islamophobia, “Clash of Civilizations”, and Forging a Post-Cold War Order!

Religions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hatem Bazian

Islamophobia, as a problem, is often argued to be a rational choice by the stereotypical media coverage of Islam and Muslims, even though it points to the symptom rather than the root cause. Islamophobia reemerges in public discourses and part of state policies in the post-Cold War period and builds upon latent Islamophobia that is sustained in the long history of Orientalist and stereotypical representation of Arabs, Muslims, and Islam itself. The book What is Islamophobia? Racism, Social Movements and the State, edited by Narzanin Massoumi, Tom Mills, and David Miller offers a unique contribution to how best to define and locate the problem of demonizing Islam and Muslims in the contemporary period. The three scholars provide a more critical and structural approach to the subject by offering what they call the “five pillars of Islamophobia”, which are the following: (1) the institutions and machinery of the state; (2) the far-right, incorporating the counter-jihad movement; (3) the neoconservative movement; (4) the transnational Zionist movement; and (5) the assorted liberal groupings including the pro-war left and the new atheist movement. The UK-based research group correctly situates Islamophobia within existing power structures and examines the forces that consciously produce anti-Muslim discourses, the Islamophobia industry, within a broad political agenda rather than the singular focus on the media. Islamophobia emerges from the “Clash of Civilizations” ideological warriors and not merely as a problem of media stereotyping, representation, and over-emphasis on the Muslim subject. In this article, I maintain that Islamophobia is an ideological construct that emerges in the post-Cold War era with the intent to rally the Western world and the American society at a moment of perceived fragmentation after the collapse of the Soviet Union in a vastly and rapidly changing world system. Islamophobia, or the threat of Islam, is the ingredient, as postulated in Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis that is needed to affirm the Western self-identify after the end of the Cold War and a lack of a singular threat or purpose through which to define, unify, and claim the future for the West. Thus, Islamophobia is the post-Cold War ideology to bring about a renewed purpose and crafting of the Western and American self.

Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


2001 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 19-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Fuller

This piece, completed one month after the events of 11 September, examines the sociological presuppositions of the major intellectual and journalistic frameworks used to understand the unfolding ‘war on terrorism’. The major frameworks include sociobiology, theodicy, political realism and ‘the clash of civilizations’. Mainstream sociological theorizing has been largely absent from the debate, and some of its more fashionable claims (e.g. about our ‘informatized world-order’) may even be cast into doubt. In general the discussion has resembled the old ‘Cold War’ rhetoric that was supposedly laid to rest with the fall of the Soviet Union, with ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islam’ replacing the threats previously posed by ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘Communism’. The sociology we teach our students may influence whether this tendency continues.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-101
Author(s):  
Aziz Douai

Western-Muslim relations have experienced long periods of peaceful coexistence,fruitful co-operation, and close interactions that have enriched both civilizations.And yet an alien observer of our mainstream media could be forgivenfor concluding that “Islam” and the “West” can never co-exist in peace becausethey seem to have nothing in common. In fact, the intermittent violence interruptingthese long peaceful interactions – from the Crusades to the “War onTerror” – has constituted the core of most mainstream media coverage and“scholarship” purporting to “study” and “explain” these relations.In a zero-sum power game, these dominant frameworks emphasize thatsuch a “clash” is inevitable. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”theory has become the best known articulation and deployment of “conflict”as an “explanatory” framework for understanding current and past Muslim-West interactions. Simply put, existential, cultural, and religious chasmshave put the Muslim world on a collision course with the western world, aproblem that is most exacerbated by the presence of “Islam” and Muslimcommunities in western societies (Huntington, 1993).1 His thesis appearsto ignore each civilization’s internal diversity and pluralism and to be willfullyoblivious to the inter- and intra-civilizational interactions and centuriesoldco-existence, as Edward Said argued in his rebuttal: “Clash of Ignorance”(2001).  Beyond the broadest generalizations, after all, what do “Islam” and the“West” mean? How long can we afford to “ignore” the “porousness” and “ambiguity”of their geographical and cultural borders? Is “conflict” between thesetwo realms inevitable? How about the centuries-old dialogue between thesecivilizations, the “Self” and the “Other”? How can researchers and intellectualsdeploy their inter-disciplinary insights and scholarship to address both thereal and the perceived civilizational “chasms”?These questions constitute the overarching themes of some very importantscholarship published in three recent books: Engaging the Other: Public Policyand Western-Muslim Intersections, edited by Karim H. Karim and MahmoudEid; Re-Imagining the Other: Culture, Media, and Western-Muslim Intersections,edited by Mahmoud Eid and Karim H. Karim; and the Routledge Handbookof Islam in the West, edited by Roberto Tottoli. With rich methodologicalapproaches, broad theoretical lenses, and diverse topics, these three books offera unique platform to build both a holistic and nuanced understanding of thecontingencies and intricacies surrounding “Islam” and the “West.” ...


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimia Zare ◽  
Habibollah Saeeidinia

Iran and Russia have common interests, especially in political terms, because of the common borders and territorial neighborhood. This has led to a specific sensitivity to how the two countries are approaching each other. Despite the importance of the two countries' relations, it is observed that in the history of the relations between Iran and Russia, various issues and issues have always been hindered by the close relations between the two countries. The beginning of Iran-Soviet relations during the Second Pahlavi era was accompanied by issues such as World War II and subsequent events. The relations between the two countries were influenced by the factors and system variables of the international system, such as the Cold War, the US-Soviet rivalry, the Second World War and the entry of the Allies into Iran, the deconstruction of the relations between the two post-Cold War superpowers, and so on.The main question of the current research is that the political relations between Iran and Russia influenced by the second Pahlavi period?To answer this question, the hypothesis was that Iran's political economic relations were fluctuating in the second Pahlavi era and influenced by the changing system theory of the international system with the Soviet Union. The findings suggest that various variables such as the structure of the international system and international events, including World War II, the arrival of controversial forces in Iran, the Cold War, the post-Cold War, the US and Soviet policies, and the variables such as the issue of oil Azerbaijan's autonomy, Tudeh's actions in Iran, the issue of fisheries and borders. Also, the policies adopted by Iranian politicians, including negative balance policy, positive nationalism and independent national policy, have affected Iran-Soviet relations. In a general conclusion, from 1320 (1942) to 1357 (1979), the relationship between Iran and Russia has been an upward trend towards peaceful coexistence. But expansion of further relations in the economic, technical and cultural fields has been political rather than political.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bryc

Russia attempts to revise a Western-led liberal world order. However, challenging the West seems to be a strategy aimed at improving Russia’s international standing. This strategy is undoubtedly ambiguous as Russia challenges the West, particularity the United States, and looks for a rapprochement at the same time.The Russian Federation abandoned the West in 2014 as a result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula what constituted breaking international law, andengagement into the war in the East Ukraine. Nevertheless, the milestone was not 2014, but 2008 when Russia had decided for the first time to use its militar yforce against Georgia and indirectly against the growing Western military and political presence in this post-Soviet republic. This game changer was hardly a surprise, because several signals of a desire to challenge the Western-led world order had appeared in the past at least twice in president Putin’s speeches in 2007 at Munich Security Conference and in 2014 during Valdai Club session in Sochi. This article seeks to provide a take in the discussion about the way Russia has been trying to reshape the post-Cold War order. This paper probes the notion that Russia has become a revisionist state trying to shape a post-Western world order. Besides, there are a few questions to be answered, first of all whether anti-Westernism is in fact its goal or rather an instrument in regaining more effective impact on international politics and how it may influence the post-ColdWar order despite its reduced political and economic potential.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

Otto von Bismarck famously said that “God has special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Divine providence may not have hurt, but it was America’s domestic political institutions that transformed a smattering of British colonies in North America into, first, an independent nation and, then, a global superpower with a network of allies and partners spanning six continents. The United States faced off against the Soviet Union for a half century during the Cold War. But Washington possessed the better institutions, and the stress of the competition caused Moscow’s political system to collapse altogether. In the post–Cold War period that followed, Washington deepened and expanded the Pax Americana, and spread unprecedented levels of global peace, prosperity, and freedom. For the first time since Ancient Rome, a single superpower so overawed any potential competitors that great power rivalry itself came to a temporary halt.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Scribner

After descending an escalator of his hotel at Central Park West on a June day in 2015, Donald Trump ascended a podium and proceeded to accuse Mexico of “sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us (sic). They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists” (Time 2015). It was a moment that marked the launch of his bid for president of the United States. From that point forward, Trump made immigration restriction one of the centerpieces of his campaign. Paired with an economically populist message, the nativist rhetoric shaped a narrative that helped launch him to the White House. His effectiveness partly lay in his ability to understand and exploit preexisting insecurities, partly in his outsider status, and partly in his willingness to tap into apparently widespread public sentiment that is uneasy with, if not overtly hostile to, migrants. This paper will try to make sense of the restrictionist logic that informs the Trump administration's worldview, alongside some of the underlying cultural, philosophical, and political conditions that inspired support for Trump by millions of Americans. This paper contends that the Clash of Civilizations (CoC) paradigm is a useful lens to help understand the positions that President Trump has taken with respect to international affairs broadly, and specifically in his approach to migration policy. This paradigm, originally coined by the historian Bernard Lewis but popularized by the political theorist Samuel Huntington (Hirsh 2016), provides a conceptual framework for understanding international relations following the end of the Cold War. It is a framework that emphasizes the importance of culture, rather than political ideology, as the primary fault line along which future conflicts will occur. Whether Trump ever consciously embraced such a framework in the early days of his candidacy is doubtful. He has been candid about the fact that he has never spent much time reading and generally responds to problems on instinct and “common sense” rather than a conceptually defined worldview developed by academics and intellectuals (Fisher 2016). Nevertheless, during the presidential campaign, and continuing after his victory, Trump surrounded himself with high-level advisers, political appointees, and staff who, if they have nothing else in common, embrace something roughly akin to the Clash of Civilizations perspective (Ashford 2016).2 The paper will focus primarily on Trump's approach to refugee resettlement. One might think that refugees would elicit an almost knee-jerk sympathy given the tragic circumstances that drove their migration, but perceptions of refugees are often tied up with geopolitical considerations and domestic political realities. Following 9/11, the threat of Islamic-inspired terrorism emerged as a national security priority. With the onset of the Syrian Civil War and the significant refugee crisis that ensued in its wake, paired with some high-profile terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe, the “Islamic threat” became even more pronounced. The perception that Islamic-inspired terrorism is a real and imminent threat has contributed to a growing antagonism toward the resettlement of refugees, and particularly Muslims. When viewed through the lens of the CoC paradigm, victims of persecution can easily be transformed into potential threats. Insofar as Islam is understood as an external and even existential threat to the American way life, the admission of these migrants and refugees could be deemed a serious threat to national security. This paper will begin by examining some of Trump's campaign promises and his efforts to implement them during the early days of his administration. Although the underlying rationale feeding into the contemporary reaction against refugee resettlement is unique in many respects, it is rooted in a much longer history that extends back to the World War II period. It was during this period that a more formal effort to admit refugees began, and it was over the next half century that the program developed. Understanding the historical backdrop, particularly insofar as its development was influenced by the Cold War context, will help to clarify some of the transitions that influenced the reception of refugees in the decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. Such an exploration also helps to explain how and why a CoC paradigm has become ascendant. The decline of the ideologically driven conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has, according Huntington's thesis, been superseded by culturally based conflicts that occur when competing civilizations come into contact. The conceptual framework that the CoC framework embodies meshes well with the cultural and economic dislocation felt by millions of Trump supporters who are concerned about the continued dissolution of a shared cultural and political heritage. It is important to keep in mind that the CoC paradigm, as a conceptual framework for understanding Donald Trump and his approach to refugee resettlement and migration more broadly, is at its core pre-political; it helps to define the cultural matrix that people use to make sense of the world. The policy prescriptions that follow from it are more effect than cause.


2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucan A. Way ◽  
Steven Levitsky

This article examines coercive capacity and its impact on autocratic regime stability in the context of post-Soviet Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. In the post-Cold War era, different types of coercive acts require different types of state power. First, high intensity and risky measures – such as firing on large crowds or stealing elections – necessitate high degrees of cohesion or compliance within the state apparatus. Second, effective low intensity measures – including the surveillance and infiltration of opposition, and various forms of less visible police harassment – require extensive state scope or a well-trained state apparatus that penetrates large parts of society. Coercive state capacity, rooted in cohesion and scope, has often been more important than opposition strength in determining whether autocrats fall or remain in power. Thus, the regime in Armenia that was backed by a highly cohesive state with extensive scope was able to maintain power in the face of highly mobilized opposition challenges. By contrast, regimes in Georgia where the state lacked cohesion and scope fell in the face of even weakly mobilized opposition. Relatively high scope but only moderate cohesion in Belarus and Ukraine has made autocratic regimes in these countries generally more effective at low intensity coercion to prevent the emergence of opposition than at high intensity coercion necessary to face down serious opposition challenges.


Author(s):  
Conor Tobin

In December 1979, Soviet troops entered the small, poor, landlocked, Islamic nation of Afghanistan, assassinated the communist president, Hafizullah Amin, and installed a more compliant Afghan leader. For almost ten years, Soviet troops remained entrenched in Afghanistan before finally withdrawing in February 1989. During this period, the United States undertook a covert program to assist the anti-communist Afghan insurgents—the mujahideen—to resist the Soviet occupation. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter’s small-scale authorization in July 1979, the secret war became the largest in history under President Ronald Reagan, running up to $700 million per year. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) acted as the war’s quartermaster, arranging supplies of weapons for the mujahideen, which were funneled through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), in coordination with Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt, and others. No Americans were directly involved in the fighting, and the overall cost to the American taxpayer was in the region of $2 billion. The Afghan cost was much higher. Over a million Afghans were killed, a further two million wounded, and over six million refugees fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. For the Soviet Union, the ten-year war constituted its largest military action in the postwar era, and the long and protracted nature of the conflict and the failure of the Red Army to subdue the Afghans is partially responsible for the internal turmoil that contributed to the eventual breakup of the Soviet empire at the end of the 1980s. The defeat of the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan proved to be the final major superpower battle of the Cold War, but it also marked the beginning of a new era. The devastation and radicalization of Afghan society resulted in the subsequent decades of continued conflict and warfare and the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism that has shaped the post-Cold War world.


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